satyr wrote:The desire to escape culpability places the individual in a position of innocence: victim of someone or something other than himself.
if someone feels culpable, no amount of rationalizing will remove from them their feeling of culpability; one cannot lie to oneself. of course one might 'desire' to be innocent of the thing they feel culpable for, but desiring, like rationalizing, doesn't change that culpability. furthermore, it wouldn't be the 'desiring' that 'places the individual in a position of innocence'. one can desire all they want. that doesn't change anything. rather what one desires is to be able to truly believe they are innocent... and to the extent that their reasoning and understanding permits them, they believe, or not.
before i move on let me clear up the problem of there being no freewill first. ultimately, nobody is culpable for anything, but not because their bodies do not commit action x, y, and z... they certainly do (e.g., joe... joe's body... robbed the bank... no doubt about it). it is because there is no 'joe' in that body... no 'joe agency' that commands and controls that body... no joe agency that makes joe think and move. in order to make a person free, that person has to be able to choose not to be able to choose, which is impossible. so long as joe is thinking and choosing and moving, every aspect of him is just as subject to causation as anything else in the world.
however, we have evolved the capacity to believe in the error of freewill because it has proven useful in the evolution of our social species. in fact there are many gross errors of reasoning that we nonetheless practice and which prove to be pragmatically useful. but the entire moral order of our social being exists upon the foundation of this error, and to pull this foundation out from under it would prove catastrophic. so, we
proceed as if we all have freewill, and make our contracts, and agreements, and promises. and when these things are broken, we proceed to accept culpability, responsibility, accountability.
now on to the issue of 'culpability'. given that we accept this error in reasoning and pretend as if we have freewill, we call someone culpable when we mean that they are the cause of something, had the option to
not be the cause of that something, but still chose to cause it. we eliminate culpability for
accidents by doing this; one has to know in advance what they're choosing to do, or else they act accidentally and are not culpable. if one knows in advance what they are about to do, an in addition to this, has some foresight of the possible effects of the action, we say that the action is intentional and not by accident. there is an exception here though: one can act intentionally without intending one of the possible effect outcomes, in which case the effect isn't an accident, but neither is it intentional. this is one problem for the matter of culpability; is one culpable for
only what they intend, or are they also culpable for
any effect of their purposeful action, provided they knew in advance it's possibility. in criminal law this is often an issue... the issue of intent. one intended to drive drunk, but didn't intent to hit someone. to find him guilty of second degree manslaughter, is it enough that he knew he could
possibly hit someone if he drove drunk? some argue yes. ah, but what if he drove by a russian terrorist, splashed mud on him... which then pissed the russian off, who in a fit of rage at this, pressed the detonator in his hand, causing the bomb he planted to blow up the bank? do we say that this was an effect of the man's drunk driving and therefore hold him culpable... or do we find him not guilty because he wasn't aware that this
could be a possible result of his drunk driving? it gets even worse. as unlikely and improbable as it was, it was
still possible that he piss a russian off who would then blow up a bank. the glaring problem here is this: where do we draw the line when considering what constitutes proper judgement when committing actions with possible outcomes.
hitting someone. more likely. pissing a russian terorist off. less likely. culpability then is determined by some kind of probability calculus? it would appear so. this is just one example of the shit that comes with accepting the freewill-error package.
now let's examine the other side of culpability... the side on which one's actions make them a victim, and the question of whether or not to hold them culpable for their victimhood. man walks into a pit of alligators and gets his leg torn off. this one's pretty easy. he's at fault because he knew that was possible. another man walks out of his front door and gets struck by a stray bullet. little trickier. he knew it was possible that could happen, but we'd call him reasonable to assume it wouldn't. here you see the gray area emerging again. if we don't hold one culpable for an effect unless one knows in advance the possibility of that effect happening, then we would hold this guy culpable because he knew it was possible (as unlikely as it was to happen). but that would be absurd. imagine nobody having sympathy for this guy; 'you dumbass, you knew you could get hit by a stray bullet when you went outside, so you shouldn't have done it and have nobody to blame but yourself!'
now let's move into the matter of criminal victimhood... and we'll use myself as an example. when a criminal commits a crime and knows in advance the legal consequences of committing that crime, he is held culpable for the consequencs he suffers if he's caught. simple enough. but legal consequences, like angry russian terrorists and stray bullets, aren't always very probable... and like the absurdity of holding the drunk driver and stray bullet guy culpable for the effects of their actions, it is also absurd to hold a criminal culpable for consequences he couldn't reasonably expect to happen as a result of his crime. example: bill is driving with a quarter of weed in his pocket. he gets pulled and searched. he gets charged with possession... but also intent to deliver and sell. now bill is certainly guilty of possession and knew in advance the risk he was taking, so would not deny culpability for being charged with the crime. but bill is not a dealer and had no intent on delivering. do we then hold bill culpable for the five years he got of probation when the prosecutor 'decided' he didn't believe bill when bill said he was no dealer?
if we say that because bill knew in advance that a prosecutor wouldn't believe his intent, but also know that the burden of proof is on the prosecutor to prove it was bill's intent to sell, we would not hold bill culpable if that burden of proof principle is violated in the prosecution. if we do hold him culpable, it is the same as saying 'you should not trust your government to follow it's own rules.' and if we say
that, we might as well also say 'the relationship between citizen and government is not founded on agreement or trust, and is therefore exempt.'
my case is in principle identical to bill's. the crime i
did commit carried consequences that i knew in advance and would have no issue denying culpability thereof if arrested. i knew what i did, willingly did it, and if caught, expected
only the consequences that are defined statutorily for that crime. however, i was not charged for the crime i committed, but another crime, which i did not commit. and i was charged with this crime because the prosecutor's duty to honor the burden of proof principle was not observed during the prosecution. he broke his own law and convicted me of a crime he could not prove i committed.
it would be absurd to call me culpable for the consequences i endure because of this conviction because as a condition of my civil contract with my government, i am to trust that my government is neither incompetent or corrupt, and expect only to be convicted of crimes i commit if i commit them.
of course, one could say 'you knew the russian might detonate the bomb if you splashed him with mud while drunk driving, and you knew you might be struck by a stray bullet when you left the house, and you knew you'd be convicted of possession with intent to deliver and sell, and you knew you'd be charged with felonious indecent exposure sex offense when you only committed a misdemeanor indecent exposure (not a sex offense per statute), so you're not a victim of the consequences and are fully culpable'. sure, one could say that, but one would be a complete imbecile to do so. and what do we do with imbeciles? we keep them out of government, court rooms, and philosophy (especially philosophy of law).
so granting that we as a society still tell ourselves the lie of freewill and act as if we have it, holding each other culpable for what happens to us is not a matter so easily decided. this is what philosophy is for; a closer examination of the terms, circumstances, and ways in which we use the concept. of course we'd like to just point a finger at everyone who pisses us off and make him guilty of something as our revenge (there's that slavish morality shining through), but it's not easy to do if that person happens to be a philosopher. he might likely turn the tables on us and make us the guilty ones. guilty of being an imbecile first (for not recognizing the lack of freewill), and guilty of being indignant slave second (for trying to weaken the strong by blame). hell you could even throw in a few more; (a) guilty of thinking one could lie to themselves and think they
weren't culpable when clearly they thought they were, (b) guilty of believing simply 'desiring' to not be held culpable can change the fact of culpability, (c) not recognizing the difference between intent and lack of intent when determining culpability, and (d) not recognizing the absurdity of blaming someone for a consequence brought about by an effect that while known in advance, is so unlikely as to not even be considered.
guy leaves his car in the parking lot and an alien ship pulls it up with a tractor beam. you stupid sonofabitch! you knew aliens might show up and take your car, dumbass. why the fuck did you leave it out there? you get no sympathy from me, pal.
riiiiiight.
note to satyr: i do not hold you culpable for not understanding what culpability is and when it is reasonable. you're doing fine.