when i was asked, i answered 'i would not want that, for it is against my will.' the fellow then asked me if it was my will which gave cause for me not wanting it, or, if it was just not wanting it that was an expression of my will.
i scratched my head and thought about the question. 'what do you mean', i asked increduously, 'aren't these the same thing?'
the fellow smiled and said 'if the first were not the case, would you or i know the difference?'
'i don't suppose whatever caused me to not want it can be known, no, so i guess not', i replied.
he went on, 'but we can know without a doubt that you didn't accidentally not want it, and that this must mean you meant to not want it, yes?'
'of course, but i see where you're going and there's still a problem here,' i added quickly. 'you're trying to simplify the meaning of the word 'will', but to say my action was an expression of my will still leaves the question; what is my will. why not just say 'i would not want that, because i don't like it?'
'because we could ask the same thing about your not liking it. wouldn't that be an expression of your will as well', he answered.
'i see what you mean. well then, i don't see what the problem is here, or why you are asking the question.'
'i'm asking', he said 'because i want to show you how the word 'will' means anything at all. we can't look inside for an answer, nor behind the word. we can only look at what you do, not why you do it.'
'ah, but wouldn't i have to explain with words that i don't want it... and that my behavior, what i do, isn't enough?'
'what came first, do you think? the feeling of aversion or the word to express it?'
'the feeling, of course. human beings behaved this way before they had language.'
'so we understood the behavior before we knew how to explain it, yes?'
'i suppose so.'
'then what is added to the meaning of the behavior when we call it 'will'?'
'oh... i see now what you mean.'
'and has anything changed about the feeling of aversion... has anything changed in our experience of aversion other than the addition of the word to now describe it; to say 'it is my will to not want this? what if, instead, we were to say 'i do not want this, for it is against my elu?'
'nothing would be different except the word, yes.'
'and whatever the word, it signifies the same thing.'
'I agree.'
'and what if we went on to ask if the elu was the cause of you not wanting it, or if not wanting it was an expression of your elu? our situation would be no different. we would deny the first because it couldn't be known, and we would affirm the second because we would assume you couldn't not want it by accident.'
'nothing's changed then. the word is really irrelevent... or relevent only to signify the meaning of a behavior.'
'that's right. words accrue around our behavior, but do nothing to change it or give it any more meaning. if they did give our behavior meaning, our behavior would change if the word changed. an act of will and an act of elu would be two different things.'
'but those words mean the same thing.'
'precisely! so it doesn't matter what you call it or how you describe it- the behavior would be the same! if the behavior is the same, we can only know that you don't want it, and never the reason why. we can distinguish between the two behaviors- what is intended and what is not- by whether or not you mean to do it. that is all.'
'then what is the purpose of philosophy... of all the great thinkers who have wondered at why we do what we do? are you saying all the theories of the 'will' are meaningless?'
'i can't say that, because whether or not a proposition is meaningless depends on its relation to other propositions, not necessarily on the world. what i'm saying is that philosophy exists in its own environment, something disconnected from our world, from how we understand our activity. philosophy is not nonsense so long as we understand that what it is doing is not explaining anything, but helping us clarify and correct the problems that arise in our peculiar uses of language... which, incidentally, is what we have just done.'
i scratched my head and thought about the question. 'what do you mean', i asked increduously, 'aren't these the same thing?'
the fellow smiled and said 'if the first were not the case, would you or i know the difference?'
'i don't suppose whatever caused me to not want it can be known, no, so i guess not', i replied.
he went on, 'but we can know without a doubt that you didn't accidentally not want it, and that this must mean you meant to not want it, yes?'
'of course, but i see where you're going and there's still a problem here,' i added quickly. 'you're trying to simplify the meaning of the word 'will', but to say my action was an expression of my will still leaves the question; what is my will. why not just say 'i would not want that, because i don't like it?'
'because we could ask the same thing about your not liking it. wouldn't that be an expression of your will as well', he answered.
'i see what you mean. well then, i don't see what the problem is here, or why you are asking the question.'
'i'm asking', he said 'because i want to show you how the word 'will' means anything at all. we can't look inside for an answer, nor behind the word. we can only look at what you do, not why you do it.'
'ah, but wouldn't i have to explain with words that i don't want it... and that my behavior, what i do, isn't enough?'
'what came first, do you think? the feeling of aversion or the word to express it?'
'the feeling, of course. human beings behaved this way before they had language.'
'so we understood the behavior before we knew how to explain it, yes?'
'i suppose so.'
'then what is added to the meaning of the behavior when we call it 'will'?'
'oh... i see now what you mean.'
'and has anything changed about the feeling of aversion... has anything changed in our experience of aversion other than the addition of the word to now describe it; to say 'it is my will to not want this? what if, instead, we were to say 'i do not want this, for it is against my elu?'
'nothing would be different except the word, yes.'
'and whatever the word, it signifies the same thing.'
'I agree.'
'and what if we went on to ask if the elu was the cause of you not wanting it, or if not wanting it was an expression of your elu? our situation would be no different. we would deny the first because it couldn't be known, and we would affirm the second because we would assume you couldn't not want it by accident.'
'nothing's changed then. the word is really irrelevent... or relevent only to signify the meaning of a behavior.'
'that's right. words accrue around our behavior, but do nothing to change it or give it any more meaning. if they did give our behavior meaning, our behavior would change if the word changed. an act of will and an act of elu would be two different things.'
'but those words mean the same thing.'
'precisely! so it doesn't matter what you call it or how you describe it- the behavior would be the same! if the behavior is the same, we can only know that you don't want it, and never the reason why. we can distinguish between the two behaviors- what is intended and what is not- by whether or not you mean to do it. that is all.'
'then what is the purpose of philosophy... of all the great thinkers who have wondered at why we do what we do? are you saying all the theories of the 'will' are meaningless?'
'i can't say that, because whether or not a proposition is meaningless depends on its relation to other propositions, not necessarily on the world. what i'm saying is that philosophy exists in its own environment, something disconnected from our world, from how we understand our activity. philosophy is not nonsense so long as we understand that what it is doing is not explaining anything, but helping us clarify and correct the problems that arise in our peculiar uses of language... which, incidentally, is what we have just done.'