First Knowledge

Barracuda wrote:the metaphysical universal object of knowledge.

Before there can be any particular thing that is known, there must be an understanding of the metaphysical universal object of knowledge.

depends on what you mean when you say 'known'. there was pre-linguistic 'knowing' that existed long before language developed. in that case, plenty of things were 'known' before any such thing as 'understanding of the metaphysical universal object of knowledge' was conceived.

so i disagree.  

the problem with your conjecture here is that it makes 'knowledge' a condition of something that is theory-laden, and therefore over complicated. you'd have a hard enough time getting philosophers to agree on what 'the metaphysical universal object of knowledge' even is, before you'd get them to agree on whether or not this is a necessary condition of knowledge.

so we would look at the word 'universal' and consider all the ways philosophers have used it. we'd probably trace this use back to plato, and then we would find aristotle criticizing the concept. from there, you'd have to pick a side and proceed from there. most empiricists and a few rationalists would take aristotle's side, while some platonic realists/idealists would hold fast to the concept of universals.

so which side do you take? are universals possible, or not?

Fixed Cross wrote:existence
late 14c., "reality," from O.Fr. existence, from M.L. existentia/exsistentia, from existentem/exsistentem (nom. existens/exsistens) "existent," prp. of L. existere/exsistere "stand forth, appear," and, as a secondary meaning, "exist, be;" from ex- "forth" (see ex-) + sistere "cause to stand". (see assist).  
- online etymology dictionary


I have heard it often said in a Nietzschean context that ontology, as epistemology, is metaphysics, and therefore has no place in a Netzschean philosophy (by which is understood a world-affirming one), which must aim at describing particulars and dismiss the notion of universals. It seems to me that this would mean that the will-to-power, as a universal definition of being, must be disregarded by such Nietzscheans, as it is an ontology. But I consider the idea that ontology is the study of universals a mistake.  At the root of this mistake is the idea that terms describing many, or even all perceivable particulars, are necessary universals, and thereby metaphysical. This error has to do with the idea of cosmic totality. The universe as a neatly limited collection of things, itself a thing. Whether we understand 'thing' as 'object', 'force', or even 'subject' as Nietzsche does, such a notion is not founded in observation and deduction, i.e. scientific method, but it is nothing but an assumption. The very notion of universals is dependent on the possibility of a definable totality.

The philosophy I am developing departs from the assumption that the universe is a neatly limited quantity, and necessarily a closed system. The law of conservation of energy may not apply to the universe (and there are indications that energy increases). More matter may come into existence. More matter may stand forth, appear. And I think that this is indeed what happens. It is possible that universe (as being) did not come into existence in its entirety, by Gods hand or by the Big Bang (effectively the same idea, a pushing back of the problem of origin behind an impressive display of power) but bit-by-bit, as matter began to stand forth / appear out of chaos, or no-thingness. This chaotic non-existence is thereby taken as the limit to existence -- but, and herein lies the epistemic ground to this new philosophy, this limit is understood as the limit of our mind, and not pertaining to objectivity in any way.

Epistemology and ontology are ultimately the same study. The study of being is the same as the study of knowledge. When we study what exists, we must also study in what way we can know. To not understand this is to believe in the thing-in-itself. Such understanding necessitates either belief in God or the active abandonment of reason. Belief in God being the passive abandonment of reason. What we must do instead is to refine reason, beyond its crude delineations of binary logic. Nature gives us no reason to think that we must conceive of existence in terms of 'yes' and 'no', of 1 and 0, which are mutually exclusive and cannot follow from each other. Such is an artifice that only applies to abstractions, not to life. Philosophy must leave behind this abstraction, and become as life. The strange logics of Heidegger are the beginnings of this process.

without-music wrote:Very good. Bataille might be useful on this point. Any system will produce its own excess; the pent-up energy must be spent. He locates such "spending" in historical phenomena like human sacrifice and seemingly trivial commonplaces like the sexual act. So much energy is squanderd in the sexual act; one must be abundant, overflowing beforehand. Such spending, I think, is the task of the artist: as sublimation. Of course, the obscene underbelly of every sublimation is a repression. And so the question must become: what is it that is being repressed in a spending of excess? Of course, Bataille meant this in the socio-economic sense. How noble an undertaking it would be to explode the barriers to his thought, to develop it on an ontological scale. I like the idea, I wonder how far one might take it.

In any case: I count myself among those Nietzscheans unwilling to give up ontology. You've spoken well on the reasons why.

What we must do instead is to refine reason, beyond its crude delineations of binary logic.

Indeed, existence precedes logic, which is an emphatically human, all-too-human affair. To transgress it: ah, fresh air!

Fixed Cross wrote:

without-music wrote:A quick question, to get at the heart of this new idea: as I understand it (and I must make explicit that I intend to think this idea properly and vigorously when I am again in possession of free time; I sense the power in it, the newness), value-ontology is a contribution of primordiality to the will to power. That is: it grounds the will to power, which is itself a valuing -- but what/who values? -- in the subject who self-values. Such self-valuation is ubiquitous, to be sure, for it must be -- otherwise whence come the play of forces that comprise our world?

Precisely. The will to power definition, as much as it aspires to be the universal truth, is still a particular formulation. The formulation is imperfect, as it includes very ambiguous terms, "will" and "power" As Sauwelios has frequently and accurately noted, the will-to-power is not to be confused with merely the combination of these two terms. As Nietzsche writes, "will" as such is meaningless. It only makes sense combined when an object is attached to the term. In "to power", Nietzsche found a universally applicable object to all wills. A small problem is that the word "power" needs to be stretched in its meaning to have this make sense. For instance, how can the experience of love be explained as power? And it must, for men yearn for this. The answer the Nietzschean will give is simple: we interpret this experience as the "feeling of power" You will see that Nietzsche confirms this, and that Nietzscheans build on this confirmation. "Love" has been interpreted in term of "will" "power" - but also "feeling". And indeed that the will to power is described as an affect, including willing, power and the feeling of power, which is willing to more power, which is the basic feeling. Nietzsche has well defined an outward motion. "of what"? Absurd question.

Heidegger continued on this, most notably with his unfolding-mastering. He approached with this the subject-ness of the subjective, reaching for a definition of it as an apparatus of sorts. A technical definition. He reached into myth and complexities of the word "being" and "becoming". He also gave examples of such unfolding, most famously perhaps his description of how culture emerges around the bridge, which is beautiful but in my eyes ultimately a failed attempt (as perhaps also the unfinished work Time and Being which I have not entirely read) to include the subjective into super perspective. A lot of art was needed to make this work. And as dense as his literature is, he is of course a phenomenal writer, as all philosophers are. This is perhaps even a (somewhat postmodern) definition of a philosopher - exceptionally interesting writer.

What Heidegger set out to do was to define the willing-to-power, to turn the noun into a verb. But with this he disrupted the formula, because wil-to-power is neither noun nor verb. It breaches the gap between the two, it explains exactly the relation between subject and object, so that neither are further necessary. It does so only in the terms will and power. The world had hereby been defined in one of its necessities. Heidegger apparently thought that this definition was not sufficient. Because it made of Heraclitean poetic insight a cold hard law. Heidegger sought to envision the inner dynamics of the will to power -- which means the inner dynamics of the world. He did so in many ways, but he was (mostly) describing what happened as seen from the outside.

The inside is rather simple. In the consciousness of both N. and H the importance of grammar was deeply ingrained. H. tried to break it, condemned it, in the end accepted it, Nietzsche mastered it. But what they both did not do was to seek grammar in its origin -- vocabulary.

What is the most important word? Where does grammar take root?

But I was talking about attempts at analytic certainty.

What is the most important word?

Baraccuda wrote:Epistemology and ontology are ultimately the same study.

The study of being is the same as the study of knowledge.

What we must do instead is to refine reason, beyond its crude delineations of binary logic. Nature gives us no reason to think that we must conceive of existence in terms of 'yes' and 'no', of 1 and 0, which are mutually exclusive and cannot follow from each other.

Magnus Anderson wrote:

Baraccuda wrote:Epistemology and ontology are ultimately the same study.

Epistemology is the study of how we know what we know. It's basically logic. Ontology, on the other hand, is a poorly defined field: it's the study of exactly what? I take it to be the study of the most general laws. It's the darling of Symbolic AI.

The study of being is the same as the study of knowledge.

As if "the study of being" makes any sense whatsoever. Look at yourself, you are studying "being".

What we must do instead is to refine reason, beyond its crude delineations of binary logic. Nature gives us no reason to think that we must conceive of existence in terms of 'yes' and 'no', of 1 and 0, which are mutually exclusive and cannot follow from each other.

What makes you think that a sequence of bits, a bit string, does not have the capacity to represent every possible reality?

The key insight is that there is no single but many different ways to conceptualize the real.

You can use the bit string format if you want -- very dear to information theorists -- but you don't have to.

Don't hate the 1's and 0's. When we take a look at a static image that is being displayed on a computer monitor we tend to think of it in high-level terms. You see a dog, you don't see a two-dimensional array of colors not to mention RGB values; and you certainly don't see a one-dimensional sequence of 1's and 0's. The former is the most Platonified perception, the second is in the middle and the third is the least -- among the three types of representation. The bit-string description, in this particular case, is the most detailed description.

And physical reality isn't binary, but triadic, on account of quarks.

I believe the issue with computer coding and the reason binary code is used is that it directly translates to the electronic hardware involved. Yes (switch on) No (switch off).

As if "the study of being" makes any sense whatsoever. Look at yourself, you are studying "being".

Ored wrote:Well the electronic functioning of computers is different from the electro-chemical one of neurons.

Computers have linear strings of data fed through circuits, where these Ons and Not Ons determine what the screen shows.

What does a computer feel? A buzzing, maybe.

Neurons don't use circuits quite so linearly. Not only does electricity activate the release of neurotransmitors, which already surpass the amount of options computers have (2) by virtue of the chemical element, but how much electricity determines how much NT which determines how much electricity. And... Well it's not quite linear. Not engeneered, so all sorts of redundancies and roundaboutnesses.

What do neural networks feel? Dopamine and serotonin, etc.

That's the technical aspect. As I mentioned elswhere, it is intelligent to be aware of Nietzsche's warning that science hides something behind a bush and later acts surprised to find it there.

Philosophers have debated whether pure aprehension of truth is possible. I again like Nietzsche's approach here: it is not, and a certain kind of person celebrates this.

Decartes famously wondered what CAN be directly apprehended that is (as the word apprehension implies) true.

Here my suggestion is not to further stretch the indirect apprehension of the external, to arrive at the in from the out, but to altogether take the in's point of view. Not what do I see that is true, but what do I am that is true.