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continuation of discussion at: http://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=188756&p=2692704#p2692704
hume is critiquing the aristotlean concept of substance, which i believe nietzsche was referencing in that quote. aristotle believed that a substance was a kind of being that was different from a property. he goes on to say that properties can change while the substance of the being does not. hume is asking how this substance can be perceived if we only know things by the impressions we get from the substance's properties.
recall:
"In order that the concept of substance could originate--which is indispensible for logic although in the strictest sense nothing real corresponds to it--it was likewise necessary that for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things."- nietzsche
but the concept of substance is NOT indispensible for logic, i'm saying. for one thing, it would be unecessary to qualify the notion of the law of identity (a=a) by this concept of substance, since substance by its very definition cannot change (only properties change). so there would never be the question: 'could substance ever be anything other than substance', see. it goes without saying that substance is substance and that it can't be anything else. this isn't the case for properties, though, or the things that have properties.
moreover, the origination of the idea of substance is not something that occured because 'for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things.' the idea of substance is completely a priori, is a rational concept that is not formed after the perception of anything, whether changeable or not. but the idea of a property is a posteriori; it relies on perception and experience.
probably, the idea of substance was originated to treat the various paradoxes created in the arguments between the eleatic school, the pluralists, heraclitus, and the atomists. aristotle was probably moved to come up with an idea that was compatible, hence, something that is immanent and unchanging (substance) while also being the ground of change and impermanence (properties). if you have a moment, check out 'substance theory'.
at any rate:
nietzsche thought that logic was inconceivable until the error of positing the 'subject' was commited, but it wasn't. this is a bit complicated to explain and would require a lot more time than i'm willing to give in a post at the moment. i'll just give you a briefing.
logic... the propositional kind which is the relevent kind for our purposes here... is nothing more than a set of rules which are used to determine whether or not an assertion is valid, sound, valid and sound, true or false. propositions are about things in the world, but are NOT parts of the world itself. the question which has challenged philosophers for centuries is whether or not the world can be represented by propositions so that propositions indicate something more than their own logical consistency. that is, if a proposition is true, does it necessarily follow that it says something true about the world rather than only being deductively or inductively true because it is logically valid and sound. consider this example:
dizzle wopters are incredibly haptonetic, and exist in a trollic place.
this world is trollic.
therefore, this world consists of haptonetic things.
this argument meets all the criteria for logical coherency, and yet it is nonsensical. the fact that the argument is logical says nothing about the world.
now, there is no question as to whether or not dizzle wopters and trollic places are nietzschean 'subjects', because the very notion of them is nonsensical to begin with. hence, a proposition can be logical without representing a real subject... hence, the belief in a real subject is not requird for logic to exist.
and finally, nietzsche would be caught in a kind of self-referential contradiction if he were to assert that belief in a subject was required for logic to exist. the very statement itself is either true or false, and if it is, it is such because it either met or violated the rules of logic. if what he said was true, then logic does exist, because his statement wouldn't be correct, much less meaningful, without it. if what he says is false, it is false because it was neither deductively or inductively coherent, in which case he's said nothing about logic in the first place.
i will concede that the 'subject', in the way that he meant it (which has nothing to do with the existence or validity of logic) is still a legitimate point. he means to dismiss the notion of the cartesian subject, the 'doer that is distinct from the deed', as he put it. of course this is correct, but being correct- that there is only the deed, the doing, the striking that IS the lightening... and NOT the lightening that is DOING the striking- does not say anything about logic. granting that there is no subject, there is still a logic of process here... which is to say, understanding even this notion of there being no subject, and only process instead, is possible because there is logical consistency within the set of propositions that contain it.
but remember, this set might only contain deductive truths, tautologies, in which case they would not necessarily say anything about the world. on the other hand, if the set contained inductive claims, how would these be proven? how do i prove there is no 'subject' and only process? well it depends on what i mean when i say 'subject' and 'process'. in this particular case i mean to say that there is no cartesian second-substance. well how do i prove that? you guessed it... through another series of claims: a second-substance could not casually interact with a first-substance (material) since they were ontologically different (see spinoza). but how do i prove THAT?
where is this going, pedro? nowhere, that's where. and its going nowhere because i'm asking metaphysical questions... using specialized, a priori philosophical terminology... creating circles of reasoning. i can create all kinds of premises that would lead to conclusions that were true so long as the premises were granted. but granting the premises does not mean my statements reflect or represent what is in the world or anything about the world.
logic is mysteriously transcendent, pedro. asking, as nietzsche did, about the genealogy of logic... how we beings began to think logically... does not say anything about logic's true beginnings. such reasoning uses a logic that was already there, already working.
pedro wrote:What are the properties then? What goes for "tiger" goes for "whiskers," "violent" and "four legged." You can split properties apart all you want, but there will always be an assumed substance.
hume is critiquing the aristotlean concept of substance, which i believe nietzsche was referencing in that quote. aristotle believed that a substance was a kind of being that was different from a property. he goes on to say that properties can change while the substance of the being does not. hume is asking how this substance can be perceived if we only know things by the impressions we get from the substance's properties.
recall:
"In order that the concept of substance could originate--which is indispensible for logic although in the strictest sense nothing real corresponds to it--it was likewise necessary that for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things."- nietzsche
but the concept of substance is NOT indispensible for logic, i'm saying. for one thing, it would be unecessary to qualify the notion of the law of identity (a=a) by this concept of substance, since substance by its very definition cannot change (only properties change). so there would never be the question: 'could substance ever be anything other than substance', see. it goes without saying that substance is substance and that it can't be anything else. this isn't the case for properties, though, or the things that have properties.
moreover, the origination of the idea of substance is not something that occured because 'for a long time one did not see or perceive the changes in things.' the idea of substance is completely a priori, is a rational concept that is not formed after the perception of anything, whether changeable or not. but the idea of a property is a posteriori; it relies on perception and experience.
probably, the idea of substance was originated to treat the various paradoxes created in the arguments between the eleatic school, the pluralists, heraclitus, and the atomists. aristotle was probably moved to come up with an idea that was compatible, hence, something that is immanent and unchanging (substance) while also being the ground of change and impermanence (properties). if you have a moment, check out 'substance theory'.
at any rate:
pedro wrote:I don't think Nietzsche meant that logic logically needed this or that, I think he was explaining what it needed genealogically, what led to its existence.
nietzsche thought that logic was inconceivable until the error of positing the 'subject' was commited, but it wasn't. this is a bit complicated to explain and would require a lot more time than i'm willing to give in a post at the moment. i'll just give you a briefing.
logic... the propositional kind which is the relevent kind for our purposes here... is nothing more than a set of rules which are used to determine whether or not an assertion is valid, sound, valid and sound, true or false. propositions are about things in the world, but are NOT parts of the world itself. the question which has challenged philosophers for centuries is whether or not the world can be represented by propositions so that propositions indicate something more than their own logical consistency. that is, if a proposition is true, does it necessarily follow that it says something true about the world rather than only being deductively or inductively true because it is logically valid and sound. consider this example:
dizzle wopters are incredibly haptonetic, and exist in a trollic place.
this world is trollic.
therefore, this world consists of haptonetic things.
this argument meets all the criteria for logical coherency, and yet it is nonsensical. the fact that the argument is logical says nothing about the world.
now, there is no question as to whether or not dizzle wopters and trollic places are nietzschean 'subjects', because the very notion of them is nonsensical to begin with. hence, a proposition can be logical without representing a real subject... hence, the belief in a real subject is not requird for logic to exist.
and finally, nietzsche would be caught in a kind of self-referential contradiction if he were to assert that belief in a subject was required for logic to exist. the very statement itself is either true or false, and if it is, it is such because it either met or violated the rules of logic. if what he said was true, then logic does exist, because his statement wouldn't be correct, much less meaningful, without it. if what he says is false, it is false because it was neither deductively or inductively coherent, in which case he's said nothing about logic in the first place.
i will concede that the 'subject', in the way that he meant it (which has nothing to do with the existence or validity of logic) is still a legitimate point. he means to dismiss the notion of the cartesian subject, the 'doer that is distinct from the deed', as he put it. of course this is correct, but being correct- that there is only the deed, the doing, the striking that IS the lightening... and NOT the lightening that is DOING the striking- does not say anything about logic. granting that there is no subject, there is still a logic of process here... which is to say, understanding even this notion of there being no subject, and only process instead, is possible because there is logical consistency within the set of propositions that contain it.
but remember, this set might only contain deductive truths, tautologies, in which case they would not necessarily say anything about the world. on the other hand, if the set contained inductive claims, how would these be proven? how do i prove there is no 'subject' and only process? well it depends on what i mean when i say 'subject' and 'process'. in this particular case i mean to say that there is no cartesian second-substance. well how do i prove that? you guessed it... through another series of claims: a second-substance could not casually interact with a first-substance (material) since they were ontologically different (see spinoza). but how do i prove THAT?
where is this going, pedro? nowhere, that's where. and its going nowhere because i'm asking metaphysical questions... using specialized, a priori philosophical terminology... creating circles of reasoning. i can create all kinds of premises that would lead to conclusions that were true so long as the premises were granted. but granting the premises does not mean my statements reflect or represent what is in the world or anything about the world.
logic is mysteriously transcendent, pedro. asking, as nietzsche did, about the genealogy of logic... how we beings began to think logically... does not say anything about logic's true beginnings. such reasoning uses a logic that was already there, already working.
