1.
The aim of this thread is to sketch a Nietzschean typology, rank-ordering human beings into basic types and subtypes.
2.
In Lampert's _Leo Strauss and Nietzsche_, there's a section titled A TYPOLOGY OF MORALS WITH ONLY TWO MORAL TYPES, in which he writes:
"At issue is the great Nietzschean theme of the genealogy of conscience, the history of morals that lays bare our spiritual past as the conflict between an instinct to obedience and an instinct to command. These two instincts define the two basic types of human beings and the two different moralities that fit or belong to them." (op.cit., page 73.)
These moralities are what Nietzsche called master morality and slave or herd morality. (I propose that we call the latter "herd morality", for even though it's basically the same as slave morality, the slave--the man of ressentiment--is not simply a herd animal; the man of ressentiment is a master type who has been enslaved--someone who still has chaos within him, a blond beast within him, which however is caged, suppressed, so it can only lacerate _itself_. The slave is the man who resents all chaos, all creativity, all will to power--but it's really his own suppressed will to power which secretly rages against itself! [Men of ressentiment and herd members tend to adopt the same morality, but for different reasons. Herd morality is not really decadent. Sure, the third class Nietzsche mentions in AC 57 consists of people with a significantly lower level of vitality than members of the first and second classes; but they are still "healthy peasants and healthy half-human animals" (WP 1051).])
3.
So now we have the two most basic types, the master type and the herd type. But in section 57 of _The Antichrist(ian)_, Nietzsche distinguishes not two but _three_ basic types:
"In every healthy society there are three types which condition each other and gravitate differently physiologically; each has its own hygiene, its own field of work, its own sense of perfection and mastery. Nature, not Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual [_geistig_, also "intellectual"] ones, those who are pre-eminently strong in muscle and temperament, and those, the third type, who excel neither in one respect nor in the other, the mediocre ones--the last as the great majority, the first as the elite." (ib., Kaufmann translation.)
In the OP of a thread about this to which I will link below, I wrote in 2010:
"I think said muscular strength follows from said strength of temperament, as those with a stronger temperament naturally exert themselves more. We have then _two_ qualities: intellectuality and strength of temperament. The three types are then 1) those who stand out for the former quality; 2) those who stand out for the latter quality; and 3) those who stand out for neither."
And, in an even older post I quoted there, I wrote:
"In Hindu thought there are the three _gunas_, or modes of nature. They are rajas, sattva, and tamas. The highest of these is sattva, the lowest, tamas. Let us first consider the middle one, rajas. [...] It is the 'lust to rule' or 'passion for power' (_Herrschsucht_) praised by Zarathustra in his speech Of the Three Evils. It is the will to power--the will to dominion (lordship).
'Will' is a resultant. It results from a coordination of forces, which stimulate each other. If these forces are not well coordinated, or if they are simply lacking, the result is a chaos or absence of forces, respectively. In both cases, the result is _tamas_, inertia. So tamas is the lowest level of will to power--the impotence to power, as Nietzsche calls it in The Antichristian.
Sattva on the other hand is the highest level of will to power."
How is sattva (Being, harmony) the highest level of the will to power? The key to answering this question can be found in the following passage:
"The teaching _mêden agan_ ["nothing in excess"] applies to men of overflowing strength [Kraft]--not to the mediocre. The _enkrateia_ ["temperance"] and _askêsis_ ["exercise; asceticism"] is only a stage toward the heights: the 'golden nature' is higher.
'Thou shalt'--unconditional obedience in Stoics, in the Christian and Arab orders, in the philosophy of Kant (it is immaterial whether to a superior or to a concept).
Higher than 'thou shalt' is 'I will' (the heroes); higher than 'I will' stands 'I am' (the gods of the Greeks).
The barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint--are neither simple nor frivolous nor moderate." (Nietzsche, WP 940 whole (1884). Compare BT 4: "overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly hostile demons of the non-Apollinian sphere, hence as characteristics of the pre-Apollinian age--that of the Titans; and of the extra-Apollinian world--that of the barbarians.")
"Nature" literally means "birth". The "golden nature" are those who are born in harmony, with their great strength not overflowing but kept in check by itself. Elsewhere, Nietzsche writes:
"[A]n ascetic life is a self-contradiction. Here a ressentiment without equal is in control, something with an insatiable instinct and will to power, which wants to become master, not over something in life but over life itself, over its deepest, strongest, most basic conditions; here an attempt is being made to use one’s force [Kraft] to block up the wells of one's force[.]" (GM III.11 (1887).)
Now contrary to such asceticism, the _enkrateia_ ["temperance"] and _askêsis_ is used, not to block up the _wells_ of one's force, but to form _banks_ around one's force, _channeling_ it (see WP 915, where Nietzsche speaks of "wanting to make asceticism natural again: in place of the aim of denial, the aim of strengthening; a gymnastics of the will"). Thus in the chapter "Sublimation, _Geist_, and Eros" from his _Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist_, Kaufmann writes:
"Reason and the sex drive are both forms of the will to power. The sex drive, however, is an impulse, and in yielding to it in its unsublimated form, man is still the slave of his passions and has no power over them. Rationality, on the other hand, gives man mastery over himself; and as the will to power is essentially the '_instinct of freedom_' (GM II 18), it can find fulfillment only through rationality. Reason is the 'highest' manifestation of the will to power, in the distinct sense that through rationality it can realize its objective most fully.
While Nietzsche thus comes to the conclusion that reason is man's highest faculty, his view is not based on any other principle than the power standard. Reason is extolled not because it is the faculty which abstracts from the given, forms universal concepts, and draws inferences, but because these skills enable it to develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their chaos, to integrate them into a harmony--and thus to give man power: power over himself and over nature. In human affairs, too, Nietzsche points out, it is reason that gives men greater power than sheer bodily strength." (op.cit., pp. 198-99.)
Sattva, rajas, and tamas correspond perfectly to the logos, thumos, and erôs (reason, spiritedness, and desire) from Plato's _Phaedrus_ (or the nous, thumos, and epithumia (intellect, spiritedness, and appetite) from the _Republic_), respectively.
4.
I will now link to the OP I mentioned. The reason I did not do so before is that it moves from three to four types. For in AC 57, Nietzsche refers to the Laws of Manu--the oldest known codification of the Hindu caste system; but there are not three, but _four_ main castes, and I wanted to stick to three types, for the time being. Now, however, I'm ready to move to four.
We have seen that there is a basic division of people into masters and herd animals, and that the masters can in turn be subdivided into philosophers and warriors (to use the terms Nietzsche uses in AC 56). In my old OP, I concluded that the two lowest Hindu castes are simply _specializations_ of the herd animal type (http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2165970#p2165970). Now in his _What Nietzsche Means_, George Morgan wrote:
"Nietzsche makes specialization the criterion of mediocrity and 'slavery': his lowest caste [of the three, not four] would include professional and business men as well as farmers and artisans. In short, nearly the whole of modern industrial society would become the foundation of the 'culture pyramid'--that is why in the long run he welcomes the development of this society." (op.cit., page 372.)
So it's fitting, if ironic, that Nietzsche lists only three castes: the specializations of the herd do not really divide it into distinct types; they're all mediocre. Still, I think there are two distinct temperaments among the herd, which we need to take into consideration.
The typologist David Keirsey distinguishes four distinct temperaments: the Rational, the Idealist, the Guardian, and the Artisan. But because he's politically correct, he presents them as all equal; and because his books fall in the category of self-help books, he says little if anything negative about each temperament. I, on the other hand, naturally rank them from high to low.
The most basic division is that between sensing and intuition. "Intuition" here does not have the popular superstitious meaning, but is rather the standard translation of Kant's term _Anschauung_: beholding with the mind's eye. The Rational temperament's form of intuition is thinking, that is, focusing on ideas; whereas the Idealist's form of intuition is feeling, that is, focusing on emotions. An emotion, mind you, is not a sensual feeling, like a touch, but a spiritual feeling. The distinction between thinking and feeling in this sense is the most basic subdivision of "intuition".
Now it may seem obvious to associate the Rational with the philosopher, but strange to associate the Idealist with the warrior. Well, first it should be noted that the word "idealism" is here used, not in the strict philosophical sense, but in the popular sense; and second, one should think of Social Justice Warriors and the Romantic view of chivalry (compare the modern meanings of "gentle" and "noble"). In how far such types are driven by genuine sympathy and in how far by a desire to raise their personal reputation is an interesting question. In fact, I'm inclined to regard the Idealist as a type driven primarily by the former, and the highest of the two herd temperaments, the Guardian, as one driven primarily by the latter. After all, the former is about something internal--one's own "heart" or "soul"--, whereas the latter is about external things--other people's opinions.
Now the Artisan may also be concerned with other people's opinions, but for this type, it's not about their _judgments_ but about their _perceptions_. A Guardian wants to be judged positively, whereas an Artisan just wants to be perceived, whether positively or negatively--even as a clown. The deepest need of the Guardian is security, which in society usually requires the favourable opinion of one's milieu; whereas the deepest need of the Artisan is stimulation. (Of the Rational, it is knowledge, and of the Idealist, identity--having a uniquely beautiful soul...)
5.
The next step is not the addition of a fifth caste or class, though it is about what's below the fourth. Below the fourth are the casteless, the out-castes--the drop-outs from all classes. When a member of any of the four classes degenerates, he's no longer worthy of being in any of the classes; he should be considered a chandala, a pariah, an "untouchable". And such drop-outs are like the Qlippoth of Qabalah, or the fallen angels of Christianity: the higher they fell from, the lower they end up:
1. healthy philosophers
2. healthy noble warriors
3. healthy herd animals (temperament A)
4. healthy herd animals (temperament B)
5 a. degenerate herd animals (temperament B)
5 b. degenerate herd animals (temperament A)
5 c. degenerate noble warriors
5 d. degenerate philosophers (e.g., Schopenhauer?)
It's easy to see why a drop-out from a higher class is worse than one from a lower class: a degenerate Social Justice Warrior, for example, can do much greater harm to society--to the class system--than a degenerate hedonist. The hedonist will just be occupied with his own depraved pleasures, whereas the SJW will rally against the whole class hierarchy, in the name of "justice" (equality).
As for the difference between morality of contentedness [herd morality] and morality of discontentedness [slave morality], Morgan writes:
"[W]hereas the healthy _have_ the virtues of rising life--that is the meaning of health--the decadent merely _need_ the virtues of decline. That is, they do not necessarily possess habits appropriate to their condition. Nietzsche believes that in fact they usually choose what is bad for them, since decadence _is_ disintegration and maladjustment. We must therefore distinguish Decadence Moralities proper, which are characteristic _expressions_ of decadence and therefore increase it, from those modes of life _appropriate_ to decadence, which he prefers to call 'hygiene'. If a decadent chooses the latter he must have some remnant of healthy instinct.
[...]
The hygienes which Nietzsche considers more or less appropriate to decadence have this in common, that they tend to eliminate ressentiment rather than express it, and do so by diminishing pain. Such modes of life, he believes, were taught by Jesus, perhaps by Epicurus and Pyrrho, and more realistically by Buddha, 'that profound physiologist'." (_What Nietzsche Means_, pp. 149-50.)
Think of typical Christians, who glorify the forgiveness of Jesus as the ideal, but are themselves really vengeful. Nietzsche somewhere calls the Buddhist "the perfect cow". Slaves tend to praise herd morality as the only good morality, but only to take revenge on the "evil" masters. About herd morality (which he calls Flock Morality), Morgan writes:
"Its cardinal teachings are 'equal rights' and 'sympathy with all suffering', and its ideal is a condition of comfort and safety for all, in which pain has been abolished--in short the complete absence of anything to fear. That would be the final consequence of 'the imperative of flock timidity'." (op.cit., page 154.)
To be sure, though, this is merely the state of herd morality _today_. It has evolved, and it used to see some value in master morality (because warriors are necessary to protect the herd against external threats). So I suppose slave morality can be at odds with herd morality: namely, when the latter is not yet ready for its own "final consequence". And in fact, the Dutch Nietzschean Menno ter Braak said that the Dutch Nazis exemplified "'opposition out of principle'; hating for the sake of hating (for the sake of the pleasure which ressentiment gives those who are incapable of stylizing it); loudly roaring that one wants what one does not want at all, because the fulfillment would only limit the opportunities for hatred" (Ter Braak, "National Socialism as a Doctrine of Rancour"). So the ultimate consequences of herd morality would not just make it obsolete (BGE 201, towards the end); they would deprive the man of ressentiment of his sole pleasure...
The aim of this thread is to sketch a Nietzschean typology, rank-ordering human beings into basic types and subtypes.
2.
In Lampert's _Leo Strauss and Nietzsche_, there's a section titled A TYPOLOGY OF MORALS WITH ONLY TWO MORAL TYPES, in which he writes:
"At issue is the great Nietzschean theme of the genealogy of conscience, the history of morals that lays bare our spiritual past as the conflict between an instinct to obedience and an instinct to command. These two instincts define the two basic types of human beings and the two different moralities that fit or belong to them." (op.cit., page 73.)
These moralities are what Nietzsche called master morality and slave or herd morality. (I propose that we call the latter "herd morality", for even though it's basically the same as slave morality, the slave--the man of ressentiment--is not simply a herd animal; the man of ressentiment is a master type who has been enslaved--someone who still has chaos within him, a blond beast within him, which however is caged, suppressed, so it can only lacerate _itself_. The slave is the man who resents all chaos, all creativity, all will to power--but it's really his own suppressed will to power which secretly rages against itself! [Men of ressentiment and herd members tend to adopt the same morality, but for different reasons. Herd morality is not really decadent. Sure, the third class Nietzsche mentions in AC 57 consists of people with a significantly lower level of vitality than members of the first and second classes; but they are still "healthy peasants and healthy half-human animals" (WP 1051).])
3.
So now we have the two most basic types, the master type and the herd type. But in section 57 of _The Antichrist(ian)_, Nietzsche distinguishes not two but _three_ basic types:
"In every healthy society there are three types which condition each other and gravitate differently physiologically; each has its own hygiene, its own field of work, its own sense of perfection and mastery. Nature, not Manu, distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual [_geistig_, also "intellectual"] ones, those who are pre-eminently strong in muscle and temperament, and those, the third type, who excel neither in one respect nor in the other, the mediocre ones--the last as the great majority, the first as the elite." (ib., Kaufmann translation.)
In the OP of a thread about this to which I will link below, I wrote in 2010:
"I think said muscular strength follows from said strength of temperament, as those with a stronger temperament naturally exert themselves more. We have then _two_ qualities: intellectuality and strength of temperament. The three types are then 1) those who stand out for the former quality; 2) those who stand out for the latter quality; and 3) those who stand out for neither."
And, in an even older post I quoted there, I wrote:
"In Hindu thought there are the three _gunas_, or modes of nature. They are rajas, sattva, and tamas. The highest of these is sattva, the lowest, tamas. Let us first consider the middle one, rajas. [...] It is the 'lust to rule' or 'passion for power' (_Herrschsucht_) praised by Zarathustra in his speech Of the Three Evils. It is the will to power--the will to dominion (lordship).
'Will' is a resultant. It results from a coordination of forces, which stimulate each other. If these forces are not well coordinated, or if they are simply lacking, the result is a chaos or absence of forces, respectively. In both cases, the result is _tamas_, inertia. So tamas is the lowest level of will to power--the impotence to power, as Nietzsche calls it in The Antichristian.
Sattva on the other hand is the highest level of will to power."
How is sattva (Being, harmony) the highest level of the will to power? The key to answering this question can be found in the following passage:
"The teaching _mêden agan_ ["nothing in excess"] applies to men of overflowing strength [Kraft]--not to the mediocre. The _enkrateia_ ["temperance"] and _askêsis_ ["exercise; asceticism"] is only a stage toward the heights: the 'golden nature' is higher.
'Thou shalt'--unconditional obedience in Stoics, in the Christian and Arab orders, in the philosophy of Kant (it is immaterial whether to a superior or to a concept).
Higher than 'thou shalt' is 'I will' (the heroes); higher than 'I will' stands 'I am' (the gods of the Greeks).
The barbarian gods express nothing of the pleasure of restraint--are neither simple nor frivolous nor moderate." (Nietzsche, WP 940 whole (1884). Compare BT 4: "overweening pride and excess are regarded as the truly hostile demons of the non-Apollinian sphere, hence as characteristics of the pre-Apollinian age--that of the Titans; and of the extra-Apollinian world--that of the barbarians.")
"Nature" literally means "birth". The "golden nature" are those who are born in harmony, with their great strength not overflowing but kept in check by itself. Elsewhere, Nietzsche writes:
"[A]n ascetic life is a self-contradiction. Here a ressentiment without equal is in control, something with an insatiable instinct and will to power, which wants to become master, not over something in life but over life itself, over its deepest, strongest, most basic conditions; here an attempt is being made to use one’s force [Kraft] to block up the wells of one's force[.]" (GM III.11 (1887).)
Now contrary to such asceticism, the _enkrateia_ ["temperance"] and _askêsis_ is used, not to block up the _wells_ of one's force, but to form _banks_ around one's force, _channeling_ it (see WP 915, where Nietzsche speaks of "wanting to make asceticism natural again: in place of the aim of denial, the aim of strengthening; a gymnastics of the will"). Thus in the chapter "Sublimation, _Geist_, and Eros" from his _Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist_, Kaufmann writes:
"Reason and the sex drive are both forms of the will to power. The sex drive, however, is an impulse, and in yielding to it in its unsublimated form, man is still the slave of his passions and has no power over them. Rationality, on the other hand, gives man mastery over himself; and as the will to power is essentially the '_instinct of freedom_' (GM II 18), it can find fulfillment only through rationality. Reason is the 'highest' manifestation of the will to power, in the distinct sense that through rationality it can realize its objective most fully.
While Nietzsche thus comes to the conclusion that reason is man's highest faculty, his view is not based on any other principle than the power standard. Reason is extolled not because it is the faculty which abstracts from the given, forms universal concepts, and draws inferences, but because these skills enable it to develop foresight and to give consideration to all the impulses, to organize their chaos, to integrate them into a harmony--and thus to give man power: power over himself and over nature. In human affairs, too, Nietzsche points out, it is reason that gives men greater power than sheer bodily strength." (op.cit., pp. 198-99.)
Sattva, rajas, and tamas correspond perfectly to the logos, thumos, and erôs (reason, spiritedness, and desire) from Plato's _Phaedrus_ (or the nous, thumos, and epithumia (intellect, spiritedness, and appetite) from the _Republic_), respectively.
4.
I will now link to the OP I mentioned. The reason I did not do so before is that it moves from three to four types. For in AC 57, Nietzsche refers to the Laws of Manu--the oldest known codification of the Hindu caste system; but there are not three, but _four_ main castes, and I wanted to stick to three types, for the time being. Now, however, I'm ready to move to four.
We have seen that there is a basic division of people into masters and herd animals, and that the masters can in turn be subdivided into philosophers and warriors (to use the terms Nietzsche uses in AC 56). In my old OP, I concluded that the two lowest Hindu castes are simply _specializations_ of the herd animal type (http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2165970#p2165970). Now in his _What Nietzsche Means_, George Morgan wrote:
"Nietzsche makes specialization the criterion of mediocrity and 'slavery': his lowest caste [of the three, not four] would include professional and business men as well as farmers and artisans. In short, nearly the whole of modern industrial society would become the foundation of the 'culture pyramid'--that is why in the long run he welcomes the development of this society." (op.cit., page 372.)
So it's fitting, if ironic, that Nietzsche lists only three castes: the specializations of the herd do not really divide it into distinct types; they're all mediocre. Still, I think there are two distinct temperaments among the herd, which we need to take into consideration.
The typologist David Keirsey distinguishes four distinct temperaments: the Rational, the Idealist, the Guardian, and the Artisan. But because he's politically correct, he presents them as all equal; and because his books fall in the category of self-help books, he says little if anything negative about each temperament. I, on the other hand, naturally rank them from high to low.
The most basic division is that between sensing and intuition. "Intuition" here does not have the popular superstitious meaning, but is rather the standard translation of Kant's term _Anschauung_: beholding with the mind's eye. The Rational temperament's form of intuition is thinking, that is, focusing on ideas; whereas the Idealist's form of intuition is feeling, that is, focusing on emotions. An emotion, mind you, is not a sensual feeling, like a touch, but a spiritual feeling. The distinction between thinking and feeling in this sense is the most basic subdivision of "intuition".
Now it may seem obvious to associate the Rational with the philosopher, but strange to associate the Idealist with the warrior. Well, first it should be noted that the word "idealism" is here used, not in the strict philosophical sense, but in the popular sense; and second, one should think of Social Justice Warriors and the Romantic view of chivalry (compare the modern meanings of "gentle" and "noble"). In how far such types are driven by genuine sympathy and in how far by a desire to raise their personal reputation is an interesting question. In fact, I'm inclined to regard the Idealist as a type driven primarily by the former, and the highest of the two herd temperaments, the Guardian, as one driven primarily by the latter. After all, the former is about something internal--one's own "heart" or "soul"--, whereas the latter is about external things--other people's opinions.
Now the Artisan may also be concerned with other people's opinions, but for this type, it's not about their _judgments_ but about their _perceptions_. A Guardian wants to be judged positively, whereas an Artisan just wants to be perceived, whether positively or negatively--even as a clown. The deepest need of the Guardian is security, which in society usually requires the favourable opinion of one's milieu; whereas the deepest need of the Artisan is stimulation. (Of the Rational, it is knowledge, and of the Idealist, identity--having a uniquely beautiful soul...)
5.
The next step is not the addition of a fifth caste or class, though it is about what's below the fourth. Below the fourth are the casteless, the out-castes--the drop-outs from all classes. When a member of any of the four classes degenerates, he's no longer worthy of being in any of the classes; he should be considered a chandala, a pariah, an "untouchable". And such drop-outs are like the Qlippoth of Qabalah, or the fallen angels of Christianity: the higher they fell from, the lower they end up:
1. healthy philosophers
2. healthy noble warriors
3. healthy herd animals (temperament A)
4. healthy herd animals (temperament B)
5 a. degenerate herd animals (temperament B)
5 b. degenerate herd animals (temperament A)
5 c. degenerate noble warriors
5 d. degenerate philosophers (e.g., Schopenhauer?)
It's easy to see why a drop-out from a higher class is worse than one from a lower class: a degenerate Social Justice Warrior, for example, can do much greater harm to society--to the class system--than a degenerate hedonist. The hedonist will just be occupied with his own depraved pleasures, whereas the SJW will rally against the whole class hierarchy, in the name of "justice" (equality).
As for the difference between morality of contentedness [herd morality] and morality of discontentedness [slave morality], Morgan writes:
"[W]hereas the healthy _have_ the virtues of rising life--that is the meaning of health--the decadent merely _need_ the virtues of decline. That is, they do not necessarily possess habits appropriate to their condition. Nietzsche believes that in fact they usually choose what is bad for them, since decadence _is_ disintegration and maladjustment. We must therefore distinguish Decadence Moralities proper, which are characteristic _expressions_ of decadence and therefore increase it, from those modes of life _appropriate_ to decadence, which he prefers to call 'hygiene'. If a decadent chooses the latter he must have some remnant of healthy instinct.
[...]
The hygienes which Nietzsche considers more or less appropriate to decadence have this in common, that they tend to eliminate ressentiment rather than express it, and do so by diminishing pain. Such modes of life, he believes, were taught by Jesus, perhaps by Epicurus and Pyrrho, and more realistically by Buddha, 'that profound physiologist'." (_What Nietzsche Means_, pp. 149-50.)
Think of typical Christians, who glorify the forgiveness of Jesus as the ideal, but are themselves really vengeful. Nietzsche somewhere calls the Buddhist "the perfect cow". Slaves tend to praise herd morality as the only good morality, but only to take revenge on the "evil" masters. About herd morality (which he calls Flock Morality), Morgan writes:
"Its cardinal teachings are 'equal rights' and 'sympathy with all suffering', and its ideal is a condition of comfort and safety for all, in which pain has been abolished--in short the complete absence of anything to fear. That would be the final consequence of 'the imperative of flock timidity'." (op.cit., page 154.)
To be sure, though, this is merely the state of herd morality _today_. It has evolved, and it used to see some value in master morality (because warriors are necessary to protect the herd against external threats). So I suppose slave morality can be at odds with herd morality: namely, when the latter is not yet ready for its own "final consequence". And in fact, the Dutch Nietzschean Menno ter Braak said that the Dutch Nazis exemplified "'opposition out of principle'; hating for the sake of hating (for the sake of the pleasure which ressentiment gives those who are incapable of stylizing it); loudly roaring that one wants what one does not want at all, because the fulfillment would only limit the opportunities for hatred" (Ter Braak, "National Socialism as a Doctrine of Rancour"). So the ultimate consequences of herd morality would not just make it obsolete (BGE 201, towards the end); they would deprive the man of ressentiment of his sole pleasure...