Private correspondence on "Rule." (2017/05/30-07/02)

Here's my complete private correspondence with someone I knew vaguely.

:::

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Sauwelios, I am wondering if you know why Socrates was against democracy, why Leo Strauss repeatedly stresses that the ancients knew all that the moderns know, and why Strauss repeatedly indicates that science would best be withheld from the public?

If you are coming to the same answer to this riddle as I am, then you will find that the answer to all of them is the same.

Hint 1:
Imagine that Nietzsche was a more perfect Thrasymachus who, in place of the philanthropy which grounds the noble lie, reveals the first principle which grounds his philanthropy. Can you see why the ancients would be dissatisfied with Nietzsche's remedy despite his truth?

Hint 1.5:
For whom (or for which manifestations) is Nietzsche's philanthropy, if the highest value is life?

Hint 2:
What is nihilism?

***

Saully:

Well, as soon as I'd read all three of your questions, I was inclined to answer "historical recurrence". Socrates was against democracy because it tends to lead to ochlocracy. Strauss repeatedly stresses that the ancients knew all that the moderns know because they had already "been there, done that"--gone through the whole anacyclosis. And Strauss repeatedly indicates science would best be withheld from the public because "[p]resent day tyranny, in contradistinction to classical tyranny, is based on the unlimited progress in the 'conquest of nature' which is made possible by modern science, as well as on the popularization or diffusion of philosophic or scientific knowledge." (Strauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero".)

Now your first hint seemed to suggest to me that Nietzsche (or those who represent him) should be tamed by a new Socrates, or that a new Plato should combine the way of Socrates with the way of Nietzsche. However that may be, let me answer the question at the end of your first hint with, "because his truth is deadly." This then directly connects your first hint to your second (hint 1.5).

The philanthropy that grounds the noble lie is the love of the true man, the genuine philosopher. The first principle that grounds that philanthropy, then, is philosophy, the most spiritual will to power. If the highest value is life, Nietzsche's philanthrophy is for those (manifestations) that have the potential for the highest life, "the most high-spirited, alive, and world-affirming human being[s]" (BGE 56). All of existence is life for Nietzsche, and the eternity of life is the highest value, but life is still a hierarchy. Nihilism is the self-devaluation of the highest values, the categories of reason ("aim", "unity", "being"--Will to Power nrs. 2, 12). The true man, the genuine philosopher is the man who has the complete logos. "In the beginning was poieseos poiesis!"

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Thank you for your response, I appreciate you taking the time to make it.

***

Saully:

Aren't you going to tell me whether my answer is the same as yours?

I think my last paragraph may have been overconcentrated and the opposite of what you meant. I'd be happy to explain/discuss.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Your last paragraph was good. Nearly all of your response pointed to what I meant, but I hadn't exactly intended historic recurrence as my answer. But I did wonder if you were thinking something more when you said historical recurrence, and of course it wouldn't be irrelevant to what I was thinking. I suppose I had considered a more detailed account and did not know how to respond without accepting or rejecting your answer, because neither would be my intention. As I said, nearly all your answers seemed to point to what I was intending. I will address what you said and then give my answer and you can see how you accept it, reject it, or something else.

I agree that Socrates did not like ochlocracy, but I had hoped to get at why he did not like it. This relates to the diffusion of philosophic and scientific knowledge. I will get to it in a moment. The answer that made me most uncertain that we were of the same mind was in regards to why Strauss repeatedly stresses that the ancients knew what the moderns knew.

The sentence which immediately follows the one you quoted from Hiero is a restatement of this idea, in fact: "Both possibilities—the possibility of a science that issues in the conquest of nature and the possibility of the popularization of philosophy or science—were known to the classics."

That would indicate that the difference between classical and modern tyranny explained by Strauss in the sentence you quoted was also known to the ancients. The question is then, why did the ancients wish to eschew tyranny in the modern sense?

I am not sure if you read the Hiero, but the teaching is in some important senses similar to that of The Republic. To put it simply, almost basely, in both works the philosophers teach the ruler how to make his subjects desire his rule. The Republic contains significantly more than this, and in that sense is a more significant work, but this is beside my point for the moment. I am curious here whether you think that Nietzsche provides a similar teaching? I personally do not think he does, and that is one important difference between Nietzsche and the ancients, and a similarity between Nietzsche and Thrasymachus, who as a sophist would teach his students the lust to rule.

As to why Socrates did not like ochlocracy and why philosophic knowledge and science was considered not to be proper for dissemination is because it brings about nihilism. This is also the real reason that Socrates opposed the sophistic revolution, not because they charged money for their teaching. The majority of men cannot handle the deadly truth of philosophic knowledge because they will never be able to live up to it. If we again consider The Republic, Socrates' notion of justice is that each citizen do the work which is proper to him. The majority of guardians will not be philosophers, and the majority of the workers will not attain rule.

This is a problem. I want to be clear that I do not mean that Nietzsche should be tamed, and also that we have gone too far to use the same methods as Plato and the ancients. The scientific revolution is in nature very different than the sophistic revolution, not to mention that the scientific revolution was enacted much more successfully and self-consciously and for very different reasons. There is a certain sense in which I think it is fair to say that the sophistic revolution was more of a flowering of consciousness which in a certain way completes itself with the self-consciousness of the Socratic school. I don't think the same could be said for the modern scientific revolution, perhaps one could think of something analogous where Nietzsche takes the place of Socrates.

What I am trying to indicate is that the ancients (and Leo Strauss) engaged in an esoteric philosophy to teach true philosophic knowledge, and an exoteric knowledge to teach every individual the form of justice where each will do the work (aim at the goal) proper to him. Strauss, I think, chose to use the same methods as the ancients (if we allow monotheism to be called such, but I do believe, by his own standards, he considered the medieval philosophers ancients, certainly not moderns).

In your last series of videos, I think it was, you indicated that Nietzsche felt there should be new values within their hierarchy. This is also what I am saying, and the hierarchy would reflect the hierarchy of life in the sense indicated by The Republic.

On a separate note, I think you should be careful about adopting the banner of others' ideas, in case they end up taking credit for your work. From what I can tell, you are too keen to let your efforts fall beneath such one-sided loyalty. I will be upfront and tell you that I am also saying this to protect what I am telling you in confidence. I do not wish to see it falling into the wrong hands.

***

Saully:

1.

The sentence which immediately follows the one you quoted from Hiero is a restatement of this idea, in fact: "Both possibilities—the possibility of a science that issues in the conquest of nature and the possibility of the popularization of philosophy or science—were known to the classics."

That would indicate that the difference between classical and modern tyranny explained by Strauss in the sentence you quoted was also known to the ancients. The question is then, why did the ancients wish to eschew tyranny in the modern sense?

I am not sure if you read the Hiero, but the teaching is in some important senses similar to that of The Republic. To put it simply, almost basely, in both works the philosophers teach the ruler how to make his subjects desire his rule. The Republic contains significantly more than this, and in that sense is a more significant work, but this is beside my point for the moment. I am curious here whether you think that Nietzsche provides a similar teaching? I personally do not think he does, and that is one important difference between Nietzsche and the ancients, and a similarity between Nietzsche and Thrasymachus, who as a sophist would teach his students the lust to rule.

So then The Republic and the Hiero both teach those who believe the pleasure for power is the highest pleasure that they may best make their students desire their rule by teaching them that commanding is harder than obeying. Nietzsche does the same thing, but does so while appealing to the _pride_ of the potential Alcibiadeses: they will still want to command, in fact they'll want to interpret their obedience to him as itself a form of commanding, a bearing of the cross of commanding while really doing his dirty work. For what greater _foil_ to the Order is there than that arrogant spoiled child, the Nietzschean?

Socrates teaches Thrasymachus that he can best make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear, i.e., by deferring to Socrates. Why?

As to why Socrates did not like ochlocracy and why philosophic knowledge and science was considered not to be proper for dissemination is because it brings about nihilism. This is also the real reason that Socrates opposed the sophistic revolution, not because they charged money for their teaching. The majority of men cannot handle the deadly truth of philosophic knowledge because they will never be able to live up to it.

Yes, but why does Socrates care? In my view it is not in the first place out of compassion for the majority. It is out of fellow feeling with the minority, with those who shall feel the wrath of the hurt majority. But where is the angry mob of today? It is diffused, as Strauss said ("diffusion" being the word I was looking for in one of my videos).

::

2.

Dear [contact],

I'm aware that my reply is long overdue, so I'll try to be succinct. Yes, Strauss chose to use the same methods as the ancients (though note that "ancients" here really only means the Platonic Age, meaning from Plato to Machiavelli. The Sophistic revolution certainly led to a crisis, which is why Socrates and Plato felt impelled to do what they did). But Machiavelli, too, had good reasons to do what he did, and moreover, we now live five centuries hence. You say:

As to why Socrates did not like ochlocracy and why philosophic knowledge and science was considered not to be proper for dissemination is because it brings about nihilism. This is also the real reason that Socrates opposed the sophistic revolution, not because they charged money for their teaching. The majority of men cannot handle the deadly truth of philosophic knowledge because they will never be able to live up to it.

Sure, but that knowledge has been diffused so far by now, and nature conquered, that we cannot go back to Platonism. But then you also say that:

If we again consider The Republic, Socrates' notion of justice is that each citizen do the work which is proper to him. The majority of guardians will not be philosophers, and the majority of the workers will not attain rule.

This is a problem. I want to be clear that I do not mean that Nietzsche should be tamed, and also that we have gone too far to use the same methods as Plato and the ancients. The scientific revolution is in nature very different than the sophistic revolution, not to mention that the scientific revolution was enacted much more successfully and self-consciously and for very different reasons. There is a certain sense in which I think it is fair to say that the sophistic revolution was more of a flowering of consciousness which in a certain way completes itself with the self-consciousness of the Socratic school. I don't think the same could be said for the modern scientific revolution, perhaps one could think of something analogous where Nietzsche takes the place of Socrates.

What I am trying to indicate is that the ancients (and Leo Strauss) engaged in an esoteric philosophy to teach true philosophic knowledge, and an exoteric knowledge to teach every individual the form of justice where each will do the work (aim at the goal) proper to him. Strauss, I think, chose to use the same methods as the ancients (if we allow monotheism to be called such, but I do believe, by his own standards, he considered the medieval philosophers ancients, certainly not moderns).

In your last series of videos, I think it was, you indicated that Nietzsche felt there should be new values within their hierarchy. This is also what I am saying, and the hierarchy would reflect the hierarchy of life in the sense indicated by The Republic.

I'm reminded of this passage:

"The one movement is unconditionally: the levelling of humanity, great ant-hills etc. The other movement, my movement: is conversely the sharpening of all antitheses and clefts, abolition of equality, the production of supreme men [Übermächtiger].
The former generates the last man, my movement the Overman. It is absolutely not the intention to conceive of the latter as the lords of the former, but two species [Arten] shall exist alongside each other,--separated as much as possible; the one, like the Epicurean gods, unconcerned with the other." (Nietzsche, Nachlass, my translation.)

Anyway, I (now) think the issue is one between heterophilia and homophilia. As Shadia Drury writes:

"There are ['in the Straussian scheme of things'] indeed three types of men: the wise, the gentlemen, and the vulgar. The wise are the lovers of the harsh, unadulterated truth. They are capable of looking into the abyss without fear and trembling. They recognise neither God nor moral imperatives. They are devoted above all else to their own pursuit of the 'higher' pleasures, which amount to consorting with their 'puppies' or young initiates.

The second type, the gentlemen, are lovers of honour and glory. They are the most ingratiating towards the conventions of their society--that is, the illusions of the cave. They are true believers in God, honour, and moral imperatives. They are ready and willing to embark on acts of great courage and self-sacrifice at a moment’s notice.

The third type, the vulgar many, are lovers of wealth and pleasure. They are selfish, slothful, and indolent. They can be inspired to rise above their brutish existence only by fear of impending death or catastrophe." (http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article5010.htm)

Classical philosophy became politic(al) for the sake of "puppies". But what if modern philosophy becomes political for the sake of "kittens" instead? What I mean is this: modernity, for example modern (i.e., basically post-1600) music, is basically for women. Thus Nietzsche writes:

"Mohammedanism, as a religion for men, is deeply contemptuous of the sentimentality and mendaciousness of Christianity--which it feels to be a women's religion." (WP 145.)

Christianity, not Islam, was of course the popular Platonism which led to the necessity of the Machiavellian turn into modernity. And as for the example of music, I have tried to explain it in this thread: http://www.ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=187862

A "frenemy" of mine has in the past suggested that Nietzsche was gay. However that may be, as regards music he still seems to have thought in terms of tonal music. To be sure, his own music was already crossing the boundaries of so-called "classical" music (his music was what eventually led me to turn away from tonal music), and the 1890s saw the first experiments in atonal music. By the way, the track that I described in one of my videos as "World War III" is this: https://billboethiusdaliscar.bandcamp.com/track/alien-footprint

On a separate note, I think you should be careful about adopting the banner of others' ideas, in case they end up taking credit for your work. From what I can tell, you are too keen to let your efforts fall beneath such one-sided loyalty. I will be upfront and tell you that I am also saying this to protect what I am telling you in confidence. I do not wish to see it falling into the wrong hands.

I take it that by "banner" you're referring to the "Value Ontologists". Well, I think perhaps I should speak on that "ontology" more explicitly. I've written on it in "a tutorial in Platonic political philosophy" which I wrote in late 2015 (here in a quick translation):

"[N]ot only are the said value sets [peace and security, excitement and sensation] valuable only insofar as people insist on their being valuable, but man himself only exists insofar as he insists that he exists... The latter idea, that beings exist only insofar as they value themselves, is of the essence of value ontology." ([Link replaced: https://pathos-of-distance.forumotion.com/t37-a-tutorial-in-platonic-political-philosophy])

I also think I should probably make my videos in Dutch from now on.

Best regards,

Pseudo-Sol/Helios

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Sauwelios wrote:Socrates teaches Thrasymachus that he can best make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear, i.e., by deferring to Socrates. Why?

Why do you think that Socrates goal was to teach Thrasymachus to make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear? Are you differentiating between Thrasymachus' students and his audience?

Sauwelios wrote:So then The Republic and the Hiero both teach those who believe the pleasure for power is the highest pleasure that they may best make their students desire their rule by teaching them that commanding is harder than obeying. Nietzsche does the same thing, but does so while appealing to the _pride_ of the potential Alcibiadeses: they will still want to command, in fact they'll want to interpret their obedience to him as itself a form of commanding, a bearing of the cross of commanding while really doing his dirty work. For what greater _foil_ to the Order is there than that arrogant spoiled child, the Nietzschean?

I am not sure that we are in complete alignment. In the above you have also used the word students in such a way that I am unsure you are differentiating students from audience.

The reason I think this is important is because I do not think that the students of Socrates, Xenophon, or Nietzsche need to be convinced in this manner.

There might be a conflict between us in our epistemology.

Sauwelios wrote:Yes, but why does Socrates care? In my view it is not in the first place out of compassion for the majority. It is out of fellow feeling with the minority, with those who shall feel the wrath of the hurt majority. But where is the angry mob of today?

But are you suggesting that Socrates felt threatened, or felt that philosophers were threatened, by the mob?

I do not think it was out of compassion either, how could it be construed as compassionate to convince others to do what is not in their best interest? Because they are incapable of achieving anything truly good? Perhaps such reasoning would be sufficient for slaves but it would seem something out of a comedy to think it would be reason enough even for the vulgar, and, by the definition you provided from Drury, would contradict their own nature to accept.

At the risk of appearing too tongue in cheek, wouldn't it be correct to say that Socrates cared insofar as he was as a god?

Sauwelios wrote: But Machiavelli, too, had good reasons to do what he did, and moreover, we now live five centuries hence.

I agree and I understand you.

Sauwelios wrote:Sure, but that knowledge has been diffused so far by now, and nature conquered, that we cannot go back to Platonism. But then you also say that:

I disagree that nature has been conquered. That is at bottom an illusion. Nature itself dictates the ways in which it can be dealt with. In order to practice science we must look at nature in such a way that we see it as it is (we see nature as it wants us to see it) and when we recombine its elements we do so under the laws of possibility which are in turn dictated by nature. In other words, when we think we are conquering nature, we are in reality merely doing the bidding of nature, by its own rules of potentiality. All of this on top of the fact that humans derived from nature, including our characteristics and our potentialities, and so our inclinations are also part of nature's bidding, and not its mastery.

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

I think that an important consideration should be appended to Strauss's division of the types of men:

Sauwelios wrote:The wise are the lovers of the harsh, unadulterated truth. They are capable of looking into the abyss without fear and trembling. They recognise neither God nor moral imperatives.

I think it would clarify things to further separate the wise between those who know (who are wise to the state of things) and those who can do, who can act wisely.

Sauwelios wrote:Classical philosophy became politic(al) for the sake of "puppies". But what if modern philosophy becomes political for the sake of "kittens" instead?

I am not sure what you are saying here. It seems like your saying what if ... in the future, but by what follows it seems you are saying that modern philosophy had already become political for the sake of kittens. Either way, I am not sure what you are implying by it.

I will add though that in my estimation, and I think this accounts for a significant difference between modern and ancient philosophy, is that modern philosophy took a trajectory which was not philosophical at all. Yes, the early modern philosophers were indeed philosophers, as was Nietzsche, but insofar as modern science is an offshoot of modern philosophy it is not philosophy. I mean this in a way similar to saying that ancient science was not the same as ancient philosophy. The main difference is that ancient philosophy was not oriented to ancient science in the same way that modern philosophy surely became — I would allow the objection that the Germans made a strong attempt to rectify that.

Sauwelios wrote:I take it that by "banner" you're referring to the "Value Ontologists".

Understand that I advised you to be cautious in full knowledge that even if you did take that advice, you would be deciding what caution could mean in such a context.

Sauwelios wrote:"[N]ot only are the said value sets [peace and security, excitement and sensation] valuable only insofar as people insist on their being valuable, but man himself only exists insofar as he insists that he exists... The latter idea, that beings exist only insofar as they value themselves, is of the essence of value ontology."

I take no real issue with the idea behind that. Though I might suggest a few steps taken further. One doesn't only exist insofar as he insists that he exists, but also insofar as he is capable of continuing to exist, and insofar as conditions were laid down before him which brought him into existence and enabled the continuance of his existence.

Where I continue to advise caution is in holding this idea to account for the grounds of being/becoming (ie. to be a grounding ontology).

As for making your videos in Dutch, I am not sure why you wished to disclose that to me. Of course that means I will not have the ability to view them in the future.

***

Saully:

First off, I apologise for the character of my last message. All of part 1 and most of part 2 was written in a "heightened state". It's easy to be tempted or distracted in such a state.

Sauwelios wrote:Socrates teaches Thrasymachus that he can best make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear, i.e., by deferring to Socrates. Why?

Why do you think that Socrates goal was to teach Thrasymachus to make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear? Are you differentiating between Thrasymachus' students and his audience?

No, I think Socrates saw that the students of the Sophists tended to be divided between a will to tyranny and a will to the morality of their fathers--and that ultimately, they wanted to be taught that the latter was in their own best interest (to their own "advantage", as Thrasymachus said before being enlightened by Socrates). I got most of this from Lampert's How Philosophy Became Socratic, by the way.

Sauwelios wrote:So then The Republic and the Hiero both teach those who believe the pleasure for power is the highest pleasure that they may best make their students desire their rule by teaching them that commanding is harder than obeying. Nietzsche does the same thing, but does so while appealing to the _pride_ of the potential Alcibiadeses: they will still want to command, in fact they'll want to interpret their obedience to him as itself a form of commanding, a bearing of the cross of commanding while really doing his dirty work. For what greater _foil_ to the Order is there than that arrogant spoiled child, the Nietzschean?

I am not sure that we are in complete alignment. In the above you have also used the word students in such a way that I am unsure you are differentiating students from audience.

The reason I think this is important is because I do not think that the students of Socrates, Xenophon, or Nietzsche need to be convinced in this manner.

There might be a conflict between us in our epistemology.

Right, I meant the students who sought them out for money. Those for whom Socrates' exoteric teaching was meant.

Here I was tempted into a kind of self-pity, I suppose--though I also couldn't be sure it wasn't correct; Nietzsche might have engaged in a form of "transgressive sacrality". Thus he wrote:

"Whether we immoralists harm  virtue?--Just as little as anarchists harm princes. Only since the latter are shot at do they sit firmly on their thrones again. Moral: one must shoot at morality." (Twilight of the Idols, "Maxims and Arrows", nr. 36 whole.)

I usually think he meant this ironically,  if not sarcastically, though.

In my experience, especially since I first began seriously studying him after reading Zarathustra's speech on "The Bestowing Virtue", Nietzsche appeals to the pride of his students, or audience if you will.

I think I was wrong to suggest that the audience of the Sophists-turned-philosophers would be dissuaded from wanting to rule by the teaching that commanding is harder than obeying. Glaucon accepts living in a "city of pigs" if he can do so as a "philosopher-dog". Pride or vanity and the supposed rewards in the afterlife suffice.

Excuse me for the tentativeness or inchoateness of these thoughts.

Sauwelios wrote:Yes, but why does Socrates care? In my view it is not in the first place out of compassion for the majority. It is out of fellow feeling with the minority, with those who shall feel the wrath of the hurt majority. But where is the angry mob of today?

But are you suggesting that Socrates felt threatened, or felt that philosophers were threatened, by the mob?

Most certainly. And not just or even especially by the mob (Drury's "vulgar many"), as by the "Wasps" (as in Aristotle's play) themselves. Thus Glaucon, I think, says he could easily imagine and I think might even help those who would rush at and assault Socrates for his idea of the philosopher-kings.

I do not think it was out of compassion either, how could it be construed as compassionate to convince others to do what is not in their best interest? Because they are incapable of achieving anything truly good? Perhaps such reasoning would be sufficient for slaves but it would seem something out of a comedy to think it would be reason enough even for the vulgar, and, by the definition you provided from Drury, would contradict their own nature to accept.

Well, but is it not really in their best interest? As you said before, "The majority of men cannot handle the deadly truth of philosophic knowledge because they will never be able to live up to it."

At the risk of appearing too tongue in cheek, wouldn't it be correct to say that Socrates cared insofar as he was as a god?

Still not sure what you mean. Why would a god care, then?

Sauwelios wrote: But Machiavelli, too, had good reasons to do what he did, and moreover, we now live five centuries hence.

I agree and I understand you.

Sauwelios wrote:Sure, but that knowledge has been diffused so far by now, and nature conquered, that we cannot go back to Platonism. But then you also say that:

I disagree that nature has been conquered. That is at bottom an illusion. Nature itself dictates the ways in which it can be dealt with. In order to practice science we must look at nature in such a way that we see it as it is (we see nature as it wants us to see it) and when we recombine its elements we do so under the laws of possibility which are in turn dictated by nature. In other words, when we think we are conquering nature, we are in reality merely doing the bidding of nature, by its own rules of potentiality. All of this on top of the fact that humans derived from nature, including our characteristics and our potentialities, and so our inclinations are also part of nature's bidding, and not its mastery.

I agree, but think this applies only to nature in the non-distinctive sense. Natures, plural, have definitely been conquered to a great extent. Of course, we cannot conquer--alter--what modern science has called "physical laws". But human nature, say, is much more than just physical laws. An insect, to use the example from Kafka's "Metamorphosis", complies with physical laws as much as a man does. Thus science could transform a man into an insect without breaking any physical law. I quote again:

"The one movement is unconditional(ly): the levelling of humanity, great ant-hills etc."

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

I think that an important consideration should be appended to Strauss's division of the types of men:

Sauwelios wrote:The wise are the lovers of the harsh, unadulterated truth. They are capable of looking into the abyss without fear and trembling. They recognise neither God nor moral imperatives.

I think it would clarify things to further separate the wise between those who know (who are wise to the state of things) and those who can do, who can act wisely.

Sure, one can know without being able to do anything with one's knowledge. Is that what you mean?

Sauwelios wrote:Classical philosophy became politic(al) for the sake of "puppies". But what if modern philosophy becomes political for the sake of "kittens" instead?

I am not sure what you are saying here. It seems like your saying what if ... in the future, but by what follows it seems you are saying that modern philosophy had already become political for the sake of kittens. Either way, I am not sure what you are implying by it.

I meant to distinguish between puppies and kittens as between young men and young women. And yes, I didn't so much mean in the future. Perhaps I should have written "has become political".

I will add though that in my estimation, and I think this accounts for a significant difference between modern and ancient philosophy, is that modern philosophy took a trajectory which was not philosophical at all. Yes, the early modern philosophers were indeed philosophers, as was Nietzsche, but insofar as modern science is an offshoot of modern philosophy it is not philosophy. I mean this in a way similar to saying that ancient science was not the same as ancient philosophy. The main difference is that ancient philosophy was not oriented to ancient science in the same way that modern philosophy surely became — I would allow the objection that the Germans made a strong attempt to rectify that.

Sauwelios wrote:I take it that by "banner" you're referring to the "Value Ontologists".

Understand that I advised you to be cautious in full knowledge that even if you did take that advice, you would be deciding what caution could mean in such a context.

Sauwelios wrote:"[N]ot only are the said value sets [peace and security, excitement and sensation] valuable only insofar as people insist on their being valuable, but man himself only exists insofar as he insists that he exists... The latter idea, that beings exist only insofar as they value themselves, is of the essence of value ontology."

I take no real issue with the idea behind that. Though I might suggest a few steps taken further. One doesn't only exist insofar as he insists that he exists, but also insofar as he is capable of continuing to exist, and insofar as conditions were laid down before him which brought him into existence and enabled the continuance of his existence.

Where I continue to advise caution is in holding this idea to account for the grounds of being/becoming (ie. to be a grounding ontology).

As for making your videos in Dutch, I am not sure why you wished to disclose that to me. Of course that means I will not have the ability to view them in the future.

Right, and I regret that, but I just find it too frustrating to not be able to readily find a suitable word every other word. In writing, that's less of problem, because my audience can't really tell how long the pauses between my words are...

I think I agree with you on modern science. And as for "value ontology", yes, there's considerably more to it than just the will of the individual.

Now I'm kind of spent, so I'll just call it a post. All of this was written sober, by the way.[/quote]

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

You have no need to apologise for your state when you write to me or the content of your responses. Do you not also think that orienting yourself to the future is a little like groping around in the darkness?

In regards to our discussion of The Republic, though I suppose this would go for many philosophical texts, I am wondering about your understanding of esoteric and exoteric. Perhaps it is there that our interpretations are in a certain misalignment.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:Socrates teaches Thrasymachus that he can best make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear, i.e., by deferring to Socrates. Why?

Why do you think that Socrates goal was to teach Thrasymachus to make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear? Are you differentiating between Thrasymachus' students and his audience?

No, I think Socrates saw that the students of the Sophists tended to be divided between a will to tyranny and a will to the morality of their fathers--and that ultimately, they wanted to be taught that the latter was in their own best interest (to their own "advantage", as Thrasymachus said before being enlightened by Socrates). I got most of this from Lampert's How Philosophy Became Socratic, by the way.

If we are talking about those who wished to be taught morality, in regards to your first question of Why?, then I do not think that these were the true students of the philosophers. In The Republic (I do not have my books with me so I cannot quote, unfortunately) after Socrates has his first discussion with Thrasymachus and then Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates says that they will continue to tell the children salutary tales when they are young and impressionable. Would that be along the same lines of what you're asking why about?

I do not see Glaucon or Adeimantus as Socrates true students. Glaucon insists that his city have certain luxuries. This transitional piece, as I understood it, had two roles in The Republic. First it was to show Glaucon's character and what he held to be important (and thus revealing his inadequacy to be Socrates true student) but also, on a more primary level, to illustrate how necessity is influenced by the character of the mass of men.

I am wondering, now, how familiar you are with the work The Statesman? Certain of your questions, such as the one below about why Socrates, in his similarity to a god, would care about the goals of the working class (if you will allow me to call it that), make me wonder about what your thoughts are. I almost want to ask, why do you think he would not care? But it is not my intention to obfuscate the discussion, though I admit to a bit of playfulness on my part.

I think the answers to your why above and why Socrates would care about nihilism infecting the workers are deeply related. They are ways which maintain a well ordered republic. Socrates plays the role of the god who orders human affairs. This doesn't only mean keeping the citizens in line, it also means directing their aims of the citizens.

As a sort of reiteration of asking you why a god wouldn't care: why do you think that the gods of the Iliad take a role in human affairs? I was aware that I was taking a risk of obscuring things when I suggested that Socrates was acting like a god. I was hoping that you would consider relationship of humans to gods. Anyway, I have gone a step further in stating my view straightforwardly above.

In regard to the Nietzsche quote you shared about shooting at morality. I agree with Nietzsche that by it one does not harm virtue, because there are many kinds of virtue, and there are different virtues for different people. There are the virtues, or morals, for the gentlemen, virtues for the workers, and virtues for the rulers. You could call them values, or morals, it is really a matter of communicating.

Sauwelios wrote:Pride or vanity and the supposed rewards in the afterlife suffice.

Do you think these are necessary for true philosophers?

Sauwelios wrote:Most certainly. And not just or even especially by the mob (Drury's "vulgar many"), as by the "Wasps" (as in Aristotle's play) themselves. Thus Glaucon, I think, says he could easily imagine and I think might even help those who would rush at and assault Socrates for his idea of the philosopher-kings.

I am not sure how we would resolve such a disagreement. As I said, I do not have my texts at hand to engage in any kind of exegesis, not that I am convinced it would be worth the work in this matter. I do not think that Glaucon is a reliable witness in this matter. And of course we have to be wary of any irony in Socrates' remarks. I have given my position above on why Socrates plants aims in all of the classes of his society (except the philosophers).

Sauwelios wrote:

I do not think it was out of compassion either, how could it be construed as compassionate to convince others to do what is not in their best interest? Because they are incapable of achieving anything truly good? Perhaps such reasoning would be sufficient for slaves but it would seem something out of a comedy to think it would be reason enough even for the vulgar, and, by the definition you provided from Drury, would contradict their own nature to accept.

Well, but is it not really in their best interest? As you said before, "The majority of men cannot handle the deadly truth of philosophic knowledge because they will never be able to live up to it."

Isn't it in one's best interests to overcome one's own limitations? They could never, of their own accord, attain the best possible state, that is true, but do you think that it is not in their interests to bring about a worse state which provides them more of what they love or desire?

Sauwelios wrote:

I disagree that nature has been conquered. That is at bottom an illusion. Nature itself dictates the ways in which it can be dealt with. In order to practice science we must look at nature in such a way that we see it as it is (we see nature as it wants us to see it) and when we recombine its elements we do so under the laws of possibility which are in turn dictated by nature. In other words, when we think we are conquering nature, we are in reality merely doing the bidding of nature, by its own rules of potentiality. All of this on top of the fact that humans derived from nature, including our characteristics and our potentialities, and so our inclinations are also part of nature's bidding, and not its mastery.

I agree, but think this applies only to nature in the non-distinctive sense. Natures, plural, have definitely been conquered to a great extent. Of course, we cannot conquer--alter--what modern science has called "physical laws". But human nature, say, is much more than just physical laws. An insect, to use the example from Kafka's "Metamorphosis", complies with physical laws as much as a man does. Thus science could transform a man into an insect without breaking any physical law. I quote again:

"The one movement is unconditional(ly): the levelling of humanity, great ant-hills etc."

Wouldn't this depend on what one considers to be nature? The manifestation of the forms of nature's is not, in my view, nature itself. In regard to the changing of man, if a man is able to be transformed in a certain way, is it not in his nature to be capable of transformation? That is what I meant. As I see it, nature has always been in forms of flux and metamorphosis. The only difference is that humans are the ones doing nature's transformative work. For that reason I do not see us as nature's conquerers but continue to be her vassals. Sure, we could say we have mastered the art of certain manifestations, but what is that really?

If you wish to discuss the idea of nature further, or continue to take issue with what I've written, I am interested to hear it. I think we will both agree it is a subject of primary significance.

Sauwelios wrote:Sure, one can know without being able to do anything with one's knowledge. Is that what you mean?

It is what I mean to a degree though I don't want to get entangled because of your wording, not to accuse you of such tricks. I don't exactly mean that they cannot do anything with their knowledge, I meant more particularly that they cannot enact the details that their knowledge would dictate or reveal, just to be clear.

Sauwelios wrote:I meant to distinguish between puppies and kittens as between young men and young women. And yes, I didn't so much mean in the future. Perhaps I should have written "has become political".

I understood that you were distinguishing a political philosophy for the sake of men and for women, but I wasn't sure of your intention in bringing it up.

***

Saully:

You have no need to apologise for your state when you write to me or the content of your responses. Do you not also think that orienting yourself to the future is a little like groping around in the darkness?

Well said. I'm reminded of Picht's Nietzsche.

In regards to our discussion of The Republic, though I suppose this would go for many philosophical texts, I am wondering about your understanding of esoteric and exoteric. Perhaps it is there that our interpretations are in a certain misalignment.

My understanding of esoteric and exoteric is as follows. Socrates says different things to different types of listeners. Most basically there are two types: as Lampert calls them in Nietzsche and Modern Times, lovers of wisdom and lovers of honour (there is a third type, the lovers of well-being and ease, but I don't think there's a separate exoteric layer for them. We may say, then, that Socrates addresses them in addressing the lovers of honour). Now the lovers of wisdom are the Sophists as well as the philosophers: originally, e.g. in Aristophanes, Socrates himself was a Sophist. In Plato, at least, Socrates convinces Sophists like Protagoras and Thrasymachus to become philosophers instead (i.e., to don the cloak of modesty with regard to wisdom). If Socrates didn't do so, his kin would teach lovers of honour--like Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides--to become tyrants. Socrates failed with regard to the three I just mentioned, because he realised too late what really needed to be done, but he succeeded with regard to, say, Glaucon. More on this below.

Sauwelios wrote:

Why do you think that Socrates goal was to teach Thrasymachus to make his students desire his teaching by teaching them what they want to hear? Are you differentiating between Thrasymachus' students and his audience?

No, I think Socrates saw that the students of the Sophists tended to be divided between a will to tyranny and a will to the morality of their fathers--and that ultimately, they wanted to be taught that the latter was in their own best interest (to their own "advantage", as Thrasymachus said before being enlightened by Socrates). I got most of this from Lampert's How Philosophy Became Socratic, by the way.

If we are talking about those who wished to be taught morality, in regards to your first question of Why?, then I do not think that these were the true students of the philosophers. In The Republic (I do not have my books with me so I cannot quote, unfortunately) after Socrates has his first discussion with Thrasymachus and then Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates says that they will continue to tell the children salutary tales when they are young and impressionable. Would that be along the same lines of what you're asking why about?

Right. I first used the word "students" with regard to young men like Glaucon and Adeimantus--the prospective students of the Sophists. But the true students of the philosophers are indeed not they, but only those with the potential to become philosophers themselves--like Glaucon's brother, Plato... Men like Glaucon will need to continue being told salutary tales, as if they were children.

I do not see Glaucon or Adeimantus as Socrates true students. Glaucon insists that his city have certain luxuries.

And yet Glaucon, at least--not sure about Adeimantus, I don't want to identify them too easily--, is not primarily or ultimately a lover of well-being and ease. His love of honour impels him to embrace a severe life while others wallow in luxury. He prides himself on being philosophical in being a faithful guard-dog of the City.

This transitional piece, as I understood it, had two roles in The Republic. First it was to show Glaucon's character and what he held to be important (and thus revealing his inadequacy to be Socrates true student) but also, on a more primary level, to illustrate how necessity is influenced by the character of the mass of men.

I am wondering, now, how familiar you are with the work The Statesman? Certain of your questions, such as the one below about why Socrates, in his similarity to a god, would care about the goals of the working class (if you will allow me to call it that), make me wonder about what your thoughts are.[/quote]

Right, I don't really know The Statesman. I have some thoughts on philosopher-gods, though:

I almost want to ask, why do you think he would not care? But it is not my intention to obfuscate the discussion, though I admit to a bit of playfulness on my part.

I think the answers to your why above and why Socrates would care about nihilism infecting the workers are deeply related. They are ways which maintain a well ordered republic. Socrates plays the role of the god who orders human affairs. This doesn't only mean keeping the citizens in line, it also means directing their aims of the citizens.

As a sort of reiteration of asking you why a god wouldn't care: why do you think that the gods of the Iliad take a role in human affairs? I was aware that I was taking a risk of obscuring things when I suggested that Socrates was acting like a god. I was hoping that you would consider relationship of humans to gods. Anyway, I have gone a step further in stating my view straightforwardly above.

The question "why would a philosopher-god care", even "why should he care", has occupied me since early 2010. I suppose, to paraphrase one of my "kittens", it's so important to me because I want to want to care, but do not necessarily care; I need a reason for it, or at least a cause. Anyway:

First, consider that Nietzsche compared his Supermen to Epicurean gods. Contrary to the Homeric gods, the Epicurean gods don't care, at least they don't intervene; at most, they look down on us with schadenfreude. Compare BGE 62:

"Suppose we could contemplate the oddly painful and equally crude and subtle comedy of European Christianity with the mocking and aloof eyes of an Epicurean god, I think our amazement and laughter would never end: doesn't it seem that a single will dominated Europe for eighteen centuries--to turn man into a sublime miscarriage? Anyone, however, who approached this almost deliberate degeneration and atrophy of man represented by the Christian European (Pascal, for example), feeling the opposite kind of desire, not in an Epicurean spirit but rather with some divine hammer in his hand, would surely have to cry out in wrath, in pity, in horror: 'O you dolts, you presumptuous, pitying dolts, what have you done! Was that work for your hands? How have you bungled and botched my beautiful stone! What presumption!'" (Kaufmann translation.)

And BGE 295:

"[Dionysus] once said: 'Under certain circumstances I love what is human'--and with this he alluded to Ariadne who was present--'man is to my mind an agreeable, courageous, inventive animal that has no equal on earth; it finds its way in every labyrinth. I am well disposed towards him: I often reflect how I might yet advance him and make him stronger, more evil, and more profound than he is.'
'Stronger, more evil, and more profound?' I asked startled. 'Yes,' he said once more; 'stronger, more evil, and more profound; also more beautiful'--and at that the tempter god smiled with his halcyon smile as though he had just paid an enchanting compliment."

In the Iliad the gods' interference seems to be due to blood-ties and worship: all three goddesses wanted to be pronounced the most beautiful by Paris. But to me that will not do: it should be love of wisdom, not love of honour, that impels me to become political. Or rather, wisdom itself. (Who today understands that "philosopher" is a most exalted title? Let's just call ourselves "wise" again!) Love of play, love of artistic creation. "Therein, that the world be a divine play [or: game] and beyond good and evil, I have Heraclitus and the philosophy of Vedanta as my predecessors." (Nietzsche, Nachlass, my translation.)

In regard to the Nietzsche quote you shared about shooting at morality. I agree with Nietzsche that by it one does not harm virtue, because there are many kinds of virtue, and there are different virtues for different people. There are the virtues, or morals, for the gentlemen, virtues for the workers, and virtues for the rulers. You could call them values, or morals, it is really a matter of communicating.

Sauwelios wrote:Pride or vanity and the supposed rewards in the afterlife suffice.

Do you think these are necessary for true philosophers?

No, I was talking about the lovers of honour.

Sauwelios wrote:Most certainly. And not just or even especially by the mob (Drury's "vulgar many"), as by the "Wasps" (as in Aristotle's play) themselves. Thus Glaucon, I think, says he could easily imagine and I think might even help those who would rush at and assault Socrates for his idea of the philosopher-kings.

I am not sure how we would resolve such a disagreement. As I said, I do not have my texts at hand to engage in any kind of exegesis, not that I am convinced it would be worth the work in this matter. I do not think that Glaucon is a reliable witness in this matter. And of course we have to be wary of any irony in Socrates' remarks. I have given my position above on why Socrates plants aims in all of the classes of his society (except the philosophers).

Not sure you've understood me. What I mean is that the lovers of honour, if not the lovers of well-being and ease, would be a threat to the philosophers if the latter presented themselves as wise (e.g., as Sophists). For one thing, it would mean they did not hide their wisdom, the deadly truths they know.

Sauwelios wrote:

I do not think it was out of compassion either, how could it be construed as compassionate to convince others to do what is not in their best interest? Because they are incapable of achieving anything truly good? Perhaps such reasoning would be sufficient for slaves but it would seem something out of a comedy to think it would be reason enough even for the vulgar, and, by the definition you provided from Drury, would contradict their own nature to accept.

Well, but is it not really in their best interest? As you said before, "The majority of men cannot handle the deadly truth of philosophic knowledge because they will never be able to live up to it."

Isn't it in one's best interests to overcome one's own limitations? They could never, of their own accord, attain the best possible state, that is true, but do you think that it is not in their interests to bring about a worse state which provides them more of what they love or desire?

Well, would that really be a worse state for them, then?

Sauwelios wrote:

I disagree that nature has been conquered. That is at bottom an illusion. Nature itself dictates the ways in which it can be dealt with. In order to practice science we must look at nature in such a way that we see it as it is (we see nature as it wants us to see it) and when we recombine its elements we do so under the laws of possibility which are in turn dictated by nature. In other words, when we think we are conquering nature, we are in reality merely doing the bidding of nature, by its own rules of potentiality. All of this on top of the fact that humans derived from nature, including our characteristics and our potentialities, and so our inclinations are also part of nature's bidding, and not its mastery.

I agree, but think this applies only to nature in the non-distinctive sense. Natures, plural, have definitely been conquered to a great extent. Of course, we cannot conquer--alter--what modern science has called "physical laws". But human nature, say, is much more than just physical laws. An insect, to use the example from Kafka's "Metamorphosis", complies with physical laws as much as a man does. Thus science could transform a man into an insect without breaking any physical law. I quote again:

"The one movement is unconditional(ly): the levelling of humanity, great ant-hills etc."

Wouldn't this depend on what one considers to be nature? The manifestation of the forms of nature's is not, in my view, nature itself. In regard to the changing of man, if a man is able to be transformed in a certain way, is it not in his nature to be capable of transformation? That is what I meant. As I see it, nature has always been in forms of flux and metamorphosis. The only difference is that humans are the ones doing nature's transformative work. For that reason I do not see us as nature's conquerers but continue to be her vassals. Sure, we could say we have mastered the art of certain manifestations, but what is that really?

If you wish to discuss the idea of nature further, or continue to take issue with what I've written, I am interested to hear it. I think we will both agree it is a subject of primary significance.

I wholly agree with you here, but that is not nature as in "the discovery of nature". To be sure, though, four years ago I wrote: "[M]odernity's conquest of nature is essentially the conquest of the nature of nature, which is conquest... A 'war to end all wars'!" What modern man really wants is to conquer the fact that the world is the will to power and nothing besides. But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered, or that nature as a whole can never be conquered, then why engage in political philosophy at all? In a way, that is my problem. I'm reminded:

I wrote:Nietzsche's philosophy is the philosophy of the eternal recurrence [i.e., not of the will to power] [...] for the following reason. Nietzsche defines philosophy as the most spiritual will to power which prescribes to nature what or how it ought to be ([BGE] 9). Nietzsche's philosophy prescribes to nature that it ought to be will to power and nothing besides. However, this means prescribing to it that it ought to be what it most probably is. In other words, commanding it that it be what it most probably is. But how could something not be what it is? How could I command a miserable wretch about nihilism to be a miserable wretch about nihilism? He could not do otherwise if he wanted to! So that's not much of a command. Therefore, the command must be, "remain what you are". But of the essence of what nature is is change. Nietzsche does not command nature to stop changing. What he does is, he commands it to keep changing to all eternity. But change is not all there is to nature; it is a series of specific forms. What Nietzsche does is, he commands nature to be that series of specific forms to all eternity. In other words, he commands it to eternally recur. This is why Nietzsche's philosophy is not simply the philosophy of the will to power, but the philosophy of the eternal recurrence of the will to power: Nietzsche's philosophy prescribes to nature, not that it be what it most probably is, but that it recur eternally as what it most probably is. In other words, he does not prescribe to nature what it ought to be, so much as how it ought to be:

"The determination 'will to power' replies to the question of being with respect to the latter's constitution; the determination 'eternal recurrence of the same' replies to the question of being with respect to its way to be." (Source: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. II, Chap. 26, trans. Krell.)

Now I should probably provide that earlier quote in its larger context:

"It's necessary to affirm eternal return because the only way to assign binding limits to modernity's conquest of nature is, paradoxically, to will its eternal return. After all, anything less than its absolute affirmation would be a saying Nay against it, and thereby itself a call to conquer nature: for modernity's conquest of nature arises 'naturally' from the nature of human herd animals. Indeed, modernity's conquest of nature is essentially the conquest of the nature of nature, which is conquest... A 'war to end all wars'!"

Sauwelios wrote:Sure, one can know without being able to do anything with one's knowledge. Is that what you mean?

It is what I mean to a degree though I don't want to get entangled because of your wording, not to accuse you of such tricks. I don't exactly mean that they cannot do anything with their knowledge, I meant more particularly that they cannot enact the details that their knowledge would dictate or reveal, just to be clear.

Sauwelios wrote:I meant to distinguish between puppies and kittens as between young men and young women. And yes, I didn't so much mean in the future. Perhaps I should have written "has become political".

I understood that you were distinguishing a political philosophy for the sake of men and for women, but I wasn't sure of your intention in bringing it up.

I was thinking of this, though it turns out I didn't remember it very well:

"In contrast to the political man, the wise man wants neither to love nor be loved. He knows that the desire to be loved necessarily leads to servitude. Instead of love, he seeks admiration, not by everyone, but by a 'competent minority'. [...] [Lucretius advises] those who would be happy to forsake the pleasures of Venus altogether. Strauss wonders if this is not too drastic a solution. He complains that the Epicurian conception of philosophy is altogether unerotic. It forgets that the philosophical life, for all its detachment, consists mainly in conversations, which require the cooperation and company of others. Strauss subtly suggests that it would be possible to 'enjoy the fruits of Venus' if we 'separate sexual pleasure from love'. In other words, the philosopher should seek the pleasures of sex, friendship and companionship without the shackles of love and family. This is the sort of reasoning that must lead the wise man to prefer boys to women. Strauss makes much of Socrates's charm and seductive qualities which enable him to lure beautiful and promising boys like Kleinias (not to mention Plato) away from politics and the family to a life dedicated to the philosophical eros. There is, in all of this, more than a hint of a fashionable homosexuality." (Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, pp. 69-70.)

I had a bit of an epiphany while writing this post: http://ilovephilosophy.com/viewtopic.php?p=2667471#p2667471

Problem: I'm an incorrigible hetero--

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Sauwelios wrote:In Plato, at least, Socrates convinces Sophists like Protagoras and Thrasymachus to become philosophers instead (i.e., to don the cloak of modesty with regard to wisdom). If Socrates didn't do so, his kin would teach lovers of honour--like Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides--to become tyrants. Socrates failed with regard to the three I just mentioned, because he realised too late what really needed to be done, but he succeeded with regard to, say, Glaucon.

I did not see Socrates as attempting to keep Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides from becoming tyrants. As I saw it, he wished them become successful as tyrants. That is why I said that Glaucon was not Socrates true student. And I would agree with what you said below, that Plato was.

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

I have no real response to the quote about Nietzsche's gods. I will say a little bit soon which could have a connection in this manner.

Sauwelios wrote:In the Iliad the gods' interference seems to be due to blood-ties and worship

I certainly agree with you on these points. There is also dominion invovled, as well as a drive to artistic creation, or  beauty.

Sauwelios wrote:Not sure you've understood me. What I mean is that the lovers of honour, if not the lovers of well-being and ease, would be a threat to the philosophers if the latter presented themselves as wise (e.g., as Sophists). For one thing, it would mean they did not hide their wisdom, the deadly truths they know.

I just meant that I don't believe that the philosophers feared threat. Don't get me wrong, I read those words in Strauss, I believe it was, and likely from other sources, but I don't think that was the reason they presented their teaching that way. Just like I do not think it was a fearlessness or a lack of a need to fear which enabled (or what have you) Nietzsche to present his teaching as he did. I don't remember which book it was in, but I remember Nietzsche saying something along the lines that his teaching would soon become necessary or unavoidable for humanity as they realized the lies of Christianity. Apologies that I can't direct to the exact quote. Again I would bring it back to art, in regards to both Nietzsche and the ancients. I am not sure if you have considered art a lot or studied it a lot, but there are certain necessities for the creation of art which are culturally related, something akin to what Hegel means with the Zeitgeist. I am not saying that I do not think there are timeless truths, but the forms in which truth takes is shaped historically, just as the manifesting forms of existence are historically contingent.

I am worried you will think I am being a blockhead for implying that Plato and Socrates were products of their time and will tell me that they transcended their time. I would agree with the latter or we would have no need to discuss them at all and that is why I do think there is a timelessness to them, but I think there is also historically contingent aspects of them for example the way we said that their methods cannot be used now despite them being so successful at the time, or the way that Nietzsche adopts Jacobi's (though develops the content) and so forth.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, would that really be a worse state for them, then?

Re: the vulgar.

It wouldn't be a worse state for them, but the vulgar are not the highest beings and it was upon those grounds that I say it is a worse state. There is something very much hidden behind this idea. Not that I am hiding it, but something significant at the bottom. It is connected to Nietzsche and what I said above had bearing on the idea of Nietzsche's gods. I will get to it soon.

Sauwelios wrote:I wholly agree with you here, but that is not nature as in "the discovery of nature".

I suppose you would have to explain to me what you mean by the discovery of nature, or I will not know what we are talking about. As far as I understood it, the discovery of nature referred to the discovery of what was unchanging, and so the laws or stable essence behind appearance.

Sauwelios wrote:What modern man really wants is to conquer the fact that the world is the will to power and nothing besides. But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered, or that nature as a whole can never be conquered, then why engage in political philosophy at all?

Re: Red — I think it is the time to say that I do not think that the world is the will to power and nothing besides. That is not to say that I do not think that the will to power is a significant operating force, but I do not think it is the grounds of being/becoming.

Re: Blue — I am not sure why you think that because I don't think that nature can be conquered I would refrain from engaging in political philosophy. On the contrary, the description I made of nature in my previous message provided a hint of the reason that I would engage in philosophy (and also art) as I do.

Sauwelios wrote:Nietzsche's philosophy is the philosophy of the eternal recurrence [i.e., not of the will to power] [...] for the following reason. Nietzsche defines philosophy as the most spiritual will to power which prescribes to nature what or how it ought to be ([BGE] 9). Nietzsche's philosophy prescribes to nature that it ought to be will to power and nothing besides. However, this means prescribing to it that it ought to be what it most probably is. In other words, commanding it that it be what it most probably is. But how could something not be what it is? How could I command a miserable wretch about nihilism to be a miserable wretch about nihilism? He could not do otherwise if he wanted to! So that's not much of a command. Therefore, the command must be, "remain what you are". But of the essence of what nature is is change. Nietzsche does not command nature to stop changing. What he does is, he commands it to keep changing to all eternity. But change is not all there is to nature; it is a series of specific forms. What Nietzsche does is, he commands nature to be that series of specific forms to all eternity. In other words, he commands it to eternally recur. This is why Nietzsche's philosophy is not simply the philosophy of the will to power, but the philosophy of the eternal recurrence of the will to power: Nietzsche's philosophy prescribes to nature, not that it be what it most probably is, but that it recur eternally as what it most probably is. In other words, he does not prescribe to nature what it ought to be, so much as how it ought to be:

"The determination 'will to power' replies to the question of being with respect to the latter's constitution; the determination 'eternal recurrence of the same' replies to the question of being with respect to its way to be." (Source: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. II, Chap. 26, trans. Krell.)

It might be fruitful to discuss what you understand by eternal recurrence. Though you might consider my saying that I do not think that the world is will to power and nothing besides a sort of blasphemy, I do not follow the doctrine of eternal recurrence, as I understand it. Closer to my mind would be eternal conversion.

Sauwelios wrote:Strauss makes much of Socrates's charm and seductive qualities which enable him to lure beautiful and promising boys like Kleinias (not to mention Plato) away from politics and the family to a life dedicated to the philosophical eros.

I am sure that I could say more in response to the quote you supplied from Drury, but in relation to this particular chunk, what do you think of Plato's seventh letter?

***

Saully:

First off, I want to say that I made two mistakes in my last message. The first was in the paraphrase of one of my "kittens": the original was "I want to want to live", so the paraphrase should be "I want to care", not "I want to want to care".

The second mistake was a misreading. Somehow when you said, "Do you think these [pride or vanity and the supposed rewards in the afterlife] are necessary for true philosophers?", I thought you were asking if I thought these would suffice for true philosophers. Anyway, my answer is still "No", although I'm divided on the subject of pride.

Sauwelios wrote: In Plato, at least, Socrates convinces Sophists like Protagoras and Thrasymachus to become philosophers instead (i.e., to don the cloak of modesty with regard to wisdom). If Socrates didn't do so, his kin would teach lovers of honour--like Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides--to become tyrants. Socrates failed with regard to the three I just mentioned, because he realised too late what really needed to be done, but he succeeded with regard to, say, Glaucon.

I did not see Socrates as attempting to keep Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides from becoming tyrants. As I saw it, he wished them become successful as tyrants. That is why I said that Glaucon was not Socrates true student. And I would agree with what you said below, that Plato was.

Maybe Socrates at one point did wish them to become successful as tyrants, but then he later realised that was wrong. I remember from Lampert though that he already tried to moderate them before his return from Potideia, but realised only upon his return that he should be much more strict with them. In any case, I group Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides (nice centering there, by the way) with Glaucon, not with Plato. The order of rank of the three is certainly Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, by the way, and perhaps Alcibiades, if not Critias, could have become a Plato if Socrates had made his realisation sooner. Then again, this is highly speculative: I don't understand Plato's Alcibiades well enough, so I could be completely wrong.

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

I have no real response to the quote about Nietzsche's gods. I will say a little bit soon which could have a connection in this manner.

My point was that, while Nietzsche says--in that Notebook (Nachlass) entry--that the Supermen will be like Epicurean gods, he certainly did not conceive his Dionysus as an Epicurean god, but as an artist-god.

Sauwelios wrote:In the Iliad the gods' interference seems to be due to blood-ties and worship

I certainly agree with you on these points. There is also dominion invovled, as well as a drive to artistic creation, or  beauty.

Sure. And to me it's only the latter which is good enough. Artistic creation is a kind of dominion, but only this kind is good enough.

Sauwelios wrote:Not sure you've understood me. What I mean is that the lovers of honour, if not the lovers of well-being and ease, would be a threat to the philosophers if the latter presented themselves as wise (e.g., as Sophists). For one thing, it would mean they did not hide their wisdom, the deadly truths they know.

I just meant that I don't believe that the philosophers feared threat. Don't get me wrong, I read those words in Strauss, I believe it was, and likely from other sources, but I don't think that was the reason they presented their teaching that way. Just like I do not think it was a fearlessness or a lack of a need to fear which enabled (or what have you) Nietzsche to present his teaching as he did. I don't remember which book it was in, but I remember Nietzsche saying something along the lines that his teaching would soon become necessary or unavoidable for humanity as they realized the lies of Christianity. Apologies that I can't direct to the exact quote. Again I would bring it back to art, in regards to both Nietzsche and the ancients.

Yes, that's probably more worthy. At most fear of their "beautiful stone" being "bungled and botched", then! Or maybe the bungled and botched stones' bungling and botching still beautiful ones, or even the beautiful statues sculpted out of such beautiful ones?

I am not sure if you have considered art a lot or studied it a lot, but there are certain necessities for the creation of art which are culturally related, something akin to what Hegel means with the Zeitgeist. I am not saying that I do not think there are timeless truths, but the forms in which truth takes is shaped historically, just as the manifesting forms of existence are historically contingent.

Actually, I started out as an artist (a poet). Conventions are certainly indispensable, an artist cannot emerge in a vacuum. But as for timelessness, I'm reminded of this:

"The outward, public expressions of artistic creation may vary from epoch to epoch, but the 'physiological' preconditions of art remain constant." (Daniel Conway, "Love's labor's lost"/Nietzsche and the political.)

And I've always associated this passage with the following:

"The metaphysical comfort--with which, I am suggesting even now, every true tragedy leaves us--that life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable--this comfort appears in incarnate clarity in the chorus of satyrs, a chorus of natural beings who live ineradicably, as it were, behind all civilization and remain eternally the same, despite the changes of generations and of the history of nations." (Birth of Tragedy 7, Kaufmann trans.)

Enough, or too much, for now. I have to ponder this.

I am worried you will think I am being a blockhead for implying that Plato and Socrates were products of their time and will tell me that they transcended their time. I would agree with the latter or we would have no need to discuss them at all and that is why I do think there is a timelessness to them, but I think there is also historically contingent aspects of them for example the way we said that their methods cannot be used now despite them being so successful at the time, or the way that Nietzsche adopts Jacobi's (though develops the content) and so forth.

I don't think you're being a blockhead, I agree entirely.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, would that really be a worse state for them, then?

Re: the vulgar.

It wouldn't be a worse state for them, but the vulgar are not the highest beings and it was upon those grounds that I say it is a worse state. There is something very much hidden behind this idea. Not that I am hiding it, but something significant at the bottom. It is connected to Nietzsche and what I said above had bearing on the idea of Nietzsche's gods. I will get to it soon.

Sauwelios wrote:I wholly agree with you here, but that is not nature as in "the discovery of nature".

I suppose you would have to explain to me what you mean by the discovery of nature, or I will not know what we are talking about. As far as I understood it, the discovery of nature referred to the discovery of what was unchanging, and so the laws or stable essence behind appearance.

I was referring especially to this:

"The purport of the discovery of nature cannot be grasped if one understands by nature 'the totality of phenomena'. For the discovery of nature consists precisely in the splitting up of that totality into phenomena which are natural and phenomena which are not natural: 'nature' is a term of distinction. Prior to the discovery of nature, the characteristic behavior of any thing or any class of things was conceived of as its custom or its way. That is to say, no fundamental distinction was made between customs or ways which are always and everywhere the same and customs or ways which differ from tribe to tribe. Barking and wagging the tail is the way of dogs, menstruation is the way of women, the crazy things done by madmen are the way of madmen, just as not eating pork is the way of Jews and not drinking wine is the way of Moslems. 'Custom' or 'way' is the prephilosophic equivalent of 'nature'." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 82-83.)

So the discovery of nature is the discovery that there is something like the nature of dogs, the nature of women, etc. It was only with historicism that these natures were no longer regarded as eternal. This is the real problem with the conquest of nature:

"[...] the passage in the Odyssey, where Hermes shows Odysseus a certain herb which he could use for protecting himself and his fellows against Circe. Now in this context, the gods can do everything, the gods are omnipotent one can say, but it is very interesting what this concept means in this context. Why are the gods omnipotent? Because they know the natures of all things, which means, of course, they are not omnipotent. They know the natures of things which are wholly independent of them and through that knowledge they are capable of using all things properly." (Strauss, "Progress or Return?")

Originally, the conquest of nature was knowing the natures of all things in order to use them for the relief of man's estate. But in the course of that conquest, it became clear that man can actually alter the natures of things (including the nature of man!), i.e., that they can be made dependent on him.

Sauwelios wrote:What modern man really wants is to conquer the fact that the world is the will to power and nothing besides. But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered, or that nature as a whole can never be conquered, then why engage in political philosophy at all?

Re: Red — I think it is the time to say that I do not think that the world is the will to power and nothing besides. That is not to say that I do not think that the will to power is a significant operating force, but I do not think it is the grounds of being/becoming.

Well, I'm reminded of Heidegger's notion that "will to power" is Nietzsche's answer to the question "what is being [Seiendes]", not to the question "what is Being [Sein]", which according to Heidegger he had never even considered.

Anyway, I'm interested to know what you do think is the grounds (interesting, too, this plural).

Re: Blue — I am not sure why you think that because I don't think that nature can be conquered I would refrain from engaging in political philosophy. On the contrary, the description I made of nature in my previous message provided a hint of the reason that I would engage in philosophy (and also art) as I do.

Right, that wasn't quite logical. I may have been too attached to the notion that political philosophy be about preserving the nature of man...

Sauwelios wrote:Nietzsche's philosophy is the philosophy of the eternal recurrence [i.e., not of the will to power] [...] for the following reason. Nietzsche defines philosophy as the most spiritual will to power which prescribes to nature what or how it ought to be ([BGE] 9). Nietzsche's philosophy prescribes to nature that it ought to be will to power and nothing besides. However, this means prescribing to it that it ought to be what it most probably is. In other words, commanding it that it be what it most probably is. But how could something not be what it is? How could I command a miserable wretch about nihilism to be a miserable wretch about nihilism? He could not do otherwise if he wanted to! So that's not much of a command. Therefore, the command must be, "remain what you are". But of the essence of what nature is is change. Nietzsche does not command nature to stop changing. What he does is, he commands it to keep changing to all eternity. But change is not all there is to nature; it is a series of specific forms. What Nietzsche does is, he commands nature to be that series of specific forms to all eternity. In other words, he commands it to eternally recur. This is why Nietzsche's philosophy is not simply the philosophy of the will to power, but the philosophy of the eternal recurrence of the will to power: Nietzsche's philosophy prescribes to nature, not that it be what it most probably is, but that it recur eternally as what it most probably is. In other words, he does not prescribe to nature what it ought to be, so much as how it ought to be:

"The determination 'will to power' replies to the question of being with respect to the latter's constitution; the determination 'eternal recurrence of the same' replies to the question of being with respect to its way to be." (Source: Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. II, Chap. 26, trans. Krell.)

It might be fruitful to discuss what you understand by eternal recurrence. Though you might consider my saying that I do not think that the world is will to power and nothing besides a sort of blasphemy, I do not follow the doctrine of eternal recurrence, as I understand it. Closer to my mind would be eternal conversion.

Oh, I don't think of the eternal recurrence as a fact. In fact, I think it's a necessary value if the will to power is to be at the same time a value and a fact (i.e., if the fact that it must be a value is to be preserved in the teeth of thinking of it as a fact). More about this in my next message, I want to finish this one in one session.

Sauwelios wrote:Strauss makes much of Socrates's charm and seductive qualities which enable him to lure beautiful and promising boys like Kleinias (not to mention Plato) away from politics and the family to a life dedicated to the philosophical eros.

I am sure that I could say more in response to the quote you supplied from Drury, but in relation to this particular chunk, what do you think of Plato's seventh letter?

People have referred me to it before, but I still haven't read it, or remembered what it's essentially about. I'll look into it again.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Sauwelios wrote:"The purport of the discovery of nature cannot be grasped if one understands by nature 'the totality of phenomena'. For the discovery of nature consists precisely in the splitting up of that totality into phenomena which are natural and phenomena which are not natural: 'nature' is a term of distinction. Prior to the discovery of nature, the characteristic behavior of any thing or any class of things was conceived of as its custom or its way. That is to say, no fundamental distinction was made between customs or ways which are always and everywhere the same and customs or ways which differ from tribe to tribe. Barking and wagging the tail is the way of dogs, menstruation is the way of women, the crazy things done by madmen are the way of madmen, just as not eating pork is the way of Jews and not drinking wine is the way of Moslems. 'Custom' or 'way' is the prephilosophic equivalent of 'nature'." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 82-83.)

So the discovery of nature is the discovery that there is something like the nature of dogs, the nature of women, etc.

This is also what I have described as nature, do you not agree?

Sauwelios wrote:It was only with historicism that these natures were no longer regarded as eternal.

It is my point of view that nature, insofar as it is nature, continues to be unchanging. The manifestations or forms in which nature can take are subject to change.

Sauwelios wrote:But in the course of that conquest, it became clear that man can actually alter the natures of things (including the nature of man!), i.e., that they can be made dependent on him.

But I do not think that man can change the nature of things. Perhaps it would be clearer if you could provide an example of what had once been a nature that has changed by modern science. Saying "the nature of — had once been — but it is now the nature of — to be (such and such)". Perhaps then I could better understand how nature has been conquered. And as a preconsideration, do you not think it is possible that certain things that were once believed to be nature were not actually so, and that nature was in fact something else?

The example of the dog: If, before modern science, humanity had bred dogs without tails and trained one never to bark, would that be considered conquering the nature of a dog?

The example of a madman: If we, through treatment, or if the madman through his own development, caused him to stop doing crazy things, would this change the nature of madmen so that madmen do not do crazy things, or would it rather be that the man was no longer considered mad insofar as he no longer did crazy things?

Returning to something you said in an earlier message:

Sauwelios wrote:But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered

In what way does the nature of nature differ from nature proper? If I said it is the nature of things to undergo certain changes (as happened before modern science in metamorphosis) and after modern science by man, in what way is the former not rather the nature of things but rather the latter? To put it another way, as I had above: Isn't it possible that what we suspected was the nature of things before were not the nature of things but rather the nature had been something else?

I promise that I am not trying to confuse the matter, I just think this is important. Let's just say, hypothetically, that we go on with this conversation and it turns out that you are right and my previous statement about nature was in some sense false, wouldn't it be more proper to say that, rather than that we have conquered nature, there was never really a nature as it had previously been understood but rather manifestations of (shall we say will to power or are things also sometimes manifestations of something else?) which we were merely as yet unaware of their process of change?

Sauwelios wrote:Maybe Socrates at one point did wish them to become successful as tyrants, but then he later realised that was wrong. I remember from Lampert though that he already tried to moderate them before his return from Potideia, but realised only upon his return that he should be much more strict with them. In any case, I group Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides (nice centering there, by the way) with Glaucon, not with Plato. The order of rank of the three is certainly Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, by the way, and perhaps Alcibiades, if not Critias, could have become a Plato if Socrates had made his realisation sooner. Then again, this is highly speculative: I don't understand Plato's Alcibiades well enough, so I could be completely wrong.

I am not certain how to clear this up at present unless we went deeply into these texts which, even if we were willing to (and as I said I do not have my texts with me), would be a very long process given the intricacy of Plato's works.

I will put forward a difference between the first three names plus Plato and Glaucon. The reasons that the first were Socrates true students was because of the nature of their presence in the world. All of the former are ordering beings, whereas Glaucon was not.

I do agree that Socrates was trying to teach them moderation, but not because he did not want them to become tyrants but because moderation can be understood in broader way than softening your behaviour.

Here is a definition of moderation from Cambridge dictionary: "the quality of doing something within reasonable limits:" But to a philosopher, or philosophically, what prescribes those limits? The limits would be reason (hence, reasonable limits). This brings us back to the teaching of the Hiero. I now recall that when I said that there was a teaching that the Hiero and Republic had in common you brought up that they teach that it is harder to rule than be ruled. That is indeed part of of the teaching, but there is more, perhaps mundane, teachings, like telling the ruler how to reward his subjects to gain their obedience. What I am proposing is that these were ways suggested to bring effort, as well as beauty, to the form of a principality, and it was these forms of moderation that Socrates wished to teach.

There is also another quote which I am sorry I do not have on hand, it is somewhere near the centre of The Republic where Socrates talks somewhat ridiculously about how in Sparta they allowed women to wrestle naked alongside the men in the agora. He says that first everyone laughed until they realized how it successfully contributed to the quality of fighters there, and tells the others that when considering making laws one should not consider whether something appears silly but how successful it is. This would be along the same lines.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:In the Iliad the gods' interference seems to be due to blood-ties and worship

I certainly agree with you on these points. There is also dominion invovled, as well as a drive to artistic creation, or beauty.

Sure. And to me it's only the latter which is good enough. Artistic creation is a kind of dominion, but only this kind is good enough.

But I would say that dominion is a kind of artistry. Also, when one is an artist one chooses from the palette of forms and contents in order to compose the work of art. Wouldn't rejecting some of the modes of past expression be akin to saying that these modes did not suffice for your artistry, rather than that they were not artistry in their own way?

Sauwelios wrote:Anyway, I'm interested to know what you do think is the grounds (interesting, too, this plural).

I think it would be best if we first sorted out our considerations of nature, otherwise, I think, such a revelation would be premature and might simply cause confusion.

Sauwelios wrote:Oh, I don't think of the eternal recurrence as a fact. In fact, I think it's a necessary value if the will to power is to be at the same time a value and a fact (i.e., if the fact that it must be a value is to be preserved in the teeth of thinking of it as a fact). More about this in my next message, I want to finish this one in one session.

I also think it might be helpful to discuss more about eternal recurrence, because what I said about eternal conversion is connected to what I hold to be the grounds of being/becoming.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:Strauss makes much of Socrates's charm and seductive qualities which enable him to lure beautiful and promising boys like Kleinias (not to mention Plato) away from politics and the family to a life dedicated to the philosophical eros.

I am sure that I could say more in response to the quote you supplied from Drury, but in relation to this particular chunk, what do you think of Plato's seventh letter?

People have referred me to it before, but I still haven't read it, or remembered what it's essentially about. I'll look into it again.

The reason I mentioned it was because it indicates that Plato did not avoid politics. I suppose I could have also mentioned The Laws, but the seventh letter indicates something of a more concrete nature.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

I would also like to add one more question, if you will allow it, to kick off our discussion of nature, if indeed we will go through with it. Is the nature of a caterpillar the same as the nature of a butterfly?

***

Saully:

Sauwelios wrote:"The purport of the discovery of nature cannot be grasped if one understands by nature 'the totality of phenomena'. For the discovery of nature consists precisely in the splitting up of that totality into phenomena which are natural and phenomena which are not natural: 'nature' is a term of distinction. Prior to the discovery of nature, the characteristic behavior of any thing or any class of things was conceived of as its custom or its way. That is to say, no fundamental distinction was made between customs or ways which are always and everywhere the same and customs or ways which differ from tribe to tribe. Barking and wagging the tail is the way of dogs, menstruation is the way of women, the crazy things done by madmen are the way of madmen, just as not eating pork is the way of Jews and not drinking wine is the way of Moslems. 'Custom' or 'way' is the prephilosophic equivalent of 'nature'." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 82-83.)

So the discovery of nature is the discovery that there is something like the nature of dogs, the nature of women, etc.

This is also what I have described as nature, do you not agree?

No, I don't. According to your description, there is no such thing as the nature of dogs, but just a phenomenon complying with physical laws which we call "dog". Every "dog", being slightly different, then has a different nature (if it has a nature at all), just as a dog and a cat do: a "cat" is just more different from a "dog" than two "dogs" are from each other.

Sauwelios wrote:It was only with historicism that these natures were no longer regarded as eternal.

It is my point of view that nature, insofar as it is nature, continues to be unchanging. The manifestations or forms in which nature can take are subject to change.

But there is then no such thing as the Form or Idea of a dog, of which the manifestations or forms are subject to change. There is then just the totality of phenomena, which is subject to change with regard to the phenomena of which it is the totality (in time; the totality of phenomena as block time would not be subject to change). That totality may always have the same physical laws, but that's still something fundamentally different from "the nature of dogs".

Sauwelios wrote:But in the course of that conquest, it became clear that man can actually alter the natures of things (including the nature of man!), i.e., that they can be made dependent on him.

But I do not think that man can change the nature of things. Perhaps it would be clearer if you could provide an example of what had once been a nature that has changed by modern science. Saying "the nature of — had once been — but it is now the nature of — to be (such and such)". Perhaps then I could better understand how nature has been conquered.

Well, I said "can", not "has". But you have given some examples down below.

And as a preconsideration, do you not think it is possible that certain things that were once believed to be nature were not actually so, and that nature was in fact something else?

That's certainly possible, in fact I think it's actually the case. Nature is history: it has turned out not to have been a discovery, but an invention. In the sense of "the nature of dogs", I mean. In a different sense, nature has turned out to be nothing else than physical laws. And those may, in turn, also turn out to not be nature; there may only be whims, not laws.

The example of the dog: If, before modern science, humanity had bred dogs without tails and trained one never to bark, would that be considered conquering the nature of a dog?

Well, yes and no. This is the example I meant above. If the nature of dogs is barking and wagging the tail, then yes, man would conquer the nature of dogs by breeding them without tails (though training is something different from breeding; discipline and breeding, nature and nurture. Nietzsche was quite the Lamarckian, and Lamarckian biology has made a bit of a comeback recently, but let's leave this between brackets for now). Although, would a dog without a tail not wag still? A friend of my brother's once remarked that our dog didn't just wag with his tail (we say it with "with" in Dutch), but with his whole body. This anecdote introduces in a comical manner the notion of primary and secondary characteristics: what is the essence of a dog? What typical aspects of a dog can we remove without removing the whole dog, the "dogness" of the dog? I would say it is the mind, though this cannot be truly separated from the body: even if it's a brain in a vat, or a mind instantiated in silico or something, it would still want to wag and bark and run on four legs and what have you. Which means...

The example of a madman: If we, through treatment, or if the madman through his own development, caused him to stop doing crazy things, would this change the nature of madmen so that madmen do not do crazy things, or would it rather be that the man was no longer considered mad insofar as he no longer did crazy things?

Well, ultimately it comes down to his thinking or wanting crazy things--his brain or mind giving crazy commands to the rest of his body, or what it imagines to be his body. But I think I see what you're trying to do here now. For yes, then the man would no longer be a madman; but the "Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things. But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!):

"Strauss notes that this view of human nature as consisting of two kinds continues throughout Nietzsche's fifth chapter even though the word 'nature' is no longer used. Abolition of one of the two kinds would amount to a change in human nature, or, because ejected nature always returns, to a social contract contrary to human nature." (Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, page 75.)

And does ejected nature always return? Horace wrote that it does, but I've adapted that line of his to RECVRRAT NATVRA, "May Nature recur".

Returning to something you said in an earlier message:

Sauwelios wrote:But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered

In what way does the nature of nature differ from nature proper? If I said it is the nature of things to undergo certain changes (as happened before modern science in metamorphosis) and after modern science by man, in what way is the former not rather the nature of things but rather the latter? To put it another way, as I had above: Isn't it possible that what we suspected was the nature of things before were not the nature of things but rather the nature had been something else?

I promise that I am not trying to confuse the matter, I just think this is important. Let's just say, hypothetically, that we go on with this conversation and it turns out that you are right and my previous statement about nature was in some sense false, wouldn't it be more proper to say that, rather than that we have conquered nature, there was never really a nature as it had previously been understood but rather manifestations of (shall we say will to power or are things also sometimes manifestations of something else?) which we were merely as yet unaware of their process of change?

Sure, you are right, nature in the sense of natures (as, e.g., the nature of dogs and the nature of women) does not exist--that is to say, it's not eternal, it has evolved:

"Nietzsche does not deny that there is a nature of man, though of course he denies that it is timeless or even that it is now unalterable: the very threat to human nature in one of its forms requires that Nietzsche act." (Lampert, op.cit., page 105.)

When I read this message of yours yesterday, I again experienced a kind of "subtle ecstasy", but this time--no wait, I now think it was the message containing this passage:

"Wouldn't this depend on what one considers to be nature? The manifestation of the forms of nature's is not, in my view, nature itself. In regard to the changing of man, if a man is able to be transformed in a certain way, is it not in his nature to be capable of transformation? That is what I meant. As I see it, nature has always been in forms of flux and metamorphosis. The only difference is that humans are the ones doing nature's transformative work. For that reason I do not see us as nature's conquerers but continue to be her vassals."

The difference is that man is now conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Due to "the popularization or diffusion of philosophic or scientific knowledge", it's no longer just the wise who are conscious of that. But what the wise, in my view, now do is this: they argue that man must shape the future to be like the past in all the essential respects. For there are basically only two options: you use the past as a positive example, or as a negative example.

"Even the proposal to phase out carnivorism in Nature was recently canvassed by philosopher Jeff McMahan in the New York Times. I think this is real progress. Life has a grim past but potentially a glorious future." (David Pearce, 2011 interview in Manniska Plus magazine.)

I quoted this again in my latest post in the Leo Strauss reading list. You may want to check out my recent posts there. In my latest, I also quoted from a post I wrote earlier, elsewhere:

"There is an important strain in Buddhism which holds that a Boddhisattva ranks even higher than a Buddha--a Buddha being someone who just is in Nirvana, and a Boddhisattva being someone who leaves that height again in order to help others down below to gain Buddhahood themselves. However, the ideal remains the Enlightenment, the Buddhahood, of all sentient beings. This is then inconsistent, as the ideal should rather be the Boddhisattvahood of all sentient beings. But a Boddisattva is someone who strives to further the Buddhahood of all sentient beings. Ergo...

"Hedonistic Transhumanism likewise wants the bliss of all sentient beings. This is the 'potentially [...] glorious future' such Transhumanists want to follow life's 'grim past' (David Pearce, 2011 interview in Manniska Plus magazine). But can the future, however 'glorious', ever justify the past for such people? If it can, and the future is as glorious as can be, then if that future eventually comes to an end, as it most probably shall, such people should want the eternal recurrence. But the same compassion that makes them judge that the pleasure of a beast of prey successfully hunting down a prey can never justify the corresponding horrors undergone by its prey must prevent them from feeling that way. Even in their universally shared bliss they would have to dwell on the 'grimness' of the past--which would nullify their bliss. Those who do feel that way, on the other hand, will want the future to be the mirror image of the past in all essential respects."

https://tinyurl.com/y8788l47

Sauwelios wrote:Maybe Socrates at one point did wish them to become successful as tyrants, but then he later realised that was wrong. I remember from Lampert though that he already tried to moderate them before his return from Potideia, but realised only upon his return that he should be much more strict with them. In any case, I group Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides (nice centering there, by the way) with Glaucon, not with Plato. The order of rank of the three is certainly Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, by the way, and perhaps Alcibiades, if not Critias, could have become a Plato if Socrates had made his realisation sooner. Then again, this is highly speculative: I don't understand Plato's Alcibiades well enough, so I could be completely wrong.

I am not certain how to clear this up at present unless we went deeply into these texts which, even if we were willing to (and as I said I do not have my texts with me), would be a very long process given the intricacy of Plato's works.

I will put forward a difference between the first three names plus Plato and Glaucon. The reasons that the first were Socrates true students was because of the nature of their presence in the world. All of the former are ordering beings, whereas Glaucon was not.

Yes, but couldn't he have been? Wouldn't he have been if Socrates had not "tamed" Thrasymachus? I don't think Glaucon was more of a dunce than Charmides, if I may be so blunt.

I do agree that Socrates was trying to teach them moderation, but not because he did not want them to become tyrants but because moderation can be understood in broader way than softening your behaviour.

Here is a definition of moderation from Cambridge dictionary: "the quality of doing something within reasonable limits:" But to a philosopher, or philosophically, what prescribes those limits? The limits would be reason (hence, reasonable limits). This brings us back to the teaching of the Hiero. I now recall that when I said that there was a teaching that the Hiero and Republic had in common you brought up that they teach that it is harder to rule than be ruled. That is indeed part of of the teaching, but there is more, perhaps mundane, teachings, like telling the ruler how to reward his subjects to gain their obedience. What I am proposing is that these were ways suggested to bring effort, as well as beauty, to the form of a principality, and it was these forms of moderation that Socrates wished to teach.

Yes, but there's a big difference between the Republic and, say, the Protagoras. The Republic makes sure that Glaucon, say, does not become a Charmides; the dialogues set chronologically before the Charmides did not do so; Charmides still became one of the Thirty Tyrants. By the time of the Charmides it was too late to prevent that from happening (though Socrates tried), but it was not too late yet for Glaucon.

There is also another quote which I am sorry I do not have on hand, it is somewhere near the centre of The Republic where Socrates talks somewhat ridiculously about how in Sparta they allowed women to wrestle naked alongside the men in the agora. He says that first everyone laughed until they realized how it successfully contributed to the quality of fighters there, and tells the others that when considering making laws one should not consider whether something appears silly but how successful it is. This would be along the same lines.

Sauwelios wrote:

I certainly agree with you on these points. There is also dominion invovled, as well as a drive to artistic creation, or beauty.

Sure. And to me it's only the latter which is good enough. Artistic creation is a kind of dominion, but only this kind is good enough.

But I would say that dominion is a kind of artistry.

Well, by "dominion" I was thinking of the will to power. "The Will to Power as Art".

I do agree with you, though. However, I would then say that dominion is only good enough if it's understood as a kind of artistry.

Also, when one is an artist one chooses from the palette of forms and contents in order to compose the work of art. Wouldn't rejecting some of the modes of past expression be akin to saying that these modes did not suffice for your artistry, rather than that they were not artistry in their own way?

Certainly, but I seem to have lost the thread here: what is your point in saying this?

Sauwelios wrote:Anyway, I'm interested to know what you do think is the grounds (interesting, too, this plural).

I think it would be best if we first sorted out our considerations of nature, otherwise, I think, such a revelation would be premature and might simply cause confusion.

Sauwelios wrote:Oh, I don't think of the eternal recurrence as a fact. In fact, I think it's a necessary value if the will to power is to be at the same time a value and a fact (i.e., if the fact that it must be a value is to be preserved in the teeth of thinking of it as a fact). More about this in my next message, I want to finish this one in one session.

I also think it might be helpful to discuss more about eternal recurrence, because what I said about eternal conversion is connected to what I hold to be the grounds of being/becoming.

Yeah, sorry, I didn't even acknowledge that term. What is eternal conversion, anyway?

Sauwelios wrote:

I am sure that I could say more in response to the quote you supplied from Drury, but in relation to this particular chunk, what do you think of Plato's seventh letter?

People have referred me to it before, but I still haven't read it, or remembered what it's essentially about. I'll look into it again.

The reason I mentioned it was because it indicates that Plato did not avoid politics. I suppose I could have also mentioned The Laws, but the seventh letter indicates something of a more concrete nature.

Right, I noticed that when I typed out that Drury quote. Of course Plato did not avoid politics; but the politics he engaged in was political philosophy, i.e., politics for the sake of philosophy. He certainly did not dedicate his life to politics, to the polis, as his family had surely hoped for him (Nietzsche writes that he was a tragic poet before becoming a student of Socrates; surely his tragedies would have contained much praise of Athens, like Sophocles', say). Then again, the same is true of Alcibiades:

"[F]or Alcibiades Athens was no more than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for his own glory or greatness." (Strauss, SPPP, "Note on the Plan".)

But for Plato, it was not about his own glory or greatness, but about the greatness of philosophy, for whose sake he glorified Dionysius.

::

I would also like to add one more question, if you will allow it, to kick off our discussion of nature, if indeed we will go through with it. Is the nature of a caterpillar the same as the nature of a butterfly?

Good one. I will appeal to Aristotle and say the butterfly in the prime of its life is the nature of both.

"With Nietzsche's new moral postulate, 'Be what you are, be eternally what you are,' with this unbounded Yes to everything that was and is, philosophy itself comes out into the open. The ugly caterpillar metamorphoses; the butterfly spreads its glorious wings. With 'pride, daring, courage, self-confidence,' with a 'will to responsibility' (GM 3.10), the philosophic spirit points to itself, points to its own nobility as a primary ground for gratitude for the goodness of the world." (Lampert, op.cit., pp. 108-09.)

I filmed two more episodes in English, by the way. I will post them in the Philosophers thread soon.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:"The purport of the discovery of nature cannot be grasped if one understands by nature 'the totality of phenomena'. For the discovery of nature consists precisely in the splitting up of that totality into phenomena which are natural and phenomena which are not natural: 'nature' is a term of distinction. Prior to the discovery of nature, the characteristic behavior of any thing or any class of things was conceived of as its custom or its way. That is to say, no fundamental distinction was made between customs or ways which are always and everywhere the same and customs or ways which differ from tribe to tribe. Barking and wagging the tail is the way of dogs, menstruation is the way of women, the crazy things done by madmen are the way of madmen, just as not eating pork is the way of Jews and not drinking wine is the way of Moslems. 'Custom' or 'way' is the prephilosophic equivalent of 'nature'." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 82-83.)

So the discovery of nature is the discovery that there is something like the nature of dogs, the nature of women, etc.

This is also what I have described as nature, do you not agree?

No, I don't. According to your description, there is no such thing as the nature of dogs, but just a phenomenon complying with physical laws which we call "dog". Every "dog", being slightly different, then has a different nature (if it has a nature at all), just as a dog and a cat do: a "cat" is just more different from a "dog" than two "dogs" are from each other.

Why do you say that "according to my description, there is no such thing as the nature of dogs"? I do not think that your description is what I meant. I would say that there is a phenomenon which manifests as what we call "dog", and every dog is slightly different and insofar as they are different have different natures (however great or slight), just as a dog and a cat do, etc. But insofar as the phenomenon manifests as what we call dogs (just as when it manifests as a particular dog) it partakes in the nature that we call dog's nature.

One of the issues I took and take with what we call dog nature or any particularly manifested nature is with the contours of that nature. Insofar as particular manifestations are only representations of that which manifests itself (which is only known by its manifestations and by the way it manifests), the nature of particular manifestations share in the nature of that which manifests (that is, natures entail their own temporality, or the propensity to metamorphose).

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:It was only with historicism that these natures were no longer regarded as eternal.

It is my point of view that nature, insofar as it is nature, continues to be unchanging. The manifestations or forms in which nature can take are subject to change.

But there is then no such thing as the Form or Idea of a dog, of which the manifestations or forms are subject to change. There is then just the totality of phenomena, which is subject to change with regard to the phenomena of which it is the totality (in time; the totality of phenomena as block time would not be subject to change). That totality may always have the same physical laws, but that's still something fundamentally different from "the nature of dogs".

Why do you say "But there is then no such thing...". I am curious why you think that my statement that because the manifestations or forms which nature can take are subject to change that the forms that are taken at any given time do not have natures? Yes, it would be, by my definition, part of their nature to be subject to change, insofar as they are so, but that does not mean that I do not distinguish manifestations temporally.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:But in the course of that conquest, it became clear that man can actually alter the natures of things (including the nature of man!), i.e., that they can be made dependent on him.

But I do not think that man can change the nature of things. Perhaps it would be clearer if you could provide an example of what had once been a nature that has changed by modern science. Saying "the nature of — had once been — but it is now the nature of — to be (such and such)". Perhaps then I could better understand how nature has been conquered.

Well, I said "can", not "has". But you have given some examples down below.

The example you refer (changing dogs), though admittedly this doesn't have a great bearing on the actual contents of the main discussion (the discussion of nature) was an example of methods which are pre-modern (training and breeding — by the way, I acknowledge the distinction you made between training and breeding in regard to the account of nature). I only point this out because isn't some case being made that it is somehow modern science that has made the conquest of nature possible? Anyway, this is something of an offhand issue.

Sauwelios wrote:

And as a preconsideration, do you not think it is possible that certain things that were once believed to be nature were not actually so, and that nature was in fact something else?

That's certainly possible, in fact I think it's actually the case. Nature is history: it has turned out not to have been a discovery, but an invention. In the sense of "the nature of dogs", I mean. In a different sense, nature has turned out to be nothing else than physical laws. And those may, in turn, also turn out to not be nature; there may only be whims, not laws.

Re: Red — I agree, that is why I brought it up.

Re: Blue — This I am not so sure about. I wouldn't necessarily call it a discovery either, but I think it can only be called an invention a posteriori, from the perspective of knowledge. I would think it is more correct to call the defining or pinning down of nature(s) attempts.

Re: Orange — The phenomena we refer to as physical laws, I agree is nature, but again I disagree that they are all there are to nature. I touched on this above in relation to manifestations, but I will relate it to what you say about whims. Let us say that what we refer to as physical laws turn out to be whimsical (I am taking this that you mean in some way capricious), I would still hold their former manifestations to be part of nature, as well as their whimsical character (as well as any manifestations that character brought about) to be so.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, yes and no. This is the example I meant above. If the nature of dogs is barking and wagging the tail, then yes, man would conquer the nature of dogs by breeding them without tails (though training is something different from breeding; discipline and breeding, nature and nurture. Nietzsche was quite the Lamarckian, and Lamarckian biology has made a bit of a comeback recently, but let's leave this between brackets for now).

As I have described nature above, and I hope in my past message(s), I still do not think it is a conquering the nature of the dog as the nature of the dog (insofar as it is a manifestation of that which manifests (which I, for my part, have not named)) entails the propensity to metamorphose, ie. become not a dog.

It might also be worthwhile for this discussion to get to the bottom of exactly what is meant by conquering?

I am adding this in an edit, for clarity. Another reason why I am arguing the position that I am and in the way that I am is that, as I see it, nature is something which is unconquerable (or unexceedable) by definition, it marks the boundaries or describes what is there. I simply feel that when the early moderns used the phrase conquest of nature they did so because it was inspiring or sounded a call to greatness, but had not philosophically thought themselves to the grounds of nature, which was one of the goals of science after the fact and not already accomplished by the early moderns. This is why I asked whether, if I was hypothetically to be wrong, it would rather be the case that what we previously considered nature was not in fact so. I discuss that more below.

This is a second addition by edit. Keep in mind that these considerations are made after the entire message is written, so you might want to read the whole thing before making a final verdict on these edits. I think an argument can be made that what I am calling nature is actually a conceptual category and in that sense is metaphysical in that I am holding it to not necessarily already have a referent but as a category which referents are attempted based on definitional self-consistency of the category. I think such a criticism would be fair, but at the same time to accept that as a refutation would be making a serious statement about language and conceptual categories in general, for example the same thing could be said about mathematics, whose rules are based on concepts which are applicable based upon conformity to the definition of the terms. I would therefore defend the integrity of the term nature as a method of orientation to the world. What that definitional self-consistency entails is what was stated in the definition given from Strauss, that it is an oppositional category to convention. In fact, the concept nature is really the primal linguistic concept because insofar as we create a word and give it definition the nature of a thing becomes definitionally self-consistent. For example, while we might say (as I have) that a given thing is, by its partaking in the being of that which manifests, capable of metamorphosis, that does not mean that the process of metamorphosis does not change the object under question to another one with a distinct nature, in the same way that I would say a caterpillar and a butterfly do not share the same nature or an embryo and the fully grown being it develops into do not share the same nature insofar as the nature of their manifestation differs. Another example of a concept whose integrity is based on definitional self-consistency is benefit. There is no benefit out in the world as an object but because we can relate qualities to it based on definitional self-consistency with its definition it becomes a meaningful category useful for orienting ourselves in the world.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, ultimately it comes down to his thinking or wanting crazy things--his brain or mind giving crazy commands to the rest of his body, or what it imagines to be his body. But I think I see what you're trying to do here now. For yes, then the man would no longer be a madman; but the "Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things. But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)

I am not sure if we are getting our meanings crossed (or are in danger of doing so). Perhaps we had better tread carefully to at least be sure we understand each other.

""Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things." — Yes, I think that is what I mean (though I haven't personally used the term "idea", I am prepared to accept it tentatively if it will help us understand each other. Please allow for that difference).

"But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)" — here is where either you lose me, or we diverge. I am on board that it is (at least hypothetically, or for the sake of our discussion, because it hasn't been done in the realm of reality) possible to get rid of the crazy type entirely, so that it no longer manifests as a physical reality, but I do not think this contradicts what I am and have been saying as it seems you are saying. The crazy type, to my mind, would still exist as a historically manifested phenomenon.

But I suppose I should also respond to this in another way, because you are making a statement about the conquest of nature. Are you saying the conquest of nature is being practiced when certain types are done away with? If that is so then I would say that my original position still stands — that I do not see such a thing as a conquest (or conquering) of nature insofar as it was always inherent in nature to do away with manifested types (for example earlier forms on the evolutionary chain), and part of the nature of manifestations to be transmutative. This aside from my assertion that our own behaviour is formed of nature making our actions something like the bidding of nature rather than its master.

Sauwelios wrote:

Returning to something you said in an earlier message:

Sauwelios wrote:But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered

In what way does the nature of nature differ from nature proper? If I said it is the nature of things to undergo certain changes (as happened before modern science in metamorphosis) and after modern science by man, in what way is the former not rather the nature of things but rather the latter? To put it another way, as I had above: Isn't it possible that what we suspected was the nature of things before were not the nature of things but rather the nature had been something else?

I promise that I am not trying to confuse the matter, I just think this is important. Let's just say, hypothetically, that we go on with this conversation and it turns out that you are right and my previous statement about nature was in some sense false, wouldn't it be more proper to say that, rather than that we have conquered nature, there was never really a nature as it had previously been understood but rather manifestations of (shall we say will to power or are things also sometimes manifestations of something else?) which we were merely as yet unaware of their process of change?

Sure, you are right, nature in the sense of natures (as, e.g., the nature of dogs and the nature of women) does not exist--that is to say, it's not eternal, it has evolved

Sorry for the confusion, I was not proposing that as my actual position, though I understand why you took it to be so because it contained the ground element of my position (what I referred to above in this message as that which manifests itself, and which I referred to in the quote questioningly as either will to power or else the thing which I have not named (and no, it's not Voldemort — sorry for this stupid joke but I feel that I am becoming ridiculous  :mrgreen:)

Sauwelios wrote:"Nietzsche does not deny that there is a nature of man, though of course he denies that it is timeless or even that it is now unalterable: the very threat to human nature in one of its forms requires that Nietzsche act." (Lampert, op.cit., page 105.)

In regard to this bolded part. This is very similar to my position, with the clarification that I am saying that the alterability is part of the nature of manifestations insofar as manifestations share in the nature of that which is becoming manifested. The latter part I have less to say about. But I think the wording "in one of its forms" indicates another significant similarity with my position.

Sauwelios wrote:When I read this message of yours yesterday, I again experienced a kind of "subtle ecstasy", but this time--no wait, I now think it was the message containing this passage:

"Wouldn't this depend on what one considers to be nature? The manifestation of the forms of nature's is not, in my view, nature itself. In regard to the changing of man, if a man is able to be transformed in a certain way, is it not in his nature to be capable of transformation? That is what I meant. As I see it, nature has always been in forms of flux and metamorphosis. The only difference is that humans are the ones doing nature's transformative work. For that reason I do not see us as nature's conquerors but continue to be her vassals."

The difference is that man is now conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Due to "the popularization or diffusion of philosophic or scientific knowledge", it's no longer just the wise who are conscious of that.

I am not sure that I agree with you that man is more conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Please notice I used the words "not sure", because it depends on what you mean by the consciousness of doing that work. The reason I become doubtful is because I do not think that many, and particularly not many of the mass who have learned from the popular diffusion of scientific knowledge, know that they are nature's vassals in the way that I mean.

Even if we have a difference here, I feel reluctant to add this because it seems such a small quibble that it might be fruitless really to go into it. The reason I do not think that many (much less man as a whole or type) are conscious of doing nature's work is because, as I understand it, being these vassals (rather than masters) renders us by definition, to a degree, unconscious of the work we are doing. I am not sure that most people are aware that they are unaware of what they are truly doing (even when they have something of a clear account of the form and content of their behaviour and context), much less would want to accept such a notion if proposed to them.

Sauwelios wrote:But what the wise, in my view, now do is this: they argue that man must shape the future to be like the past in all the essential respects.

My thoughts aren't so different than yours here, but some things might depend on interpretation. I would appreciate if you explicated on what you mean by the word "essential" here. This, as I understand it and in the capacity which I agree with you, relates to what I said above about art and choosing "from the palette of contents and forms". I will say more on that below.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:Maybe Socrates at one point did wish them to become successful as tyrants, but then he later realised that was wrong. I remember from Lampert though that he already tried to moderate them before his return from Potideia, but realised only upon his return that he should be much more strict with them. In any case, I group Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides (nice centering there, by the way) with Glaucon, not with Plato. The order of rank of the three is certainly Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, by the way, and perhaps Alcibiades, if not Critias, could have become a Plato if Socrates had made his realisation sooner. Then again, this is highly speculative: I don't understand Plato's Alcibiades well enough, so I could be completely wrong.

I am not certain how to clear this up at present unless we went deeply into these texts which, even if we were willing to (and as I said I do not have my texts with me), would be a very long process given the intricacy of Plato's works.

I will put forward a difference between the first three names plus Plato and Glaucon. The reasons that the first were Socrates true students was because of the nature of their presence in the world. All of the former are ordering beings, whereas Glaucon was not.

Yes, but couldn't he have been? Wouldn't he have been if Socrates had not "tamed" Thrasymachus? I don't think Glaucon was more of a dunce than Charmides, if I may be so blunt.

I do not think that Glaucon could have been. I think there was something distinct in the natures of Thrasymachus and Glaucon. I am very frustrated that I am not quite able to give you direct references to texts and I do not like that you would have to take my word for things, but I think at this point exegetical issues are really side issues to the real discussion under way, so, for my part, I ignore my frustration. I can only say that there is a very telling quote in Socrates early conversation with Thrasymachus when Thrasymachus asks Socrates what he is saying and Socrates responds with something like, I am saying what you are saying. If I remember correctly the words are even contextually jarring by the way the discussion continues. On the other hand, Glaucon's reaction to Thrasymachus's speeches is to say that he is not convinced by Thrasymachus, that he thinks justice is what is best and then wants to be convinced of it by Socrates. In this way, Glaucon plays the role of the listener who is told what he wants to hear, and it is a display for the knowing Thrasymachus.

I wouldn't deny the imperfections of Charmides, I just think that his nature made him a different kind of audience to Socrates than Glaucon was. The failure of Socrates is not necessarily Socrates' fault, but the indication of the nature of his audience is telling.

Since you think that Socrates wasn't training tyrants, I am wondering what you think a philosopher king would be? A tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by law. This is again why I think the Statesman is important, because that is again a significant aspect of Plato's teaching in the dialogue, that the ruler forms the laws from a position outside of the law.

Sauwelios wrote:Yes, but there's a big difference between the Republic and, say, the Protagoras. The Republic makes sure that Glaucon, say, does not become a Charmides; the dialogues set chronologically before the Charmides did not do so; Charmides still became one of the Thirty Tyrants. By the time of the Charmides it was too late to prevent that from happening (though Socrates tried), but it was not too late yet for Glaucon.

Charmides became a tyrant because it was in his nature, as I see it. But what makes you think that becoming so would be part of Glaucon's nature? As I mentioned above, in The Republic he is presented as one who wants to be convinced of the superiority of justice.

Sauwelios wrote:However, I would then say that dominion is only good enough if it's understood as a kind of artistry.

I am not sure if this seems like something to merely quibble over. Wouldn't it be rather that the work of art that the one in position of dominion creates (so to speak) would simply be judged on its beauty, in the same way that we could point to pieces of more conventional art and evaluate them aesthetically, rather than whether the one in that position knows they are creating a work of art (because, as far as I can see, the latter wouldn't automatically cause a beautiful product, if you will allow those analogical terms).

Sauwelios wrote:

Also, when one is an artist one chooses from the palette of forms and contents in order to compose the work of art. Wouldn't rejecting some of the modes of past expression be akin to saying that these modes did not suffice for your artistry, rather than that they were not artistry in their own way?

Certainly, but I seem to have lost the thread here: what is your point in saying this?

Here is the part about the palette which I mentioned.

The reason I brought this up is because you said that those particular past expressions were not enough to impel you (I believe it was), but what is at issue for the artist (and more specifically for artistic inspiration, providing and receiving) is not the exact copying (or repetition) of past form and content as they were presented, but the arrangement of elements which have been manifested so that those elements are manifested again (even as new in form, or manifestation in the terminology which I have been using — and, as an aside, as nature's vassal).

Sauwelios wrote:Yeah, sorry, I didn't even acknowledge that term. What is eternal conversion, anyway?

The process I described above is part of eternal conversion. It is the reformation (or transmutation) of elements.

Sauwelios wrote:Right, I noticed that when I typed out that Drury quote. Of course Plato did not avoid politics; but the politics he engaged in was political philosophy, i.e., politics for the sake of philosophy. He certainly did not dedicate his life to politics, to the polis, as his family had surely hoped for him (Nietzsche writes that he was a tragic poet before becoming a student of Socrates; surely his tragedies would have contained much praise of Athens, like Sophocles', say). Then again, the same is true of Alcibiades:

"[F]or Alcibiades Athens was no more than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for his own glory or greatness." (Strauss, SPPP, "Note on the Plan".)

Some of this depends on how we are conceiving politics. If the quote was to indicate that Socrates' charm caused, in this case, Plato to not become a politician then that is one thing. But even in that case, if we are to believe that Plato was on his way to becoming a tragic poet before Socrates, would Socrates' influencing him to dedicate himself to philosophical eros really be changing his course from politics to philosophy? Would you then say that tragic poets were entirely politicians, because I would assert that there is much more to their art than that. If their art had something to do with politics, couldn't then the same be said about Plato's philosophy?

Also, if politics are the affairs of the city, and the affairs of the city centre around the lives of men, wouldn't Plato's concern with the philosophical life be, by extension, related to the affairs of the city insofar as it concerns the lives of men? To say nothing of the bearing that even his not-explicitly-political works would have on the bearing of the lives of men...

Sauwelios wrote:

I would also like to add one more question, if you will allow it, to kick off our discussion of nature, if indeed we will go through with it. Is the nature of a caterpillar the same as the nature of a butterfly?

Good one. I will appeal to Aristotle and say the butterfly in the prime of its life is the nature of both.

I wish that I had moved this somewhere up in my response. I feel that there was a place I should have introduced it.

I would be interested in hearing a broader account about what you mean by the butterfly in the prime of its life being the nature of both the butterfly and the caterpillar, if you are willing to give it. It is not how I would have answered, in line with what I said about nature above, in any case.

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

I want to add that, though I hold the content of this conversation to be of prime importance, I am not sure that I should be responding as regularly as I have been. I am self employed and my enthusiasm of the discussion is spurring me to jump into it with all my attention and all speed. If I end up taking longer in the future to respond then know this is the reason why. All the same, I may very well be unable to contain myself as has been the case thus far.

***

Saully:

Sauwelios wrote:

[snipped]

This is also what I have described as nature, do you not agree?

No, I don't. According to your description, there is no such thing as the nature of dogs, but just a phenomenon complying with physical laws which we call "dog". Every "dog", being slightly different, then has a different nature (if it has a nature at all), just as a dog and a cat do: a "cat" is just more different from a "dog" than two "dogs" are from each other.

Why do you say that "according to my description, there is no such thing as the nature of dogs"? I do not think that your description is what I meant. I would say that there is a phenomena which manifests as what we call "dog", and every dog is slightly different and insofar as they are different have different natures (however great or slight), just as a dog and a cat do, etc. But insofar as the phenomena manifests as what we call dogs (just as when it manifests as a particular dog) it partakes in the nature that we call dog's nature.

You see, this makes no sense to me. If all dogs have different natures, how can they all still partake in the same dog nature? That we call them all dogs is irrelevant; we could also call them by different names--just as we do a dog or a cat.

One of the issues I took and take with what we call dog nature or any particularly manifested nature is with the contours of that nature. Insofar as particular manifestations are only representations of that which manifests itself (which is only known by its manifestations and by the way it manifests), the nature of particular manifestations share in the nature of that which manifests (that is, natures entail their own temporality, or the propensity to metamorphose).

It may help to formulate this Platonically. "The forms of particular manifestations (e.g., particular "dogs") share in the Form which (not "of that which"!) manifests or is manifested (e.g., "Dogness")." Either what they share in is their nature or they each have their own nature. Either they are all imperfect approximations of something perfect, or each of them is perfect in its own way. Or each of them may be an imperfect approximation of something perfect, but then there are different perfect things for each to approximate (different teloi). At least that's how I see it.

Sauwelios wrote:

[snipped]

It is my point of view that nature, insofar as it is nature, continues to be unchanging. The manifestations or forms in which nature can take are subject to change.

But there is then no such thing as the Form or Idea of a dog, of which the manifestations or forms are subject to change. There is then just the totality of phenomena, which is subject to change with regard to the phenomena of which it is the totality (in time; the totality of phenomena as block time would not be subject to change). That totality may always have the same physical laws, but that's still something fundamentally different from "the nature of dogs".

Why do you say "But there is then no such thing...". I am curious why you think that my statement that because the manifestations or forms which nature can take are subject to change that the forms that are taken at any given time do not have natures? Yes, it would be, by my definition, part of their nature to be subject to change, insofar as they are so, but that does not mean that I do not distinguish manifestations temporally.

Look, if nature is that which takes manifestations or forms, then those manifestations or forms cannot themselves be natures. They are manifestations or forms of nature, or of different natures, but not themselves natures. They are nature in the non-distinctive sense, part of nature as a whole, but not themselves natures. Unless they are, but then they aren't manifestations or forms of a nature (unless it be in the sense of a Form or Idea--but the Forms are not forms; they're intelligible, not sensible).

Sauwelios wrote:

[snipped]

But I do not think that man can change the nature of things. Perhaps it would be clearer if you could provide an example of what had once been a nature that has changed by modern science. Saying "the nature of — had once been — but it is now the nature of — to be (such and such)". Perhaps then I could better understand how nature has been conquered.

Well, I said "can", not "has". But you have given some examples down below.

The example you refer (changing dogs), though admittedly this doesn't have a great bearing on the actual contents of the main discussion (the discussion of nature) was an example of methods which are pre-modern (training and breeding — by the way, I acknowledge the distinction you made between training and breeding in regard to the account of nature). I only point this out because isn't some case being made that it is somehow modern science that has made the conquest of nature possible? Anyway, this is something of an offhand issue.

There is no absolute divide between ancient and modern science. Breeding, if not training, was already a kind of "technology", yes. The difference is that pre-modern dog breeders always wanted to breed dogs; they never wanted to have their dogs evolve into a different species. This is not necessarily because they wouldn't want that, but because they didn't think about it that way. To them, a dog was a dog was a dog. There was supposed to be something like "dog nature" (and before that, "the dog way". The concept "way" was no less absolute than nature, it just didn't distinguish between eternal and temporary ways: our way, the way of the ancestors, was considered as necessary as, say, the way of the Sun (of whom Heraclitus says he will be pursued and persecuted by the Erinyes if he crosses his bounds)). To late moderns or post-moderns, there are no natures, just ways--and God, the Avenger, is dead! This came about through the modern project which involved manipulating for the sake of human nature the natures of all other things. Consider that Descartes still (exoterically) taught that, while animals were machines, human beings were not. A century later, human beings, too, were considered machines.

Sauwelios wrote:

And as a preconsideration, do you not think it is possible that certain things that were once believed to be nature were not actually so, and that nature was in fact something else?

That's certainly possible, in fact I think it's actually the case. Nature is history: it has turned out not to have been a discovery, but an invention. In the sense of "the nature of dogs", I mean. In a different sense, nature has turned out to be nothing else than physical laws. And those may, in turn, also turn out to not be nature; there may only be whims, not laws.

Re: Red — I agree, that is why I brought it up.

Re: Blue — This I am not so sure about. I wouldn't necessarily call it a discovery either, but I think it can only be called an invention a posteriori, from the perspective of knowledge. I would think it is more correct to call the defining or pinning down of nature(s) attempts.

Interesting. Nietzsche's "philosophers of the future" are tentatively characterised as (at)tempters.

Re: Orange — The phenomena we refer to as physical laws, I agree is nature, but again I disagree that they are all there are to nature. I touched on this above in relation to manifestations, but I will relate it to what you say about whims. Let us say that what we refer to as physical laws turn out to be whimsical (I am taking this that you mean in some way capricious), I would still hold their former manifestations to be part of nature, as well as their whimsical character (as well as any manifestations that character brought about) to be so.

Well, I would hold their manifestations to be part of nature as a whole--i.e., in the non-distinctive sense--, whereas I would hold their whimsical character to be the nature of nature--i.e., nature in the distinctive sense.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, yes and no. This is the example I meant above. If the nature of dogs is barking and wagging the tail, then yes, man would conquer the nature of dogs by breeding them without tails (though training is something different from breeding; discipline and breeding, nature and nurture. Nietzsche was quite the Lamarckian, and Lamarckian biology has made a bit of a comeback recently, but let's leave this between brackets for now).

As I have described nature above, and I hope in my past message(s), I still do not think it is a conquering the nature of the dog as the nature of the dog (insofar as it is a manifestation of that which manifests (which I, for my part, have not named)) entails the propensity to metamorphose, ie. become not a dog.

But then what is the difference between the nature of the cat and the nature of the dog? Then the nature of the cat entails the propensity to metamorphose, e.g., become a dog (e.g., if a dog eats a cat, at least some of the cat will become the dog, whereas the rest becomes dog excrement and leftovers). The propensity to metamorphose is universal; the propensity to bark and wag the tail is not. Your "nature", methinks, is simply the universe, which can manifest as cats and dogs and many other things. (Added later: Your "nature" is, methinks, not the universal cat or dog, but the universal universal...)

It might also be worthwhile for this discussion to get to the bottom of exactly what is meant by conquering?

In the first place, mastering, but then that becomes making the natures of all things dependent on man--including the nature of man. As I wrote elsewhere:

"Actually, it is for the sake of a certain part of human nature that [/i]other[/i] parts of human nature are being conquered. In fact, it was also that part, and not the whole of human nature, for whose sake the conquest of non-human nature was promoted in the first place. It is what Nietzsche would call the human, all too human part or the herd animal part. In other words, the 'humanist' part." (http://www.thinkhumanism.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=6920)

I am adding this in an edit, for clarity. Another reason why I am arguing the position that I am and in the way that I am is that, as I see it, nature is something which is unconquerable (or unexceedable) by definition, it marks the boundaries or describes what is there. I simply feel that when the early moderns used the phrase conquer of nature they did so because it was inspiring or sounded a call to greatness, but had not philosophically thought themselves to the grounds of nature, which was one of the goals of science after the fact and not already accomplished by the early moderns. This is why I asked whether, if I was hypothetically to be wrong, that it would rather be the case that what we previously considered nature was not in fact so. I discuss that more below.

Well, in my view, the fact that it's not really a conquest of nature but only of something formerly called nature, does not make it any less problematic. Perhaps what is conquered is precisely the pre-modern conception of nature. Indeed, the nature of man as "postulated" in paragraphs 32-35 of Strauss's essay on Nietzsche is only the natural end of man in that he is 1) man's peak, the highest man; and 2) natural in the non-distinctive sense of "nature", though of that nature as a whole, including its terrifying and questionable aspects. In fact, he is the highest man precisely because he is the complementary, whole man. He is a match for the universe, his Ariadne.

This is a second addition by edit. Keep in mind that these considerations are made after the entire message is written, so you might want to read the whole thing before making a final verdict on these edits. I think an argument can be made that what I am calling nature is actually a conceptual category and in that sense is metaphysical in that I am holding it to not necessarily already have a referent but as a category which referents are attempted based on definitional self-consistency of the category. I think such a criticism would be fair, but at the same time to accept that as a refutation would be making a serious statement about language and conceptual categories in general, for example the same thing could be said about mathematics, whose rules are based on concepts which are applicable based upon conformity to the definition of the terms. I would therefore defend the integrity of the term nature as a method of orientation to the world. What that definitional self-consistency entails is what was stated in the definition given from Strauss, that it is an oppositional category to convention. In fact, the concept nature is really the primal linguistic concept because insofar as we create a word and give it definition the nature of a thing becomes definitionally self-consistent. For example, while we might say (as I have) that a given thing is, by its partaking in the being of that which manifests, capable of metamorphosis, that does not mean that the process of metamorphosis does not change the object under question to another one with a distinct nature, in the same way that I would say a caterpillar and a butterfly do not share the same nature or an embryo and the fully grown being it develops into do not share the same nature insofar as the nature of their manifestation differs. Another example of a concept whose integrity is based on defintional self-consistency is benefit. There is no benefit out in the world as an object but because we can relate qualities to it based on definitional self-consistency with its definition it becomes a meaningful category useful for orienting ourselves in the world.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, ultimately it comes down to his thinking or wanting crazy things--his brain or mind giving crazy commands to the rest of his body, or what it imagines to be his body. But I think I see what you're trying to do here now. For yes, then the man would no longer be a madman; but the "Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things. But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)

I am not sure if we are getting our meanings crossed (or are in danger of doing so). Perhaps we had better tread carefully to at least be sure we understand each other.

""Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things." — Yes, I think that is what I mean (though I haven't personally used the term "idea", I am prepared to accept it tentatively if it will help us understand each other. Please allow for that difference).

"But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)" — here is where either you lose me, or we diverge. I am on board that it is (at least hypothetically, or for the sake of our discussion, because it hasn't been done in the realm of reality) possible to get rid of the crazy type entirely, so that it no longer manifests as a physical reality, but I do not think this contradicts what I am and have been saying as it seems you are saying. The crazy type, to my mind, would still exist as a historically manifested phenomena.

Yes, it would still exist in the past. But this is not good enough. Heraclitus as a one-time event is only good enough for Heraclitus--our past is his present. Even if the eternal recurrence is a fact, that may mean there won't be "another" Heraclitus for nine zillion years.

But I suppose I should also respond to this in another way, because you are making a statement about the conquest of nature. Are you saying the conquest of nature is being practiced when certain types are done away with? If that is so then I would say that my original position still stands — that I do not see such a thing as a conquest (or conquering) of nature insofar as it was always inherent in nature to do away with manifested types (for example earlier forms on the evolutionary chain), and part of the nature of manifestations to be transmutative. This aside from my assertion that our own behaviour is formed of nature making our actions something like the bidding of nature rather than its master.

"The most concerned ask today: 'How is man to be maintained?' Zarathustra however asketh, as the first and only one: 'How is man to be surpassed?'
The Superman, I have at heart; that is the first and only thing to me--and not man[.]" (Zarathustra 4, "The Higher Man" 3.)

I think the question political philosophy seeks to answer is: "How is the Superman to be maintained, or attained again?" For:

"The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the sequence of living beings (--man is an end--): but what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, as being more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future.
This more valuable type existed often enough in the past: but as a happy accident, as an exception, never as something willed. Rather, it has been precisely the most feared; hitherto it has been almost the frightening;--and out of that fright the opposite type has been willed, bred, attained: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick human animal,--the Christian...

"Mankind does not represent an development toward something better or stronger or higher, the way it is believed today. 'Progress' is merely a modern idea, that is to say, a false idea. The European of today remains far inferior in value to the European of the Renaissance; further development is altogether not by any necessity elevation, enhancement, strengthening.
In another sense, constant success in individual cases occurs in the most widely different parts of the earth and under the most widely different cultures, in which cases a higher type does indeed manifests itself: something which, in relation to collective mankind, is a kind of Superman. Such happy accidents of great success have always been possible, and will perhaps always be possible. And even whole dynasties, tribes, peoples may occasionally represent such a bull's-eye." (Nietzsche, The Antichrist, sections 3-4. Note that the word translated as "represent" and "manifest" is one and the same, and so is the word translated as "case" and "accident".)

Sorry for quoting at length. Note the "perhaps", though...

Sauwelios wrote:

Returning to something you said in an earlier message:

"But if it's good enough for you that the nature of nature can never be conquered"

In what way does the nature of nature differ from nature proper? If I said it is the nature of things to undergo certain changes (as happened before modern science in metamorphosis) and after modern science by man, in what way is the former not rather the nature of things but rather the latter? To put it another way, as I had above: Isn't it possible that what we suspected was the nature of things before were not the nature of things but rather the nature had been something else?

I promise that I am not trying to confuse the matter, I just think this is important. Let's just say, hypothetically, that we go on with this conversation and it turns out that you are right and my previous statement about nature was in some sense false, wouldn't it be more proper to say that, rather than that we have conquered nature, there was never really a nature as it had previously been understood but rather manifestations of (shall we say will to power or are things also sometimes manifestations of something else?) which we were merely as yet unaware of their process of change?

Sure, you are right, nature in the sense of natures (as, e.g., the nature of dogs and the nature of women) does not exist--that is to say, it's not eternal, it has evolved

Sorry for the confusion, I was not proposing that as my actual position, though I understand why you took it to be so because it contained the ground element of my position (what I referred to above in this message as that which manifests itself, and which I referred to in the quote questioningly as either will to power or else the thing which I have no named (and no, it's not Voldemort — sorry for this stupid joke but I feel that I am becoming ridiculous  :mrgreen:)

Sauwelios wrote:"Nietzsche does not deny that there is a nature of man, though of course he denies that it is timeless or even that it is now unalterable: the very threat to human nature in one of its forms requires that Nietzsche act." (Lampert, op.cit., page 105.)

In regard to this bolded part. This is very similar to my position, with the clarification that I am saying that the alterability is part of the nature of manifestations insofar as manifestations share in the nature of that which is becoming manifested. The latter part I have less to say about. But I think the wording "in one of its forms" indicates another significant similarity with my position.

What Lampert means there is one of the two natural human types.

"At issue is the great Nietzschean theme of the genealogy of conscience, the history of morals that lays bare our spiritual past as the conflict between an instinct to obedience and an instinct to command. These two instincts define the two basic types of human beings and the two different moralities that fit or belong to them. [...] Though they were always a threat, the exceptions were nevertheless esteemed because they were useful for the common good of the tribe as its fearless leaders and defenders. [...] Strauss's essay has shown that nature has become a problem because of the conquest of human nature in a very precise sense, namely, elimination of one of the two natural human types. The Baconian-Cartesian technological conquest of nature is only a means, if an indispensable means, to the achievement of the ideal of the large majority, universal comfortable self-preservation, which makes the other type expendable." (Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, pp. 73-74, 104-05.)

Sauwelios wrote:When I read this message of yours yesterday, I again experienced a kind of "subtle ecstasy", but this time--no wait, I now think it was the message containing this passage:

"Wouldn't this depend on what one considers to be nature? The manifestation of the forms of nature's is not, in my view, nature itself. In regard to the changing of man, if a man is able to be transformed in a certain way, is it not in his nature to be capable of transformation? That is what I meant. As I see it, nature has always been in forms of flux and metamorphosis. The only difference is that humans are the ones doing nature's transformative work. For that reason I do not see us as nature's conquerors but continue to be her vassals."

The difference is that man is now conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Due to "the popularization or diffusion of philosophic or scientific knowledge", it's no longer just the wise who are conscious of that.

I am not sure that I agree with you that man is more conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Please notice I used the words "not sure", because it depends on what you mean by the consciousness of doing that work. The reason I become doubtful is because I do not think that many, and particularly not many of the mass who have learned from the popular diffusion of scientific knowledge, know that they are nature's vassals in the way that I mean.

No, certainly not nature's vassals. They think of it as being nature's conquerors. But in reality it's a case of the bondsmen "conquering" the conquerors and their vassals. And where is the priest in all this?...

Even if we have a difference here, I feel reluctant to add this because it seems such a small quibble that it might be fruitless really to go into it. The reason I do not think that many (much less man as a whole or type) are conscious of doing nature's work is because, as I understand it, being these vassals (rather than masters) renders us by definition, to a degree, unconscious of the work we are doing. I am not sure that most people are aware that they are unaware of what they are truly doing (even when they have something of a clear account of the form and content of their behaviour and context), much less would want to accept such a notion if proposed to them.

Yeah, imagine they found out they'd been doing nature's dirty work while thinking they were conquering her!

Sauwelios wrote:But what the wise, in my view, now do is this: they argue that man must shape the future to be like the past in all the essential respects.

My thoughts aren't so different than yours here, but some things might depend on interpretation. I would appreciate if you explicated on what you mean by the word "essential" here. This, as I understand it and in the capacity which I agree with you, relates to what I said below about art and choosing "from the palette of contents and forms". I will say more on that below.

At this point, I can only offer you another quote (I should go to bed):

"Strauss's whole argument on this chapter requires that the subjugation of nature by the highest natures be understood as a response to the already existing attempt to subjugate nature, primarily the modern moral attempt to subjugate human nature to the imperatives of one type of human being. As Strauss said in On Tyranny, we are now brought face to face with a new form of tyranny because of '"the conquest of nature" and in particular of human nature' (OT 27). Nietzsche's new task is the task made imperative by our history of the subjugation of our nature. The new task does not subjugate human nature; it sets out instead to conquer the already far-advanced rage to subjugate human nature through the elimination of its supreme forms. To achieve its ends, the new task grants sway to the predatory beings, to 'men of the highest spirituality, of the greatest reason,' those who act in accord with their nature and in accord with reason." (Lampert, op.cit., page 77.)

The subjugation of nature by the highest natures is the subjugation of the non-sense and chance in the already existing attempt to conquer it:

"It is however the history of man hitherto, i.e. the rule of non-sense and chance, which is the necessary condition for the subjugation of non-sense and chance. [... T]he gruesome rule of non-sense and chance, nature, the fact that almost all men are fragments, cripples and gruesome accidents, the whole present and past is itself a fragment, a riddle, a gruesome accident unless it is willed as a bridge to the future (cf. Zarathustra, 'Of Redemption')." (Strauss, SPPP, "Note on the Plan", paragraphs 34 and 35.)

Sauwelios wrote:

"Maybe Socrates at one point did wish them to become successful as tyrants, but then he later realised that was wrong. I remember from Lampert though that he already tried to moderate them before his return from Potideia, but realised only upon his return that he should be much more strict with them. In any case, I group Critias, Alcibiades and Charmides (nice centering there, by the way) with Glaucon, not with Plato. The order of rank of the three is certainly Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, by the way, and perhaps Alcibiades, if not Critias, could have become a Plato if Socrates had made his realisation sooner. Then again, this is highly speculative: I don't understand Plato's Alcibiades well enough, so I could be completely wrong."

I am not certain how to clear this up at present unless we went deeply into these texts which, even if we were willing to (and as I said I do not have my texts with me), would be a very long process given the intricacy of Plato's works.

I will put forward a difference between the first three names plus Plato and Glaucon. The reasons that the first were Socrates true students was because of the nature of their presence in the world. All of the former are ordering beings, whereas Glaucon was not.

Yes, but couldn't he have been? Wouldn't he have been if Socrates had not "tamed" Thrasymachus? I don't think Glaucon was more of a dunce than Charmides, if I may be so blunt.

I do not think that Glaucon could have been. I think there was something distinct in the natures of Thrasymachus and Glaucon. I am very frustrated that I am not quite able to give you direct references to texts and I do not like that you would have to take my word for things, but I think at this point exegetical issues are really side issues to the real discussion under way, so, for my part, I ignore my frustration. I can only say that there is a very telling quote in Socrates early conversation with Thrasymachus when Thrasymachus asks Socrates what he is saying and Socrates responds with something like, I am saying what you are saying. If I remember correctly the words are even contextually jarring by the way the discussion continues. On the other hand, Glaucon's reaction to Thrasymachus's speeches is to say that he is not convinced by Thrasymachus, that he thinks justice is what is best and then wants to be convinced of it by Socrates. In this way, Glaucon plays the role of the listener who is told what he wants to hear, and it is a display for the knowing Thrasymachus.

Yes, but Socrates is not really saying what Thrasymachus is saying, at least not to Glaucon et al.

I wouldn't deny the imperfections of Charmides, I just think that his nature made him a different kind of audience to Socrates that Glaucon was. The failure of Socrates is not necessarily Socrates' fault, but the indication of the nature of his audience is telling.

Since you think that Socrates wasn't training tyrants, I am wondering what you think a philosopher king would be? A tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by law. This is again why I think the Statesman is important, because that is again a significant aspect of Plato's teaching in the dialogue, that the ruler forms the laws from a position outside of the law.

I disagree if you're saying that's all a tyrant is. I think a tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by justice even more than by law. The problem with tyranny is not that the tyrant is above all, including the law, but that he is not rightfully so.

"The best regime is that in which the best men habitually rule, or aristocracy. Goodness is, if not identical with wisdom, at any rate dependent on wisdom: the best regime would seem to be the rule of the wise. In fact, wisdom appeared to the classics as that title to rule which is highest according to nature. It would be absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by any regulations; hence the rule of the wise must be absolute rule. It would be equally absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by consideration of the unwise wishes of the unwise; hence the wise rulers ought not to be responsible to their unwise subjects. To make the rule of the wise dependent on election by the unwise or consent of the unwise would mean to subject what is by nature higher to control by what is by nature lower, i.e., to act against nature. Yet this solution, which at first glance seems to be the only just solution for a society in which there are wise men, is, as a rule, impracticable. The few wise cannot rule the many unwise by force. The unwise multitude must recognize the wise as wise and obey them freely because of their wisdom. But the ability of the wise to persuade the unwise is extremely limited: Socrates, who lived what he taught, failed in his attempt to govern Xanthippe. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the conditions required for rule of the wise will ever be met. What is more likely to happen is that an unwise man, appealing to the natural right of wisdom and catering to the lowest desires of the many, will persuade the multitude of his right: the prospects for tyranny are brighter than those for rule of the wise." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 140-41.)

Sauwelios wrote:Yes, but there's a big difference between the Republic and, say, the Protagoras. The Republic makes sure that Glaucon, say, does not become a Charmides; the dialogues set chronologically before the Charmides did not do so; Charmides still became one of the Thirty Tyrants. By the time of the Charmides it was too late to prevent that from happening (though Socrates tried), but it was not too late yet for Glaucon.

Charmides became a tyrant because it was in his nature, as I see it. But what makes you think that becoming so would be part of Glaucon's nature? As I mentioned above, in The Republic he is presented as one who wants to be convinced of the superiority of justice.

Behold, philosophy has become Socratic! What you see as the difference between Charmides and Glaucon is really the difference between Socrates' approach to their type before and after the Charmides. Charmides wasn't, or didn't have to be, such a bad kid.

Sauwelios wrote:However, I would then say that dominion is only good enough if it's understood as a kind of artistry.

I am not sure if this seems like something to merely quibble over. Wouldn't it be rather that the work of art that the one in position of dominion creates (so to speak) would simply be judged on its beauty, in the same way that we could point to pieces of more conventional art and evaluate them aesthetically, rather than whether the one in that position knows they are creating a work of art (because, as far as I can see, the latter wouldn't automatically cause a beautiful product, if you will allow those analogical terms).

I didn't say it had to be understood that way by the artist...

Sauwelios wrote:

Also, when one is an artist one chooses from the palette of forms and contents in order to compose the work of art. Wouldn't rejecting some of the modes of past expression be akin to saying that these modes did not suffice for your artistry, rather than that they were not artistry in their own way?

Certainly, but I seem to have lost the thread here: what is your point in saying this?

Here is the part about the palette which I mentioned.

The reason I brought this up is because you said that those particular past expressions were not enough to impel you (I believe it was), but what is at issue for the artist (and more specifically for artistic inspiration, providing and receiving) is not the exact copying (or repetition) of past form and content as they were presented, but the arrangement of elements which have been manifested so that those elements are manifested again (even as new in form, or manifestation in the terminology which I have been using — and, as an aside, as nature's vassal).

I suppose you're right.

"For that single eye of the world, before which the empirical-real world together with its reverberation in the dream pours itself out, that Dionysian-Apollinian union is consequently an eternal and unchangeable, yea single form of enjoyment: [for that eye] there is no Dionysian appearance [Schein] without an Apollinian reverberation [Widerschein]." (https://beta.groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/human_superhuman/conversations/messages/425)

Sauwelios wrote:Yeah, sorry, I didn't even acknowledge that term What is eternal conversion, anyway?

The process I described above is part of eternal conversion. It is the reformation (or transmutation) of elements.

Do you think there are irreducible elements?

"He is described with great elegance as a little child, and a child for ever; for things compounded are larger and are affected by age; whereas the primary seeds of things, or atoms, are minute and remain in perpetual infancy." (Bacon, Wisdom of the Ancients, "Cupid; Or the Atom".)

Sauwelios wrote:Right, I noticed that when I typed out that Drury quote. Of course Plato did not avoid politics; but the politics he engaged in was political philosophy, i.e., politics for the sake of philosophy. He certainly did not dedicate his life to politics, to the polis, as his family had surely hoped for him (Nietzsche writes that he was a tragic poet before becoming a student of Socrates; surely his tragedies would have contained much praise of Athens, like Sophocles', say). Then again, the same is true of Alcibiades:

"[F]or Alcibiades Athens was no more than the pedestal, exchangeable if need be with Sparta or Persia, for his own glory or greatness." (Strauss, SPPP, "Note on the Plan".)

Some of this depends on how we are conceiving politics. If the quote was to indicate that Socrates' charm caused, in this case, Plato to not become a politician then that is one thing. But even in that case, if we are to believe that Plato was on his way to becoming a tragic poet before Socrates, would Socrates' influencing him to dedicate himself to philosophical eros really be changing his course from politics to philosophy? Would you then say that tragic poets were entirely politicians, because I would assert that there is much more to their art than that. If their art had something to do with politics, couldn't then the same be said about Plato's philosophy?

I don't think tragic poet was a fulltime job in ancient Athens. I mean, wasn't Sophocles a general?

I filmed a(n attempt at a) thirteenth episode yesterday, and said something about this. Plato did not become or want to become a Dionysius.

Also, if politics are the affairs of the city, and the affairs of the city centre around the lives of men, wouldn't Plato's concern with the philosophical life be, by extension, related to the affairs of the city insofar as it concerns the lives of men? To say nothing of the bearing that even his not-explicitly-political works would have on the bearing of the lives of men...

Sauwelios wrote:"I would also like to add one more question, if you will allow it, to kick off our discussion of nature, if indeed we will go through with it. Is the nature of a caterpillar the same as the nature of a butterfly?"

Good one. I will appeal to Aristotle and say the butterfly in the prime of its life is the nature of both.

I wish that I had moved this somewhere up in my response. I feel that there was a place I should have introduced it.

I would be interested in hearing a broader account about what you mean by the butterfly in the prime of its life being the nature of both the butterfly and the caterpillar, if you are willing to give it. It is not how I would have answered, in line with what I said about nature above, in any case.

It's Aristotelian. Though the caterpillar and butterfly forms both belong to the nature of the butterfly, the "flowering" (flourishing) butterfly is their nature in the sense of their telos.

"To put it vividly: the ascetic priest provided until the most modern times the repulsive and gloomy caterpillar form in which alone the philosopher could live and creep about... Has all this really altered? Has that many-colored and dangerous winged creature, the 'spirit' which this caterpillar concealed [the butterfly was traditionally a symbol of the soul], really been unfettered at last and released into the light, thanks to a sunnier, warmer, brighter world?" (Nietzsche, Genealogy III 10, Kaufmann translation.)

However this may be, that unfettered "spirit" or "mind" (Geist) is truly the nature of the caterpillar as well.

"Plato and Nietzsche share great politics because each knew what religions are good for. But they share as well the essential[!] paganism of all philosophy, eros for the earth, and that is the deepest sharing, for each discovered that in being eros for what is, philosophy is eros for eros, for being as fecund becoming that allows itself to be glimpsed in what it is: eros or will to power." (Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, pagina ultima.)

"Nature's beneficence, the goodness of nature, is affirmed in the only way now possible, as a process of becoming, as history, as a rule of non-sense and chance that necessarily generates fragments and that has no outcome in wholeness other than the complementary Yes pronounced on the process by the complementary man. [...] Nietzsche restored the primacy of the Good: life is lovable as it is. Nietzsche returned to the fundamental experiences from which the primacy of the Good is derived, the experience of philosophical eros." (Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, page 107.)

I want to add that, though I hold the content of this conversation to be of prime importance, I am not sure that I should be responding as regularly as I have been. I am self employed and my enthusiasm of the discussion is spurring me to jump into it with all my attention and all speed. If I end up taking longer in the future to respond then know this is the reason why. All the same, I may very well be unable to contain myself as has been the case thus far.

Very understandable. I'll try to take some more time myself.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Sauwelios wrote:You see, this makes no sense to me. If all dogs have different natures, how can they all still partake in the same dog nature? That we call them all dogs is irrelevant; we could also call them by different names--just as we do a dog or a cat.

Dogs of different breeds have different natures corresponding to their breeds. Individual dogs have different natures corresponding to their individual manifestations. They share of the nature dog by the similar traits which makes them all of the subspecies dogs under the genus Canis. Why does this make no sense to you? We classify dogs as such because of their shared traits, it is those traits which make up their nature as dogs.

In the same way that you have a particular nature as being an individual but share the nature of a human as being of that species. Can you explain to me what the problem you have with this is?

Sauwelios wrote:

One of the issues I took and take with what we call dog nature or any particularly manifested nature is with the contours of that nature. Insofar as particular manifestations are only representations of that which manifests itself (which is only known by its manifestations and by the way it manifests), the nature of particular manifestations share in the nature of that which manifests (that is, natures entail their own temporality, or the propensity to metamorphose).

It may help to formulate this Platonically. "The forms of particular manifestations (e.g., particular "dogs") share in the Form which (not "of that which"!) manifests or is manifested (e.g., "Dogness")." Either what they share in is their nature or they each have their own nature. Either they are all imperfect approximations of something perfect, or each of them is perfect in its own way. Or each of them may be an imperfect approximation of something perfect, but then there are different perfect things for each to approximate (different teloi). At least that's how I see it.

I am not sure that it will help to formulate this Platonically as you have because you misunderstood what I said. I repeat that particular manifestations are manifestations of that which manifests because I am not saying that what manifests is dogness. What manifests itself is, as far as we have understood by physics, atomic particles, but it is not relevant to what I am saying exactly what the smallest particles or most fundamental structure is but rather that those fundamental structures manifest in formations.

So what I was saying is that the nature of what manifests (formations) share the nature of that which manifests in formations, the particles which create it. And formations must necessarily share in some part of the nature of what is manifesting, therefore, because of the nature of the motion of atomic particles, what manifests is subject to change and so I am saying it is in the nature of formations to change.

Sauwelios wrote:Look, if nature is that which takes manifestations or forms, then those manifestations or forms cannot themselves be natures. They are manifestations or forms of nature, or of different natures, but not themselves natures. They are nature in the non-distinctive sense, part of nature as a whole, but not themselves natures. Unless they are, but then they aren't manifestations or forms of a nature (unless it be in the sense of a Form or Idea--but the Forms are not forms; they're intelligible, not sensible).

The word nature is used in English in two different ways which were not created by me. Nature can refer to the existing realm but it can also refer to the basic or inherent qualities of things: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nature

In that sense, I see no contradiction in what I said. If you think it is confusing to use the same word for two different things then that is fine but it is a problem of the language and not what I am saying. Things have inherent qualities, those compose their nature. Nature is also the the word for all existing phenomena. Therefore I am using the word in both ways.

Sauwelios wrote:There is no absolute divide between ancient and modern science. Breeding, if not training, was already a kind of "technology", yes. The difference is that pre-modern dog breeders always wanted to breed dogs; they never wanted to have their dogs evolve into a different species. This is not necessarily because they wouldn't want that, but because they didn't think about it that way. To them, a dog was a dog was a dog. There was supposed to be something like "dog nature" (and before that, "the dog way". The concept "way" was no less absolute than nature, it just didn't distinguish between eternal and temporary ways: our way, the way of the ancestors, was considered as necessary as, say, the way of the Sun (of whom Heraclitus says he will be pursued and persecuted by the Erinyes if he crosses his bounds)). To late moderns or post-moderns, there are no natures, just ways--and God, the Avenger, is dead! This came about through the modern project which involved manipulating for the sake of human nature the natures of all other things. Consider that Descartes still (exoterically) taught that, while animals were machines, human beings were not. A century later, human beings, too, were considered machines.

Some may think that there are no natures, but I am arguing that there are.

Would you care to demonstrate how human beings being machines means that they no longer have a nature and is not rather, if anything, indicative that what we took to be the nature of humans before was not rather false or merely incomplete?

Sauwelios wrote:

Re: Orange — The phenomena we refer to as physical laws, I agree is nature, but again I disagree that they are all there are to nature. I touched on this above in relation to manifestations, but I will relate it to what you say about whims. Let us say that what we refer to as physical laws turn out to be whimsical (I am taking this that you mean in some way capricious), I would still hold their former manifestations to be part of nature, as well as their whimsical character (as well as any manifestations that character brought about) to be so.

Well, I would hold their manifestations to be part of nature as a whole--i.e., in the non-distinctive sense--, whereas I would hold their whimsical character to be the nature of nature--i.e., nature in the distinctive sense.

Don't you see that you also use nature in its two distinct senses? The first, which you called nature as a whole, refers to definition 1 in the Oxford link I provided above and what you called the nature of nature refers to definition 2...

Sauwelios wrote:But then what is the difference between the nature of the cat and the nature of the dog? Then the nature of the cat entails the propensity to metamorphose, e.g., become a dog (e.g., if a dog eats a cat, at least some of the cat will become the dog, whereas the rest becomes dog excrement and leftovers). The propensity to metamorphose is universal; the propensity to bark and wag the tail is not. Your "nature", methinks, is simply the universe, which can manifest as cats and dogs and many other things. (Added later: Your "nature" is, methinks, not the universal cat or dog, but the universal universal...)

You want me to enumerate the differences between cats in physical features and behavioural traits? Cats are solitary animals whereas dogs are pack animals, they both have different skeletal structures, cats are physically built more numble and have stealthy behaviour whereas dogs are built to run for longer periods of time, cats are carnivores whereas dogs are omnivores, cats have retractable claws whereas dogs do not... You know you could research the distinctive traits of dogs and cats if you wished to. Also, it is not merely the presence of specific features taken alone but their co-existence which entails their classification.

The propensity to metamorphose is universal, yes. That is why I said that all manifestations partake in that which manifests, you call it the universe, but you could also look at it as what is scientifically looked at as the building blocks of the universe, so maybe not just atomic particles but space as well (in that particles are separated and move in space).

In regard to your "methinks", what is the point you are making regarding what I am describing as nature?

Sauwelios wrote:

It might also be worthwhile for this discussion to get to the bottom of exactly what is meant by conquering?

In the first place, mastering, but then that becomes making the natures of all things dependent on man--including the nature of man.

"Actually, it is for the sake of a certain part of human nature that [/i]other[/i] parts of human nature are being conquered. In fact, it was also that part, and not the whole of human nature, for whose sake the conquest of non-human nature was promoted in the first place. It is what Nietzsche would call the human, all too human part or the herd animal part. In other words, the 'humanist' part." (http://www.thinkhumanism.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=6920)

In this case I would stand by my saying that we have not conquered nature because nature is not dependent on man because man is formed of nature (in the sense of definition 1) and imbued with the qualities (definition 2) by nature (definition 1).

On top of that, when man seeks to change natures (definition 2), man defers to nature (definition 1) for the proper methods of such action and so is bound by nature (definition 1) not only in his own qualities (definition 2) which guide and activate his will but also the nature of the methods (definition 2) by which he must act to produce any effect whatsoever.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, in my view, the fact that it's not really a conquest of nature but only of something formerly called nature, does not make it any less problematic. Perhaps what is conquered is precisely the pre-modern conception of nature.

But we have not conquered the pre-modern conception of nature either because the pre-modern conception of nature was a word used to describe that which is unchanging. That we before took to be unchanging those things which were subject to change does not mean we have therefore conquered nature but that we took to be nature that which was not so.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:Well, ultimately it comes down to his thinking or wanting crazy things--his brain or mind giving crazy commands to the rest of his body, or what it imagines to be his body. But I think I see what you're trying to do here now. For yes, then the man would no longer be a madman; but the "Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things. But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)

I am not sure if we are getting our meanings crossed (or are in danger of doing so). Perhaps we had better tread carefully to at least be sure we understand each other.

""Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things." — Yes, I think that is what I mean (though I haven't personally used the term "idea", I am prepared to accept it tentatively if it will help us understand each other. Please allow for that difference).

"But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)" — here is where either you lose me, or we diverge. I am on board that it is (at least hypothetically, or for the sake of our discussion, because it hasn't been done in the realm of reality) possible to get rid of the crazy type entirely, so that it no longer manifests as a physical reality, but I do not think this contradicts what I am and have been saying as it seems you are saying. The crazy type, to my mind, would still exist as a historically manifested phenomena.

Yes, it would still exist in the past. But this is not good enough. Heraclitus as a one-time event is only good enough for Heraclitus--our past is his present. Even if the eternal recurrence is a fact, that may mean there won't be "another" Heraclitus for nine zillion years.

What you have said here makes no sense in the context. We were discussing whether there was a nature of the madman based on the definition that a madman is callsed so because he does crazy things. You said that if a madman was cured and there were no more madmen then "madman" would simply be an idea and not a physical reality. I said that the physical reality would exist as a past manifestation and so the nature of the madman would continue to be the same, but the nature would itself be that which describes the past manifestation.

In what way is that "not good enough". It makes no difference if Heraclitus will never recur in regards to saying that Heraclitus had a nature and it would be revealed in his past manifestation.

Sauwelios wrote:

But I suppose I should also respond to this in another way, because you are making a statement about the conquest of nature. Are you saying the conquest of nature is being practiced when certain types are done away with? If that is so then I would say that my original position still stands — that I do not see such a thing as a conquest (or conquering) of nature insofar as it was always inherent in nature to do away with manifested types (for example earlier forms on the evolutionary chain), and part of the nature of manifestations to be transmutative. This aside from my assertion that our own behaviour is formed of nature making our actions something like the bidding of nature rather than its master.

"The most concerned ask today: 'How is man to be maintained?' Zarathustra however asketh, as the first and only one: 'How is man to be surpassed?'
The Superman, I have at heart; that is the first and only thing to me--and not man[.]" (Zarathustra 4, "The Higher Man" 3.)

I think the question political philosophy seeks to answer is: "How is the Superman to be maintained, or attained again?" For:

"The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the sequence of living beings (--man is an end--): but what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, as being more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future.
This more valuable type existed often enough in the past: but as a happy accident, as an exception, never as something willed. Rather, it has been precisely the most feared; hitherto it has been almost the frightening;--and out of that fright the opposite type has been willed, bred, attained: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick human animal,--the Christian...

"Mankind does not represent an development toward something better or stronger or higher, the way it is believed today. 'Progress' is merely a modern idea, that is to say, a false idea. The European of today remains far inferior in value to the European of the Renaissance; further development is altogether not by any necessity elevation, enhancement, strengthening.
In another sense, constant success in individual cases occurs in the most widely different parts of the earth and under the most widely different cultures, in which cases a higher type does indeed manifests itself: something which, in relation to collective mankind, is a kind of Superman. Such happy accidents of great success have always been possible, and will perhaps always be possible. And even whole dynasties, tribes, peoples may occasionally represent such a bull's-eye." (Nietzsche, The Antichrist, sections 3-4. Note that the word translated as "represent" and "manifest" is one and the same, and so is the word translated as "case" and "accident".)

Sorry for quoting at length. Note the "perhaps", though...

I understand Nietzsche's position, but why do you pose that in response to the quote you gave of mine?

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:"Nietzsche does not deny that there is a nature of man, though of course he denies that it is timeless or even that it is now unalterable: the very threat to human nature in one of its forms requires that Nietzsche act." (Lampert, op.cit., page 105.)

In regard to this bolded part. This is very similar to my position, with the clarification that I am saying that the alterability is part of the nature of manifestations insofar as manifestations share in the nature of that which is becoming manifested. The latter part I have less to say about. But I think the wording "in one of its forms" indicates another significant similarity with my position.

What Lampert means there is one of the two natural human types.

"At issue is the great Nietzschean theme of the genealogy of conscience, the history of morals that lays bare our spiritual past as the conflict between an instinct to obedience and an instinct to command. These two instincts define the two basic types of human beings and the two different moralities that fit or belong to them. [...] Though they were always a threat, the exceptions were nevertheless esteemed because they were useful for the common good of the tribe as its fearless leaders and defenders. [...] Strauss's essay has shown that nature has become a problem because of the conquest of human nature in a very precise sense, namely, elimination of one of the two natural human types. The Baconian-Cartesian technological conquest of nature is only a means, if an indispensable means, to the achievement of the ideal of the large majority, universal comfortable self-preservation, which makes the other type expendable." (Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, pp. 73-74, 104-05.)

I disagree with Lampert on this, then, in a different way. I do not see that the trait of humanity to command and dominate will be extinguished through scientific progress. The desire for humans to always want more will continue in those of the dominating type. Even if you look at the actually existing communist system, which would be as close to the manifestation of a society of last men, there was still the dominating class. The only reason that communism became practicable was because it was transformed into a system led by elites and ultimately a hierarchy.

Sauwelios wrote:

I am not sure that I agree with you that man is more conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Please notice I used the words "not sure", because it depends on what you mean by the consciousness of doing that work. The reason I become doubtful is because I do not think that many, and particularly not many of the mass who have learned from the popular diffusion of scientific knowledge, know that they are nature's vassals in the way that I mean.

No, certainly not nature's vassals. They think of it as being nature's conquerors. But in reality it's a case of the bondsmen "conquering" the conquerors and their vassals. And where is the priest in all this?...

Again, I am not sure what you mean by the first part, bringing in the word "bondsmen", and what you are suggesting by the bondsmen conquering the conquerors and their vassals... And what are you asking about the priest, if the priest is conscious of being nature's vassal?

Sauwelios wrote:

Even if we have a difference here, I feel reluctant to add this because it seems such a small quibble that it might be fruitless really to go into it. The reason I do not think that many (much less man as a whole or type) are conscious of doing nature's work is because, as I understand it, being these vassals (rather than masters) renders us by definition, to a degree, unconscious of the work we are doing. I am not sure that most people are aware that they are unaware of what they are truly doing (even when they have something of a clear account of the form and content of their behaviour and context), much less would want to accept such a notion if proposed to them.

Yeah, imagine they found out they'd been doing nature's dirty work while thinking they were conquering her!

But that is what I am proposing. Do you not also think it is the case? When humans set out to conquer nature, do you think they imagined that the state of the modern world would be what they were labouring for? Take the example of cars for instance, what they were made for, in what way to "alleviate" man's estate, and how they have completely transformed our environment and also added the burden of maintaining them. Another example would be the event of the atomic bomb. I think it is fair to say that we were to a large degree unconscious of what we were really accomplishing in that regard and possibly all other human pursuits.

We could also look at it in a more concrete or elementary way. When any human has a thought or idea, where does it come from? To save time, I would hazard to say that it bubbles forth from somewhere in our unconscious mind but such would indicate that we are not really in control of exactly what or even when a particular idea bubbles forth, not to mention our unconscious mind is again composed by the evolutionary process which stems from a nature prior to the will of man...

Sauwelios wrote:

I do not think that Glaucon could have been. I think there was something distinct in the natures of Thrasymachus and Glaucon. I am very frustrated that I am not quite able to give you direct references to texts and I do not like that you would have to take my word for things, but I think at this point exegetical issues are really side issues to the real discussion under way, so, for my part, I ignore my frustration. I can only say that there is a very telling quote in Socrates early conversation with Thrasymachus when Thrasymachus asks Socrates what he is saying and Socrates responds with something like, I am saying what you are saying. If I remember correctly the words are even contextually jarring by the way the discussion continues. On the other hand, Glaucon's reaction to Thrasymachus's speeches is to say that he is not convinced by Thrasymachus, that he thinks justice is what is best and then wants to be convinced of it by Socrates. In this way, Glaucon plays the role of the listener who is told what he wants to hear, and it is a display for the knowing Thrasymachus.

Yes, but Socrates is not really saying what Thrasymachus is saying, at least not to Glaucon et al.

I am not sure that I get what you are saying. Socrates is not saying it to Glaucon because Glaucon is not of the same nature as Thrasymachus is.

Sauwelios wrote:

I wouldn't deny the imperfections of Charmides, I just think that his nature made him a different kind of audience to Socrates that Glaucon was. The failure of Socrates is not necessarily Socrates' fault, but the indication of the nature of his audience is telling.

Since you think that Socrates wasn't training tyrants, I am wondering what you think a philosopher king would be? A tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by law. This is again why I think the Statesman is important, because that is again a significant aspect of Plato's teaching in the dialogue, that the ruler forms the laws from a position outside of the law.

I disagree if you're saying that's all a tyrant is. I think a tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by justice even more than by law. The problem with tyranny is not that the tyrant is above all, including the law, but that he is not rightfully so.

"The best regime is that in which the best men habitually rule, or aristocracy. Goodness is, if not identical with wisdom, at any rate dependent on wisdom: the best regime would seem to be the rule of the wise. In fact, wisdom appeared to the classics as that title to rule which is highest according to nature. It would be absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by any regulations; hence the rule of the wise must be absolute rule. It would be equally absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by consideration of the unwise wishes of the unwise; hence the wise rulers ought not to be responsible to their unwise subjects. To make the rule of the wise dependent on election by the unwise or consent of the unwise would mean to subject what is by nature higher to control by what is by nature lower, i.e., to act against nature. Yet this solution, which at first glance seems to be the only just solution for a society in which there are wise men, is, as a rule, impracticable. The few wise cannot rule the many unwise by force. The unwise multitude must recognize the wise as wise and obey them freely because of their wisdom. But the ability of the wise to persuade the unwise is extremely limited: Socrates, who lived what he taught, failed in his attempt to govern Xanthippe. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the conditions required for rule of the wise will ever be met. What is more likely to happen is that an unwise man, appealing to the natural right of wisdom and catering to the lowest desires of the many, will persuade the multitude of his right: the prospects for tyranny are brighter than those for rule of the wise." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 140-41.)

The problem here is that Leo Strauss is either wrong in that quote or is purposely using the modern understanding of tyrant as opposed to the ancient understanding of tyrant. I think that the latter is completely possible because it seems unlikely that Strauss would be unaware of the ancient understanding of tyrant. Moderns take the word tyrant to be necessarily negative because we have come to think of it as the norm that there should be rule of law and equality of rights. Remember that Strauss adhered to the exoteric model of good and bad for the sake of his modern democratic audience.

Take this quote from Diogenes Laetius: "[T]he people looked up to him [Solon], and would gladly have had him rule as tyrant; he refused..." (Solon: I.49). If tyrant was understood in ancient times as necessarily unjust, how could it be said that the people would gladly have had a man they respected, and believed to be just, rule them as tyrant? The obvious answer is that in ancient times the designation did not automatically refer to the justice of the regime in the same way as the modern understanding has come to take it because moderns take for granted that rule of law and equal rights are the norm.

So I stand by what I said because the ancient use of the word tyrant did not automatically refer to the justice of the position.

Sauwelios wrote:

Charmides became a tyrant because it was in his nature, as I see it. But what makes you think that becoming so would be part of Glaucon's nature? As I mentioned above, in The Republic he is presented as one who wants to be convinced of the superiority of justice.

Behold, philosophy has become Socratic! What you see as the difference between Charmides and Glaucon is really the difference between Socrates' approach to their type before and after the Charmides. Charmides wasn't, or didn't have to be, such a bad kid.

Again, your assuming that tyrant necessarily meant something bad is a modern interpretation.

Sauwelios wrote:

Sauwelios wrote:However, I would then say that dominion is only good enough if it's understood as a kind of artistry.

I am not sure if this seems like something to merely quibble over. Wouldn't it be rather that the work of art that the one in position of dominion creates (so to speak) would simply be judged on its beauty, in the same way that we could point to pieces of more conventional art and evaluate them aesthetically, rather than whether the one in that position knows they are creating a work of art (because, as far as I can see, the latter wouldn't automatically cause a beautiful product, if you will allow those analogical terms).

I didn't say it had to be understood that way by the artist...

I didn't say you did. That was the point I was making, that one does not need to see it as art for it to be art.

Sauwelios wrote:

The process I described above is part of eternal conversion. It is the reformation (or transmutation) of elements.

Do you think there are irreducible elements?

"He is described with great elegance as a little child, and a child for ever; for things compounded are larger and are affected by age; whereas the primary seeds of things, or atoms, are minute and remain in perpetual infancy." (Bacon, Wisdom of the Ancients, "Cupid; Or the Atom".)

I can only hypothesize about that, but I think there likely are. But as for describing the contours of them, such would only be an attempt in the same way as I have held our past explications of nature to be attempts.

Sauwelios wrote:I don't think tragic poet was a fulltime job in ancient Athens. I mean, wasn't Sophocles a general?

I filmed a(n attempt at a) thirteenth episode yesterday, and said something about this. Plato did not become or want to become a Dionysius.

If this part is worth discussing, I think we should get back to the original issue. The quote under question by Drury was "Strauss makes much of Socrates's charm and seductive qualities which enable him to lure beautiful and promising boys like Kleinias (not to mention Plato) away from politics and the family to a life dedicated to the philosophical eros."

Are you taking this "away from politics" to mean strictly that he did not want to become a politician, or that he did not want to engage in politics? I took it to mean the latter. If it is the latter then I was merely pointing out that it is not true because he did do so by trying to influence the tyrant Dionysius, as well as through his philosophical work. If we are saying that he did not become a politician then it is the case he did not become a politician. Though, we might add, there is no way of knowing that it was the influence of Socrates that made led him away from being a politician and that it was not rather in his nature to begin with to not become a politician.

Sauwelios wrote:It's Aristotelian. Though the caterpillar and butterfly forms both belong to the nature of the butterfly, the "flowering" (flourishing) butterfly is their nature in the sense of their telos.

Okay, I understand what you mean. By my formulation, I would still not say that the butterfly and caterpillar share the same nature. I would say it is in the nature of the caterpillar to become a butterfly through metamorphosis, but not that their distinct natures are the same.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

The only difference between the first definition of nature and my own is that I am including humans in it, so yes I am using it as a synonym for universe of a sort.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

Because you have read my messages I cannot edit them. To be clear, there is a difference between the concepts of nature and universe. Universe is a category referring to all phenomena taken together whereas nature (and in particular as I am using it) refers to the phenomenon which comprises the universe as well as the features and way of that phenomena (I could use nature here, in the sense of definition 2, but I do not want to confuse things). We could not point at particular things and say that we see the universe in this thing (except perhaps metaphorically or poetically), because the universe is the category which comprises all things, whereas it is particularly by reference to manifest phenomena by which we establish nature and its contours.

In speaking about nature we are speaking about immanent phenomena, the features of phenomena, and its way. In speaking about the universe we are speaking in particular about the phenomena taken together. The only reason that they would be confused is because using the word nature doesn't as yet specify the phenomena¹ under question. But when I say that we are vassals of nature I am not saying we are vassals of the universe because I am not saying that we are manifestations of the whole but manifestations of phenomena and it is the phenomena which we are manifestations of which provide us with our way, both in partaking of the qualities of that which manifests and in the formation that that which manifests takes.

Adding in edit: Re: Socrates teaching tyranny. Why do you think that Strauss says that philosophers had to hide their true teaching or else would be judged mad or criminal?

[¹ Note that my mysterious former contact also said "phenomena" when he meant "phenomenon" (previously, I edited that, but at this point I can't be sure which he meant. This has been my policy throughout: edit him, but only when I'm sure).]

***

Saully:

Sauwelios wrote:You see, this makes no sense to me. If all dogs have different natures, how can they all still partake in the same dog nature? That we call them all dogs is irrelevant; we could also call them by different names--just as we do a dog or a cat.

Dogs of different breeds have different natures corresponding to their breeds. Individual dogs have different natures corresponding to their individual manifestations. They share of the nature dog by the similar traits which makes them all of the subspecies dogs under the genus Canis. Why does this make no sense to you? We classify dogs as such because of their shared traits, it is those traits which make up their nature as dogs.

In the same way that you have a particular nature as being an individual but share the nature of a human as being of that species. Can you explain to me what the problem you have with this is?

I guess the problem I have is that it's not normative, just descriptive.

Sauwelios wrote:

One of the issues I took and take with what we call dog nature or any particularly manifested nature is with the contours of that nature. Insofar as particular manifestations are only representations of that which manifests itself (which is only known by its manifestations and by the way it manifests), the nature of particular manifestations share in the nature of that which manifests (that is, natures entail their own temporality, or the propensity to metamorphose).

It may help to formulate this Platonically. "The forms of particular manifestations (e.g., particular "dogs") share in the Form which (not "of that which"!) manifests or is manifested (e.g., "Dogness")." Either what they share in is their nature or they each have their own nature. Either they are all imperfect approximations of something perfect, or each of them is perfect in its own way. Or each of them may be an imperfect approximation of something perfect, but then there are different perfect things for each to approximate (different teloi). At least that's how I see it.

I am not sure that it will help to formulate this Platonically as you have because you misunderstood what I said. I repeat that particular manifestations are manifestations of that which manifests because I am not saying that what manifests is dogness. What manifests itself is, as far as we have understood by physics, atomic particles, but it is not relevant to what I am saying exactly what the smallest particles or most fundamental structure is but rather that those fundamental structures manifest in formations.

So what I was saying is that the nature of what manifests (formations) share the nature of that which manifests in formations, the particles which create it. And formations must necessarily share in some part of the nature of what is manifesting, therefore, because of the nature of the motion of atomic particles, what manifests is subject to change and so I am saying it is in the nature of formations to change.

Okay. I don't think this has anything to do with what I'm discussing. The formations we call human beings share equally in the nature of what is manifesting as do insects (to use that Kafka example again).

Sauwelios wrote:Look, if nature is that which takes manifestations or forms, then those manifestations or forms cannot themselves be natures. They are manifestations or forms of nature, or of different natures, but not themselves natures. They are nature in the non-distinctive sense, part of nature as a whole, but not themselves natures. Unless they are, but then they aren't manifestations or forms of a nature (unless it be in the sense of a Form or Idea--but the Forms are not forms; they're intelligible, not sensible).

The word nature is used in English in two different ways which were not created by me. Nature can refer to the existing realm but it can also refer to the basic or inherent qualities of things: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nature

In that sense, I see no contradiction in what I said. If you think it is confusing to use the same word for two different things then that is fine but it is a problem of the language and not what I am saying. Things have inherent qualities, those compose their nature. Nature is also the the word for all existing phenomena. Therefore I am using the word in both ways.

I have no problem with that; I've adhered to Strauss's distinction between nature in the distinctive and in the non-dinstinctive sense all along. Could our miscommunication be due to a difference between British and American English, though? For I'd rather subscribe to this dictionary entry: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nature

Sauwelios wrote:There is no absolute divide between ancient and modern science. Breeding, if not training, was already a kind of "technology", yes. The difference is that pre-modern dog breeders always wanted to breed dogs; they never wanted to have their dogs evolve into a different species. This is not necessarily because they wouldn't want that, but because they didn't think about it that way. To them, a dog was a dog was a dog. There was supposed to be something like "dog nature" (and before that, "the dog way". The concept "way" was no less absolute than nature, it just didn't distinguish between eternal and temporary ways: our way, the way of the ancestors, was considered as necessary as, say, the way of the Sun (of whom Heraclitus says he will be pursued and persecuted by the Erinyes if he crosses his bounds)). To late moderns or post-moderns, there are no natures, just ways--and God, the Avenger, is dead! This came about through the modern project which involved manipulating for the sake of human nature the natures of all other things. Consider that Descartes still (exoterically) taught that, while animals were machines, human beings were not. A century later, human beings, too, were considered machines.

Some may think that there are no natures, but I am arguing that there are.

Would you care to demonstrate how human beings being machines means that they no longer have a nature and is not rather, if anything, indicative that what we took to be the nature of humans before was not rather false or merely incomplete?

A machine is just a configuration of parts. What we call a "coffee machine", for instance, is not in itself a coffee machine; it's just a configuration of parts, but we call it a coffee machine because it was designed and built to make coffee. Now unless you believe in an intelligent designer behind, say, dogs and humans, these too are just configurations of parts, with no inherent purpose. We can endlessly reconfigure them, for our own purposes or just for fun.

Sauwelios wrote:

Re: Orange — The phenomena we refer to as physical laws, I agree is nature, but again I disagree that they are all there are to nature. I touched on this above in relation to manifestations, but I will relate it to what you say about whims. Let us say that what we refer to as physical laws turn out to be whimsical (I am taking this that you mean in some way capricious), I would still hold their former manifestations to be part of nature, as well as their whimsical character (as well as any manifestations that character brought about) to be so.

Well, I would hold their manifestations to be part of nature as a whole--i.e., in the non-distinctive sense--, whereas I would hold their whimsical character to be the nature of nature--i.e., nature in the distinctive sense.

Don't you see that you also use nature in its two distinct senses? The first, which you called nature as a whole, refers to definition 1 in the Oxford link I provided above and what you called the nature of nature refers two definition 2...

I know. I think it's rather you who only see that now.

Sauwelios wrote:But then what is the difference between the nature of the cat and the nature of the dog? Then the nature of the cat entails the propensity to metamorphose, e.g., become a dog (e.g., if a dog eats a cat, at least some of the cat will become the dog, whereas the rest becomes dog excrement and leftovers). The propensity to metamorphose is universal; the propensity to bark and wag the tail is not. Your "nature", methinks, is simply the universe, which can manifest as cats and dogs and many other things. [Added later: Your "nature" is, methinks, not the universal cat or dog, but the universal universal...]

You want me to enumerate the differences between cats in physical features and behavioural traits? Cats are solitary animals whereas dogs are pack animals, they both have different skeletal structures, cats are physically built more numble and have stealthy behaviour whereas dogs are built to run for longer periods of time, cats are carnivores whereas dogs are omnivores, cats have retractable claws whereas dogs do not... You know you could research the distinctive traits of dogs and cats if you wished to. Also, it is not merely the presence of specific features taken alone but their co-existence which entails their classification.

The propensity to metamorphose is universal, yes. That is why I said that all manifestations partake in that which manifests, you call it the universe, but you could also look at it as what is scientifically looked at as the building blocks of the universe, so maybe not just atomic particles but space as well (in that particles are separated and move in space).

I didn't want you to enumerate the differences between cats and dogs. As for particles in space, that is unthinkable. If there's nothing in between the particles, then there's nothing in between the particles. If there's something between them, then particles are not the most basic building blocks. Actually, I think "building blocks" are unthinkable, for then it would be like the kind of puzzle where you have say eight tiles in a grid of three by three, which you have to slide around to see the image. The universe would then be like a grid of x by y (where the variables may be equal and may be infinite) from which no tile is missing, so they cannot be slid around. Anyway, this is just an idea I had; I don't think it's pertinent to our discussion.

In regard to your "methinks", what is the point you are making regarding what I am describing as nature?

That it's everything and nothing.

Sauwelios wrote:

It might also be worthwhile for this discussion to get to the bottom of exactly what is meant by conquering?

In the first place, mastering, but then that becomes making the natures of all things dependent on man--including the nature of man.

"Actually, it is for the sake of a certain part of human nature that [/i]other[/i] parts of human nature are being conquered. In fact, it was also that part, and not the whole of human nature, for whose sake the conquest of non-human nature was promoted in the first place. It is what Nietzsche would call the human, all too human part or the herd animal part. In other words, the 'humanist' part." (http://www.thinkhumanism.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?t=6920)

In this case I would stand by my saying that we have not conquered nature because nature is not dependent on man because man is formed of nature (in the sense of definition 1) and imbued with the qualities (definition 2) by nature (definition 1).

Sure, he is imbued with those qualities by Nature, and we cannot conquer Nature, but we can conquer those qualities. We can disimbue him with those qualities or imbue him with new qualities. We can play Deus sive Natura in that regard.

On top of that, when man seeks to change natures (definition 2), man defers to nature (definition 1) for the proper methods of such action and so is bound by nature (definition 1) not only in his own qualities (definition 2) which guide and activate his will but also the nature of the methods (definition 2) by which he must act to produce any effect whatsoever.

Yes, but isn't this like saying that a son can never usurp his father's throne because he'd have to do so with qualities with which he was imbued by his father? A man with blue eyes can breed people, including himself and his offspring, so as to have no more blue eyes.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, in my view, the fact that it's not really a conquest of nature but only of something formerly called nature, does not make it any less problematic. Perhaps what is conquered is precisely the pre-modern conception of nature.

But we have not conquered the pre-modern conception of nature either because the pre-modern conception of nature was a word used to describe that which is unchanging. That we before took to be unchanging those things which were subject to change does not mean we have therefore conquered nature but that we took to be nature that which was not so.

Well, then we have conquered what we took to be nature. We can no longer take it to be nature, whereas we could for a long time.

Sauwelios wrote:

[snipped]

I am not sure if we are getting our meanings crossed (or are in danger of doing so). Perhaps we had better tread carefully to at least be sure we understand each other.

""Idea" of the madman is still that of a man who does crazy things." — Yes, I think that is what I mean (though I haven't personally used the term "idea", I am prepared to accept it tentatively if it will help us understand each other. Please allow for that difference).

"But then that's just an idea, with no physical reality. And this is precisely what the conquest of human nature is about: bringing it about that the "crazy" other type is no longer a physical reality (and certainly no longer an ideal!)" — here is where either you lose me, or we diverge. I am on board that it is (at least hypothetically, or for the sake of our discussion, because it hasn't been done in the realm of reality) possible to get rid of the crazy type entirely, so that it no longer manifests as a physical reality, but I do not think this contradicts what I am and have been saying as it seems you are saying. The crazy type, to my mind, would still exist as a historically manifested phenomena.

Yes, it would still exist in the past. But this is not good enough. Heraclitus as a one-time event is only good enough for Heraclitus--our past is his present. Even if the eternal recurrence is a fact, that may mean there won't be "another" Heraclitus for nine zillion years.

What you have said here makes no sense in the context. We were discussing whether there was a nature of the madman based on the definition that a madman is callsed so because he does crazy things. You said that if a madman was cured and there were no more madmen then "madman" would simply be an idea and not a physical reality. I said that the physical reality would exist as a past manifestation and so the nature of the madman would continue to be the same, but the nature would itself be that which describes the past manifestation.

In what way is that "not good enough". It makes no difference if Heraclitus will never recur in regards to saying that Heraclitus had a nature and it would be revealed in his past manifestation.

My girlfriend loves cats, not in the least because they are, as she puts it, "silly". But what if cats are genetically "cured" so as to no longer be silly? if the silliness is bred out of them? Then she, or someone like her in the future, will like cats considerably less; they will no longer be good enough to give her the amount of delight they give her now (other things being equal). And it would hardly be a consolation if I, or someone like me in the future, then told her they had at least been silly in the past, and might be silly again in nine zillion years.

Sauwelios wrote:

But I suppose I should also respond to this in another way, because you are making a statement about the conquest of nature. Are you saying the conquest of nature is being practiced when certain types are done away with? If that is so then I would say that my original position still stands — that I do not see such a thing as a conquest (or conquering) of nature insofar as it was always inherent in nature to do away with manifested types (for example earlier forms on the evolutionary chain), and part of the nature of manifestations to be transmutative. This aside from my assertion that our own behaviour is formed of nature making our actions something like the bidding of nature rather than its master.

"The most concerned ask today: 'How is man to be maintained?' Zarathustra however asketh, as the first and only one: 'How is man to be surpassed?'
The Superman, I have at heart; that is the first and only thing to me--and not man[.]" (Zarathustra 4, "The Higher Man" 3.)

I think the question political philosophy seeks to answer is: "How is the Superman to be maintained, or attained again?" For:

"The problem I thus pose is not what shall succeed mankind in the sequence of living beings (--man is an end--): but what type of man shall be bred, shall be willed, as being more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future.
This more valuable type existed often enough in the past: but as a happy accident, as an exception, never as something willed. Rather, it has been precisely the most feared; hitherto it has been almost the frightening;--and out of that fright the opposite type has been willed, bred, attained: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick human animal,--the Christian...

"Mankind does not represent an development toward something better or stronger or higher, the way it is believed today. 'Progress' is merely a modern idea, that is to say, a false idea. The European of today remains far inferior in value to the European of the Renaissance; further development is altogether not by any necessity elevation, enhancement, strengthening.
In another sense, constant success in individual cases occurs in the most widely different parts of the earth and under the most widely different cultures, in which cases a higher type does indeed manifests itself: something which, in relation to collective mankind, is a kind of Superman. Such happy accidents of great success have always been possible, and will perhaps always be possible. And even whole dynasties, tribes, peoples may occasionally represent such a bull's-eye." (Nietzsche, The Antichrist, sections 3-4. Note that the word translated as "represent" and "manifest" is one and the same, and so is the word translated as "case" and "accident".)

Sorry for quoting at length. Note the "perhaps", though...

I understand Nietzsche's position, but why do you pose that in response to the quote you gave of mine?

I hope to have made that more clear by the example I just gave about cats. Your original position does not make the loss of cats' silliness, or of (the possibility) of such bull's-eyes, any better.

Sauwelios wrote:"Nietzsche does not deny that there is a nature of man, though of course he denies that it is timeless or even that it is now unalterable: the very threat to human nature in one of its forms requires that Nietzsche act." (Lampert, op.cit., page 105.)

In regard to this bolded part. This is very similar to my position, with the clarification that I am saying that the alterability is part of the nature of manifestations insofar as manifestations share in the nature of that which is becoming manifested. The latter part I have less to say about. But I think the wording "in one of its forms" indicates another significant similarity with my position.

Sauwelios wrote:What Lampert means there is one of the two natural human types.

"At issue is the great Nietzschean theme of the genealogy of conscience, the history of morals that lays bare our spiritual past as the conflict between an instinct to obedience and an instinct to command. These two instincts define the two basic types of human beings and the two different moralities that fit or belong to them. [...] Though they were always a threat, the exceptions were nevertheless esteemed because they were useful for the common good of the tribe as its fearless leaders and defenders. [...] Strauss's essay has shown that nature has become a problem because of the conquest of human nature in a very precise sense, namely, elimination of one of the two natural human types. The Baconian-Cartesian technological conquest of nature is only a means, if an indispensable means, to the achievement of the ideal of the large majority, universal comfortable self-preservation, which makes the other type expendable." (Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, pp. 73-74, 104-05.)

I disagree with Lampert on this, then, in a different way. I do not see that the trait of humanity to command and dominate will be extinguished through scientific progress. The desire for humans to always want more will continue in those of the dominating type. Even if you look at the actually existing communist system, which would be as close to the manifestation of a society of last men, there was still the dominating class. The only reason that communism became practicable was because it was transformed into a system led by elites and ultimately a hierarchy.

Well, the ideal of true Marxian Communism is still alive and well, and according to Fixed Cross even Hillary and the like are essentially Marxist. It is, then, I think, Marx or Nietzsche. Anyway, you seem to say here that you don't think the trait to command and dominate can be extinguished from humanity. That it cannot be bred out, genetically/nanotechnologically etc. engineered out (see Hedonistic Transhumanism).

Sauwelios wrote:

I am not sure that I agree with you that man is more conscious of doing nature's transformative work. Please notice I used the words "not sure", because it depends on what you mean by the consciousness of doing that work. The reason I become doubtful is because I do not think that many, and particularly not many of the mass who have learned from the popular diffusion of scientific knowledge, know that they are nature's vassals in the way that I mean.

No, certainly not nature's vassals. They think of it as being nature's conquerors. But in reality it's a case of the bondsmen "conquering" the conquerors and their vassals. And where is the priest in all this?...

Again, I am not sure what you mean by the first part, bringing in the word "bondsmen", and what you are suggesting by the bondsmen conquering the conquerors and their vassals... And what are you asking about the priest, if the priest is conscious of being nature's vassal?

I was referring to the tripartite social structure of the Germanic Middle Ages. The philosophers would be disguised among the priests; the conquerors and their vassals would be noblemen; and the common people would be peasants or bondsmen. I was trying to suggest that the noblemen belonged to the commanding type, the peasants to the obeying type, and that it's less clear to what type the priests and the philosophers belonged. The priests often came from the nobility, and yet they were to be servants of God whereas the philosophers are servants of nature.

"How doth this happen! So did I ask myself. What persuadeth the living thing to obey, and command, and even be obedient in commanding?" (Zarathustra, "Self-Surpassing", Common trans.)

Sauwelios wrote:

Even if we have a difference here, I feel reluctant to add this because it seems such a small quibble that it might be fruitless really to go into it. The reason I do not think that many (much less man as a whole or type) are conscious of doing nature's work is because, as I understand it, being these vassals (rather than masters) renders us by definition, to a degree, unconscious of the work we are doing. I am not sure that most people are aware that they are unaware of what they are truly doing (even when they have something of a clear account of the form and content of their behaviour and context), much less would want to accept such a notion if proposed to them.

Yeah, imagine they found out they'd been doing nature's dirty work while thinking they were conquering her!

But that is what I am proposing. Do you not also think it is the case? When humans set out to conquer nature, do you think they imagined that the state of the modern world would be what they were labouring for? Take the example of cars for instance, what they were made for, in what way to "alleviate" man's estate, and how they have completely transformed our environment and also added the burden of maintaining them. Another example would be the event of the atomic bomb. I think it is fair to say that we were to a large degree unconscious of what we were really accomplishing in that regard and possibly all other human pursuits.

We could also look at it in a more concrete or elementary way. When any human has a thought or idea, where does it come from? To save time, I would hazard to say that it bubbles forth from somewhere in our unconscious mind but such would indicate that we are not really in control of exactly what or even when a particular idea bubbles forth, not to mention our unconscious mind is again composed by the evolutionary process which stems from a nature prior to the will of man...

I have no gripe with any of this.

Sauwelios wrote:

I do not think that Glaucon could have been. I think there was something distinct in the natures of Thrasymachus and Glaucon. I am very frustrated that I am not quite able to give you direct references to texts and I do not like that you would have to take my word for things, but I think at this point exegetical issues are really side issues to the real discussion under way, so, for my part, I ignore my frustration. I can only say that there is a very telling quote in Socrates early conversation with Thrasymachus when Thrasymachus asks Socrates what he is saying and Socrates responds with something like, I am saying what you are saying. If I remember correctly the words are even contextually jarring by the way the discussion continues. On the other hand, Glaucon's reaction to Thrasymachus's speeches is to say that he is not convinced by Thrasymachus, that he thinks justice is what is best and then wants to be convinced of it by Socrates. In this way, Glaucon plays the role of the listener who is told what he wants to hear, and it is a display for the knowing Thrasymachus.

Yes, but Socrates is not really saying what Thrasymachus is saying, at least not to Glaucon et al.

I am not sure that I get what you are saying. Socrates is not saying it to Glaucon because Glaucon is not of the same nature as Thrasymachus is.

What I mean is, to Glaucon it may indeed seem as if Socrates is saying what Thrasymachus is saying, but Thrasymachus comes to see that that is not the case. Socrates tells Glaucon that justice is indeed to his (Glaucon's) advantage and that he is the stronger (a strong, philosophical guard-dog). Thrasymachus on the other hand sees that Glaucon is duped and that doing so is to his (Thrasymachus') advantage and that he is stronger than Glaucon (wise, like Socrates). Before that insight, Socrates is wiser than Thrasymachus, not with regard to philosophy but to political philosophy--the right politics for philosophy at that point in time. The crux of that politics was a compromise with stupidity, with the Glaucons--philosophers donning the robes of priests, of the just, the virtuous.

Sauwelios wrote:

I wouldn't deny the imperfections of Charmides, I just think that his nature made him a different kind of audience to Socrates that Glaucon was. The failure of Socrates is not necessarily Socrates' fault, but the indication of the nature of his audience is telling.

Since you think that Socrates wasn't training tyrants, I am wondering what you think a philosopher king would be? A tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by law. This is again why I think the Statesman is important, because that is again a significant aspect of Plato's teaching in the dialogue, that the ruler forms the laws from a position outside of the law.

I disagree if you're saying that's all a tyrant is. I think a tyrant is one who rules unconstrained by justice even more than by law. The problem with tyranny is not that the tyrant is above all, including the law, but that he is not rightfully so.

"The best regime is that in which the best men habitually rule, or aristocracy. Goodness is, if not identical with wisdom, at any rate dependent on wisdom: the best regime would seem to be the rule of the wise. In fact, wisdom appeared to the classics as that title to rule which is highest according to nature. It would be absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by any regulations; hence the rule of the wise must be absolute rule. It would be equally absurd to hamper the free flow of wisdom by consideration of the unwise wishes of the unwise; hence the wise rulers ought not to be responsible to their unwise subjects. To make the rule of the wise dependent on election by the unwise or consent of the unwise would mean to subject what is by nature higher to control by what is by nature lower, i.e., to act against nature. Yet this solution, which at first glance seems to be the only just solution for a society in which there are wise men, is, as a rule, impracticable. The few wise cannot rule the many unwise by force. The unwise multitude must recognize the wise as wise and obey them freely because of their wisdom. But the ability of the wise to persuade the unwise is extremely limited: Socrates, who lived what he taught, failed in his attempt to govern Xanthippe. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that the conditions required for rule of the wise will ever be met. What is more likely to happen is that an unwise man, appealing to the natural right of wisdom and catering to the lowest desires of the many, will persuade the multitude of his right: the prospects for tyranny are brighter than those for rule of the wise." (Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 140-41.)

The problem here is that Leo Strauss is either wrong in that quote or is purposely using the modern understanding of tyrant as opposed to the ancient understanding of tyrant. I think that the latter is completely possible because it seems unlikely that Strauss would be unaware of the ancient understanding of tyrant. Moderns take the word tyrant to be necessarily negative because we have come to think of it as the norm that there should be rule of law and equality of rights. Remember that Strauss adhered to the exoteric model of good and bad for the sake of his modern democratic audience.

Take this quote from Diogenes Laetius: "[T]he people looked up to him [Solon], and would gladly have had him rule as tyrant; he refused..." (Solon: I.49). If tyrant was understood in ancient times as necessarily unjust, how could it be said that the people would gladly have had a man they respected, and believed to be just, rule them as tyrant? The obvious answer is that in ancient times the designation did not automatically refer to the justice of the regime in the same way as the modern understanding has come to take it because moderns take for granted that rule of law and equal rights are the norm.

About Solon, Wikipedia writes: "His reforms failed in the short term, yet he is often credited with having laid the foundations for Athenian democracy." Socrates lived in the Athenian democracy. By then, "tyrant" had already become a negative term: the only good tyrant would be one who endeavoured to establish a democracy. In a democracy, there would be no good use for a tyrant.

So I stand by what I said because the ancient use of the word tyrant did not automatically refer to the justice of the position.

Sauwelios wrote:

Charmides became a tyrant because it was in his nature, as I see it. But what makes you think that becoming so would be part of Glaucon's nature? As I mentioned above, in The Republic he is presented as one who wants to be convinced of the superiority of justice.

Behold, philosophy has become Socratic! What you see as the difference between Charmides and Glaucon is really the difference between Socrates' approach to their type before and after the Charmides. Charmides wasn't, or didn't have to be, such a bad kid.

Again, your assuming that tyrant necessarily meant something bad is a modern interpretation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Tyrants
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyrant

Sauwelios wrote:

[snipped]

I am not sure if this seems like something to merely quibble over. Wouldn't it be rather that the work of art that the one in position of dominion creates (so to speak) would simply be judged on its beauty, in the same way that we could point to pieces of more conventional art and evaluate them aesthetically, rather than whether the one in that position knows they are creating a work of art (because, as far as I can see, the latter wouldn't automatically cause a beautiful product, if you will allow those analogical terms).

I didn't say it had to be understood that way by the artist...

I didn't say you did. That was the point I was making, that one does not need to see it as art for it to be art.

I agree. However, I still think, as I wrote years ago, that something is only art if it's the communication of an inner state.

Sauwelios wrote:

The process I described above is part of eternal conversion. It is the reformation (or transmutation) of elements.

Do you think there are irreducible elements?

"He is described with great elegance as a little child, and a child for ever; for things compounded are larger and are affected by age; whereas the primary seeds of things, or atoms, are minute and remain in perpetual infancy." (Bacon, Wisdom of the Ancients, "Cupid; Or the Atom".)

I can only hypothesize about that, but I think there likely are. But as for describing the contours of them, such would only be an attempt in the same way as I have held our past explications of nature to be attempts.

Sauwelios wrote:I don't think tragic poet was a fulltime job in ancient Athens. I mean, wasn't Sophocles a general?

I filmed a(n attempt at a) thirteenth episode yesterday, and said something about this. Plato did not become or want to become a Dionysius.

If this part is worth discussing, I think we should get back to the original issue. The quote under question by Drury was "Strauss makes much of Socrates's charm and seductive qualities which enable him to lure beautiful and promising boys like Kleinias (not to mention Plato) away from politics and the family to a life dedicated to the philosophical eros."

Are you taking this "away from politics" to mean strictly that he did not want to become a politician, or that he did not want to engage in politics? I took it to mean the latter. If it is the latter then I was merely pointing out that it is not true because he did do so by trying to influence the tyrant Dionysius, as well as through his philosophical work. If we are saying that he did not become a politician then it is the case he did not become a politician. Though, we might add, there is no way of knowing that it was the influence of Socrates that made led him away from being a politician and that it was not rather in his nature to begin with to not become a politician.

Sauwelios wrote:It's Aristotelian. Though the caterpillar and butterfly forms both belong to the nature of the butterfly, the "flowering" (flourishing) butterfly is their nature in the sense of their telos.

Okay, I understand what you mean. By my formulation, I would still not say that the butterfly and caterpillar share the same nature. I would say it is in the nature of the caterpillar to become a butterfly through metamorphosis, but not that their distinct natures are the same.

The only difference between the first definition of nature and my own is that I am including humans in it, so yes I am using it as a synonym for universe of a sort.

Because you have read my messages I cannot edit them. To be clear, there is a difference between the concepts of nature and universe. Universe is a category referring to all phenoma taken together whereas nature (and in particular as I am using it) refers to the phenomena which comprises the universe as well features and way of that phenomena (I could use nature here, in the sense of definition 2, but I do not want to confuse things). We could not point at particular things and say that we see the universe in this thing (except perhaps metaphorically or poetically), because the universe is the category which comprises all things, whereas it is particularly by reference to manifest phenomena by which we establish nature and its contours.

In speaking about nature we are speaking about immanent phenomena, the features of phenomena, and its way. In speaking about the universe we are speaking in particular about the phenomena taken together. The only reason that they would be confused is because using the word nature doesn't as yet specify the phenomena under question. But when I say that we are vassals of nature I am not saying we are vassals of the universe because I am not saying that we are manifestations of the whole but manifestations of phenomena and it is the phenomena which we are manifestations of which provide us with our way, both in partaking of the qualities of that which manifests and in the formation that that which manifests takes.

Isn't everything connected, though?

Adding in edit: Re: Socrates teaching tyranny. Why do you think that Strauss says that philosophers had to hide their true teaching or else would be judged mad or criminal?

I'm reminded:

"The constant folly of the traditional mystic has been to be so proud of himself for discovering the great secret that the Universe is no more than a toy invented by himself for his amusement that he hastens to display his powers by deliberately misunderstanding and misusing the toy. He has not grasped the fact that just because it is no more than a projection of his own Point-of-View, it is integrally Himself that he offends!

Here lies the error of such Pantheism as that of Mansur el-Hallaj, whom Sir Richard Burton so delightfully twits in the Kasîdah with his impotence--

Mansur was wise, but wiser they who smote
....him with the hurlèd stones;
And though his blood a witness bore, no
....Wisdom-Might could mend his bones.

God was in the stones no less than within his turband-wrapping; and when the twain crashed together, one point of perception of the fact was obscured--which was in no wise his design!" (Aleister Crowley, Little Essays toward Truth, "Trance".)

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

It appears to me at this point that many of our differences are not so significant. It seems like some of our disagreements are arising from what we are implying rather than what we are saying.

Sauwelios wrote:I guess the problem I have is that it's not normative, just descriptive.

Here is an example of what I meant. I was not trying to make a normative statement by describing nature. I think this is the same with the discussion we were having first about madmen and in this post you brought up the silliness of the cat because I asked in what way is it not good enough. It just seems to me that we are speaking at different purposes. I wished to establish a description of nature and not the normative implications of it, which is again why I asked what that Nietzsche quote had to do with what you were quoting of me and in your latest reply you said that it should be clear in the example about cats and that it does not make the bulls-eye any better.

Are you saying that there is an issue with describing the world if it does not have a normative teaching? I don't mean this in any way confrontationally, I just don't think we are trying to discuss the same thing and if that is the case then we are destined to be locked in a number of disagreements that may not even be so. That is not to deny that we might disagree, only that if we continue speaking about different things then the nature of our disagreements may be illusory and I am not sure if it is worth our time to be chasing such phantoms.

Sauwelios wrote:Okay. I don't think this has anything to do with what I'm discussing. The formations we call human beings share equally in the nature of what is manifesting as do insects (to use that Kafka example again).

The latter is what I was saying. Is there then something I am missing and so failing to adequately respond to what you had intended? If you are saying that Kafka's insect would be an example of a contradiction of my description of nature then it would be my positition that Gregor Samsa was no longer human after he woke up as an insect.

Sauwelios wrote:A machine is just a configuration of parts. What we call a "coffee machine", for instance, is not in itself a coffee machine; it's just a configuration of parts, but we call it a coffee machine because it was designed and built to make coffee. Now unless you believe in an intelligent designer behind, say, dogs and humans, these too are just configurations of parts, with no inherent purpose. We can endlessly reconfigure them, for our own purposes or just for fun.

I had asked "Would you care to demonstrate how human beings being machines means that they no longer have a nature" — but now I want to know why you think that having no inherent purpose means that there is no nature of humans?

I do not believe there is an intelligent designer. The closest I would come to explicating a purpose to humans would be a posteriori looking at what humans have done, but I would not be fooled into believing that calling the history or fate of humans "purpose" was necessarily anything more than a rationalization rather than a discovery of some hidden meaning.

When you say we can reconfigure humans, perhaps you would also allow the word change, my impulse is to say what you had originally about dogs wagging their tail which is that after a certain degree of changes it might be more properly said that they are no longer of the nature which they were before. I still don't think we are conquering the nature of humans because we change their manifestations.

I am beginning to wonder if even some of this discussion is besides the point. When I am trying to defend the point that we have not conquered nature, I am not saying that science has therefore no results but merely that the results it does have shouldn't be considered conquering nature. I would take the point that such a quibble could be considered insignificant in relation to what humans are doing, in other words to say that asserting that humans have not conquered nature is far less ground-breaking than the development of modern science and what it can accomplish. Nonetheless I do think that the realization does have philosophical implications, most specifically that we are not the ones in control of our own impulses to create, that they arise from a source beyond ourselves. If this is the case it would dethrone the centrality of the human will.

Sauwelios wrote: As for particles in space, that is unthinkable. If there's nothing in between the particles, then there's nothing in between the particles. If there's something between them, then particles are not the most basic building blocks. Actually, I think "building blocks" are unthinkable, for then it would be like the kind of puzzle where you have say eight tiles in a grid of three by three, which you have to slide around to see the image. The universe would then be like a grid of x by y (where the variables may be equal and may be infinite) from which no tile is missing, so they cannot be slid around. Anyway, this is just an idea I had; I don't think it's pertinent to our discussion.

I am not sure if you wish to discuss this. Of course "building blocks" is just a metaphor so I am not going to argue about the necessity of its use. Also, I think that there is something between the particles even if we have to remain calling it space or if we can attach other qualities to it than what we normally consider mere space then so be it. I do not think that the universe is one substance anyway, which is to say I am not a monist.

Sauwelios wrote:

In regard to your "methinks", what is the point you are making regarding what I am describing as nature?

That it's everything and nothing.

Well as I said, nature refers to the phenomenon which comprises the universe, as well as the qualities of that phenomenon. If you wish to say that is nothing or argue the uselessness of the term or demonstrate how that makes my position on the conquering of nature defunct or any or all of those things then you may do so.

Sauwelios wrote:

In this case I would stand by my saying that we have not conquered nature because nature is not dependent on man because man is formed of nature (in the sense of definition 1) and imbued with the qualities (definition 2) by nature (definition 1).

Sure, he is imbued with those qualities by Nature, and we cannot conquer Nature, but we can conquer those qualities. We can disimbue him with those qualities or imbue him with new qualities. We can play Deus sive Natura in that regard.

Again this brings us back to what it means to conquer. We can change the qualities of man insofar as the nature of man is changeable. If we change man to a point where he is no longer human then we still have not conquered human nature because human nature, as I am saying, was only what had been changed and not the new being created.

As I said above, if you think this distinction is insignificant because what is taking place as a result of modern science has a far greater impact, I would accept that. I have not argued that what I am asserting is far more ground breaking than modern science. But in relation to this which I am quoting from you above, I would say it is not truly we who are playing "Deus sive Natura" but nature itself playing it through us. It is for that reason I think it is worth bringing up at all. We may laugh in glee at our power, but the caution of the ancient term hubris is still applicable because in making these changes we do not really know what we are doing, we do not know the consequences and we are not truly the ones sitting at the controls.

Sauwelios wrote:

On top of that, when man seeks to change natures (definition 2), man defers to nature (definition 1) for the proper methods of such action and so is bound by nature (definition 1) not only in his own qualities (definition 2) which guide and activate his will but also the nature of the methods (definition 2) by which he must act to produce any effect whatsoever.

Yes, but isn't this like saying that a son can never usurp his father's throne because he'd have to do so with qualities with which he was imbued by his father? A man with blue eyes can breed people, including himself and his offspring, so as to have no more blue eyes.

I do think there is a difference between speaking about nature and speaking about man and kingship. We cannot breed people to have no nature nor can we breed them to not be part of nature, composed of natural elements, or not subject to the laws of nature, whatever they happen to be.

Sauwelios wrote:

But we have not conquered the pre-modern conception of nature either because the pre-modern conception of nature was a word used to describe that which is unchanging. That we before took to be unchanging those things which were subject to change does not mean we have therefore conquered nature but that we took to be nature that which was not so.

Well, then we have conquered what we took to be nature. We can no longer take it to be nature, whereas we could for a long time.

That I do not disagree with. But to my mind, all it shows is that we had a false view of what nature consisted of.

Sauwelios wrote:Well, the ideal of true Marxian Communism is still alive and well, and according to Fixed Cross even Hillary and the like are essentially Marxist. It is, then, I think, Marx or Nietzsche. Anyway, you seem to say here that you don't think the trait to command and dominate can be extinguished from humanity. That it cannot be bred out, genetically/nanotechnologically etc. engineered out (see Hedonistic Transhumanism).

I understand that Marxism is not dead. I see its influence clearly in modern politics. I am saying that I don't think that the trait to dominate can be extinguished from humanity. I think that if there ever was a singularity as transhumanism predicts, rather than leading to an extinguishing of domination it will only usher in a new wave of it as those who are able to improve themselves will definitely dominate the others. If we then say that the dominators are technically no longer of the nature human and the humans are the dominated ones (ie. not at the top of the food chain, so to speak), then I could see the point. I am still sure that the humans which remained would find ways of dominating one another in minuscule ways, and in that sense the gene would not be bred out of them unless they were bred into something not quite human themselves, like automatons. And if we bred humans as automatons in such a way that they were no longer able to reason, in losing the capacity for reason could we really say that they are human?  Also, I don't think it is necessarily in the nature of humans to be at the top of the food chain (or whatever phrase would be more fitting). Or is that what you are saying, that the contextual position[s] of humans are part of their nature?

To be clear, I am not saying that the species human cannot be extinguished from existence. Even the obeying type actually has the dominating quality, isn't that what the Christian transvaluation of values was about? And in order for the Christians to maintain their position on top they needed to take on the qualities of the dominators. We need only look at the history of Rome to see it is so. Slavery was only abolished in the 19th century in Christian countries and even after that they continued to hold colonial empires and by the time the 20th century rolled around they were undergoing a transformation in their consciously held beliefs and coming up with new ways to dominate.

Being philosophically conscious of that quality of human nature is important but I don't think it is the fundamental issue of our work.

Sauwelios wrote:What I mean is, to Glaucon it may indeed seem as if Socrates is saying what Thrasymachus is saying, but Thrasymachus comes to see that that is not the case. Socrates tells Glaucon that justice is indeed to his (Glaucon's) advantage and that he is the stronger (a strong, philosophical guard-dog). Thrasymachus on the other hand sees that Glaucon is duped and that doing so is to his (Thrasymachus') advantage and that he is stronger than Glaucon (wise, like Socrates). Before that insight, Socrates is wiser than Thrasymachus, not with regard to philosophy but to political philosophy--the right politics for philosophy at that point in time. The crux of that politics was a compromise with stupidity, with the Glaucons--philosophers donning the robes of priests, of the just, the virtuous.

But I had already said that Socrates as well as Xenophon in his Hiero, wanted to teach the tyrants the way to rule properly. I am just not saying it was a "compromise with stupidity". What I am saying is that it was part of giving order to man by the differing qualities of individuals and groups.

Sauwelios wrote:About Solon, Wikipedia writes: "His reforms failed in the short term, yet he is often credited with having laid the foundations for Athenian democracy." Socrates lived in the Athenian democracy. By then, "tyrant" had already become a negative term: the only good tyrant would be one who endeavoured to establish a democracy. In a democracy, there would be no good use for a tyrant.

Yes, Solon was a democrat. The reason I quoted Diogenes Laertius was to show that the word tyrant was not used only with a negative implication but to indicate an absolute ruler.

If we change the quote's wording to what you had said tyranny was by definition it would have to read something like "[T]he people looked up to him [Solon], and would gladly have had him rule unconstrained by justice and not rightfully so; he refused..."

Again, the reason for me giving that quote was to show the word use. The people of Athens considered Solon just and so to say they would gladly have had him rule as a tyrant unconstrained by justice would be contradictory to what is being implied by saying that Athenians would have gladly accepted him as tyrant. Because they considered Solon to be naturally just, they believed that he could be a just tyrant. If one could use the words "just tyrant" in the ancient times it shows that the term did not automatically signify injustice or the phrase would be self-contradictory.

I don't disagree with you when you said that ancient democracy contributed to tyranny being considered a bad thing in the same way that modern democrats would automatically consider it a bad thing, but when I said that Socrates and his followers taught their pupils to be tyrants I meant that they taught them to be absolute rulers (as this was the original meaning of the word tyrant) and the ways in which one would order the polis wisely.

Sauwelios wrote:

Again, your assuming that tyrant necessarily meant something bad is a modern interpretation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Tyrants
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyrant

What is the point you are making by providing those links? I am not sure if you read the wikipedia page for Tyrant but it actually discusses what I have said about the term:

"The original Greek term, however, merely meant an authoritarian sovereign without reference to character,[3] bearing no pejorative connotation during the Archaic and early Classical periods." — and it was not me who put that in there.

***

Saully's mysterious former contact:

This is partly off-topic to the second degree. In regards to what you were saying about space and particles and me responding that I am not a monist. I might remind you that I haven't said what I take to be the fundamental grounds yet. Assuming by your responses that you are dissatisfied with my descriptions of nature because they are not normative, you may have a problem with what I call the grounds for the same reason, they are not immediately normative. As I said with regards to nature, first one would consider the grounds and then the implications of them.

***

Saully:

Sauwelios wrote:I guess the problem I have is that it's not normative, just descriptive.

Here is an example of what I meant. I was not trying to make a normative statement by describing nature. I think this is the same with the discussion we were having first about madmen and in this post you brought up the silliness of the cat because I asked in what way is it not good enough. It just seems to me that we are speaking at different purposes. I wished to establish a description of nature and not the normative implications of it, which is again why I asked what that Nietzsche quote had to do with what you were quoting of me and in your latest reply you said that it should be clear in the example about cats and that it does not make the bulls-eye any better.

Actually, I said it does not make the loss of (the possibility of) such bull's-eyes any better. I don't think this matters to what you're saying here, though.

Are you saying that there is an issue with describing the world if it does not have a normative teaching?

Well, if there's only will to power, there can be no description that's not (also) a prescription (prescriptive, normative). This is actually why willing the eternal recurrence is logically necessary for the philosophy of the will to power.

Sauwelios wrote:Okay. I don't think this has anything to do with what I'm discussing. The formations we call human beings share equally in the nature of what is manifesting as do insects (to use that Kafka example again).

The latter is what I was saying. Is there then something I am missing and so failing to adequately respond to what you had intended? If you are saying that Kafka's insect would be an example of a contradiction of my description of nature then it would be my positition that Gregor Samsa was no longer human after he woke up as an insect.

What you seem to be missing is the feeling that that is a problem.

"One day, Gregor Samsa, a traveling salesman, wakes up to find himself transformed into a giant insect (the most common translation of the German description ungeheuer Ungeziefer, literally 'monstrous vermin')." (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Metamorphosis#Part_I)

Sauwelios wrote:A machine is just a configuration of parts. What we call a "coffee machine", for instance, is not in itself a coffee machine; it's just a configuration of parts, but we call it a coffee machine because it was designed and built to make coffee. Now unless you believe in an intelligent designer behind, say, dogs and humans, these too are just configurations of parts, with no inherent purpose. We can endlessly reconfigure them, for our own purposes or just for fun.

I had asked "Would you care to demonstrate how human beings being machines means that they no longer have a nature" — but now I want to know why you think that having no inherent purpose means that there is no nature of humans?

Well, as Strauss wrote, "the nature of a being is its end" (Nietzsche essay, paragraph 33.) That's Aristotle, to whom Strauss refers there.

I do not believe there is an intelligent designer. The closest I would come to explicating a purpose to humans would be a posteriori looking at what humans have done, but I would not be fooled into believing that calling the history or fate of humans "purpose" was necessarily anything more than a rationalization rather than a discovery of some hidden meaning.

But Strauss speaks of the "discovery or invention" of nature. And as Voltaire said, if God didn't (doesn't!) exist, it would be necessary to invent Him. Deus sive Natura, but now in the distinctive sense of "nature". The nature of man, specifically.

Sauwelios wrote:

Again, your assuming that tyrant necessarily meant something bad is a modern interpretation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty_Tyrants
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tyrant

What is the point you are making by providing those links? I am not sure if you read the wikipedia page for Tyrant but it actually discusses what I have said about the term:

"The original Greek term, however, merely meant an authoritarian sovereign without reference to character,[3] bearing no pejorative connotation during the Archaic and early Classical periods." — and it was not me who put that in there.

The very next sentence reads: "However, it was clearly a negative word to Plato, a Greek philosopher [sic], and on account of the decisive influence of philosophy on politics, its negative connotations only increased, continuing into the Hellenistic period."

[Note that my correspondent never even read my last message.]