Big Rosa wrote:Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on '
determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.
[I will however be publishing an essay specifically about this in the next few years, where I will substantiate what I have to say below far more fully.]
This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.
For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.
As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., '
determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.
To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.
To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]
When the details are worked out, '
determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.
But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]
So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?
Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?
It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.
Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.
So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.
The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?
Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]
If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.
Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.
This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.
As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.
And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.
No wonder Marx argued:
The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]
And:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.' [Ibid., pp.64-65.]
These concepts "rule" us too if we are suitably uncritical.
Many of these ideas are not original to me (but the Marxist application of them is). They first appeared, as far as I am aware, in Bertrand Russell's essay:
Russell, B. (1917a), 'On The Notion Of A Cause', in Russell (1917b), pp.132-51.
--------, (1917b), Mysticism And Logic (George, Allen and Unwin).
These ideas can be found explicitly stated in the following (but not from a Marxist angle):
Gallop, D. (1962), 'On Being Determined', Mind 71, pp.181-96.
I have also followed this analysis of 'law':
Swartz, N. (1985), The Concept Of A Physical Law (Cambridge University Press).
--------, (2006), 'Laws Of Nature', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A PDF of the former can be downloaded here:
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/The latter is found here:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/Influential Wittgensteinian criticisms of modern scientistic philosophies of 'mind' can be found here:
Bennett, M., and Hacker, P. (2003), Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience (Blackwell).
--------, (2008), History Of Cognitive Neuroscience (Blackwell).
Those who think an appeal to ordinary language is inappropriate here should re-read what Marx said above, consult the first half of following, and then think again:
Button, G., Coulter, J., Lee, J., and Sharrock, W. (1995), Computers, Minds And Conduct (Polity Press).
The bottom line is that Marxists have been too quick to appropriate concepts and forms-of-thought from traditional (alienated ruling-class) philosophy without subjecting them to close enough scrutiny. Unfortunately, this means that while our politics seems radical enough, our theory (both here and in relation to dialectics, for example) is thoroughly traditional -- and, if I may say so, disconcertingly conservative.
I explain why I say this in the first few sections of the following:
http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htmFinally, I'd try to get this material published in Marxist journals, etc., but I am generally treated as a pariah, and face emotive and irrational hostility wherever I try to present such ideas.
Seems "ruling ideas rule" comrades who are editors, too.
Of course, the above does not imply I believe in something called 'The Freedom of the Will'.
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